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Abstract 
The difference between Geographical Indication (GI) and generic food terms is an 
important and highly contentious issue in international negotiations. This distinction 
is of significant importance to producers, manufacturers, consumers, and policy-
makers all over the world because it means the difference between the restricted 
versus open use of certain popular terms in domestic and global markets. This thesis 
uses a food studies approach that employs cheese as a lens to understand the 
contested politics of Generic Geographical Indications (GGIs), which has been 
under-explored in the literature on GIs. Through case study and an analysis 
of written policy material and other documents, websites, blogs, artifacts, 
observations, and semi-structured interviews and discussions, it investigates the 
complex processes through which European and New World (NW) actors compete 
over the status – protected or generic - of cheese names, why this struggle is 
manifested in the case of Parmesan but not of Cheddar, and how we can better 
understand genericism within the context of GI policy. The thesis argues that actors 
guided by differing agricultural paradigms compete to secure the use of terms 
through oppositional discursive strategies of ‘gastro-panic’ where they appeal to a 
language of security in order to persuade policy-makers to take action against the 
perceived threatening actions of their opponents. It finds that unlike the contested 
term Parmesan no such panic has emerged surrounding Cheddar because its 
widespread use has not been interpreted as a threat to the ‘original.’ As well, 
genericism emerges as both a dynamic and socially-constructed concept subject to 
ongoing negotiation and contestation and a strategic discursive device used block the 
successful registration of proposed product names as GIs. The debate over cheese 
reveals the inherently political nature of the ways in which genuineness and 
genericness are constructed in an increasingly competitive marketplace. 
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Preface 
The inspiration for this thesis started with a pizza – the ‘Pizza Napoletana’, 
otherwise known for its ‘margherita’ variety. It is probably the most basic, 
minimalist, and recognizable type of pizza around the world. The ingredients consist 
mainly of a simple red tomato base, white mozzarella topping, olive oil, and bits of 
green basil and oregano, the colors of which are said to be reminiscent of the Italian 
flag. But it was not the ingredients, the preparation, or even the taste of this pizza 
that intrigued me but the contested use of its name, the authenticity of which 
individuals and groups had arisen to promote and protect.  
I first learned of the issues surrounding Pizza Napoletana in 2009 when it 
was protected as a Traditional Specialty Guaranteed (TSG) in the European Union 
(EU). The TSG certifies the traditional composition and recipe of a food or dish and 
does not restrict its production to any particular place of origin. This means that 
anyone in the EU can still use the name provided they produce their pizza according 
to a strict set of specifications outlined in an 11-page document on the True 
Neapolitan Pizza Association’s website. The catch is that the pizza’s ingredients 
must be derived from the Campania region of Italy and no substitutes may be used. 
Formal objections were raised by Germany and Poland to the protection of the name 
and an added irony was that even pizza-makers in Naples could not agree on what 
characterized the ‘real’ thing. 
I found this baffling, even downright frustrating. I thought about how over 
centuries foods have travelled with migrants across borders and represent a 
fundamental aspect of individual and collective identity and a connection to home. 
Foods have been fused and integrated into new local cultures and suited to local 
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tastes and ingredients. Italian cuisine is among the most successfully globalized 
foods in the world and pizza is its shining star. Every aspect of a pizza from its 
dough and toppings to its cooking methods varies around the world and certain 
regions have developed their own signature specialties. I wondered how anyone 
could possibly declare that there is only ‘one way’ to prepare a widely-produced type 
of pizza, why they were they so adamant about it, and how it was legitimate to 
restrict the use of the name.  
I became so intrigued to understand the motivations – cultural, economic, 
political, and otherwise – that fuelled this endeavor that I wrote my Master’s thesis 
on European food name protection schemes and made Geographical Indications 
(GIs) the focus of my PhD research. I started out a sceptic convinced that it was 
necessary to take a more critical approach to GIs than had thus far been the case. But 
like cheese, the composition of which changes and transforms over time, my own 
beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and opinions surrounding the topic over which you are 
about to read have also matured and changed. The writing of this thesis has not only 
been an intellectual but also a personal endeavor for me, something like a 
socialization process experienced through the research itself. It has also been a 
learning experience about my position within the debate. Thus, far from being 
‘merely’ a pizza, I came to realize that Neapolitan pizza is celebrated as an iconic 
symbol of Italian culture and it was this quintessential Italianness represented by the 
name that was worth fighting for, despite how absurd its protection seemed to me at 
the time. 
From the beginning I have been well aware of my own pre-conceived 
judgments, values, and preferences surrounding this topic and how one’s background 
can influence the ways certain issues are viewed and opinions formed. This stems, I 
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feel, from being born and raised in the United States, a country founded by 
immigrants that is often equated to a ‘salad bowl’ of intermingling food cultures 
derived from all over the world. At my house there was always a tub of grated 
organic US-produced ‘Parmesan’ innocently sitting in the refrigerator and my insight 
and appreciation of the complicated nature of this simple food product would not 
occur until much later. I was also raised as a vegetarian from birth and entered the 
world destined to have a unique relationship with what I eat. Over my lifetime the 
food I consume has evolved into something I love to grow, pick, harvest, preserve, 
purchase, prepare, and share. It is a subject I spend my days celebrating, 
contemplating, theorizing, writing, talking, and worrying about. This has also led me 
to take a particular stance on issues of food and agriculture that supports alternative 
food movements and more agro-ecological approaches to agriculture.  
I made it a point to subject my views to rational critical examination and 
realized quite quickly just how much they would be influenced. This is because it is 
difficult not to take a normative position in the GI debate. The protection of food 
names is a highly emotional issue and the position of each side has been likened to a 
religion to which followers submit with unquestioning devotion and opponents 
harshly critique. I found it hard not to be swept away by the passion and seriousness 
to which the artisanal cheese-makers I spoke with dedicated to a lifetime of making 
cheese. Viewing themselves as guardians of ancient and irreplaceable traditions, they 
likened the precision and care required to ‘raise’ the cheese as similar to looking 
after a baby. They professed their utmost pride in the quality, uniqueness, and even 
the nutritional value of their cheese. Contending that there was no other product out 
there like it, one cheese-maker declared that, “A person living with a small piece of 
Parmigiano can live all his life” (Personal interview, February 28, 2013). This was 
xiv 
 
contrasted with many of the representatives I spoke to representing the interests of 
generic cheese-makers and companies – business people wearing suits and ties who 
emphasized productiveness and commercial and market opportunities instead of the 
devoted daily transformation of milk into cheese. It would be tempting to want to 
protect the small cheese-makers unconditionally against their industrial counterparts. 
However, despite not having an affinity for the mass production of industrial 
cheeses, I realized that those who were fighting to protect their right to the use of 
cheese names did have a point. 
Taking both sides into consideration, I was determined to be as objective as 
was reasonably possible in my approach. It did not take me long to realize that 
objectivity is an idealistic vision unattainable for those who are involved in 
qualitative, interactive analyses. Regardless of the stance of the researcher, those 
with whom we come in contact with form and shape pre-conceived notions about us 
that affect their positions and responses to interview questions. Knowing that there is 
a great deal of tension between the EU and other countries on the GI and generic 
issue, upon contacting interviewees I made it a point to keep my national identity 
discreet in order to prevent any distortion of their perceptions of my motivations and 
responses to my research. But for those I spoke to I could never simply be a neutral 
“researcher.” The second I opened my mouth I became the “American researcher,” 
for better or for worse, which was made very clear in interviews I conducted with 
both European and non-European officials.  
For instance, one EU trade official I met with exclaimed, “I love to speak to 
Americans even more than the convinced or the converteds” (Personal interview, 
April 9, 2013) and an Italian Ministry of Agriculture official wondered with shock 
and amazement, “How did you, a woman from the US, become interested in the 
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topic and end up over here in Europe?” (Personal interview, February 22, 2013). He 
then proceeded to lecture me on how important it was to raise awareness of the GI 
concept in the US. I was immediately judged as coming from a country with 
appalling industrial food standards that European interviewees needed to “educate” 
about the subject, “prove” the worth of their position, and “persuade” to side with it.  
On the other side, the withholding of my nationality when approaching 
American interviewees resulted in hesitation, distrust, and suspicion of my motives. 
Upon starting a discussion with an American cheese association representative, the 
first issue she wanted to address had to do with “where I stood” on the generic issue. 
When I made it clear that I was doing academic research and was approaching the 
issue from an objective standpoint, she was not in any way convinced. Fearing that I 
had been swayed throughout the course of my studies in Europe, it was her job to 
gauge my intentions and ensure that I was in a position to fairly and accurately 
represent American dairy interests. It was not until the end of the interview that she 
revealed that by not making my Americanness immediately apparent, that she did 
not pass on my request for further interviews to colleagues and contacts and I 
therefore received few responses to interview requests. 
This was never intended to be a normative thesis and I have done my best to 
represent the perspectives of both sides in an equitably critical manner. Throughout 
the PhD process I have balanced the pro-protection and pro-generic camps on both 
shoulders and come to discover that neither side is wholly the angel, nor is either 
side wholly the devil. Each has important and good points to make and at the same 
time seems misguided and inflexible in others, which I have attempted to illustrate 
throughout the thesis.   
1 
 
First Course 
1. Introduction 
It was the best of cheese; it was the worst of cheese,  
It was traditional and artisanal; it was modern and industrial, 
Its name was protected; its name was generic, 
It was an epoch of the international harmonization of agri-food trade rules; it was an 
epoch of the fragmentation of agri-food trade rules… 
 
This thesis tells the story of two cheeses, Parmesan and Cheddar, and their 
position within a global dispute over the right to use particular food names in 
commerce. Similar in their state of being cheese, they differ in physical composition 
and circumstances. On the one hand is Parmesan – hard, granulated, and sold grated 
or in chunks. Declared by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be a translation of 
Parmigiano-Reggiano, the Parmesan name enjoys Protected Designation of Origin 
(PDO) status within the European Union (EU). At the global level a PDO is 
otherwise known as a Geographical Indication (GI), a sign used on goods that 
confers legal protection for the exclusive use of a product name to producer groups 
in a defined geographical area based on the assumption that a product’s uniqueness 
is the result of a symbiotic relationship between its geographical and cultural origin. 
This means that only those cheese-makers within a strictly-defined region of Italy 
who use particular ingredients and abide by an exacting recipe may call their cheese 
Parmesan, and anyone outside this region is forbidden from using the name to 
market their products. This is not yet the case in third countries and the EU would 
like to see Parmesan protected worldwide. However, a number of countries both 
within the EU and abroad have contested the decision to protect Parmesan and 
requested an international standard for the name on the basis that it is the generic 
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term for a type of cheese long produced in various territories. The use of the name 
Parmesan is a highly controversial issue and the debate remains at a standstill. 
On the other hand is Cheddar – smooth, hard, sometimes crumbly, rinded or 
in blocks, varying in color from off-white and yellowish or orange and intensity of 
taste from mild to extra-strong, sharp or mature. The name Cheddar has been 
uncritically assumed to have lost the link to its original location of origin within the 
United Kingdom (UK), rendering it un-protectable and open for use by anyone 
anywhere to market a certain type of cheese. A name like Cheddar may be referred to 
as a Generic Geographical Indication (GGI),
1
 a seemingly oxymoronic concept that 
describes a food name once used to designate a product’s geographic source that has 
over time been so widely used that it has lost the connection to its origin and become 
part of the public domain. Generic terms are the antithesis of GIs because they can 
be used by anyone, anywhere, at any time, and may not be privately owned. Under 
GI systems of protection, if a name is deemed generic it may never be registered in 
order to prevent the monopolization of common terms. However, in some cases 
generic terms may be incorporated into a compound GI that receives protection, such 
as ‘West Country Farmhouse [Cheddar]’ or ‘Orkney Scottish Island [Cheddar].’ 
Cheddar is a rare exception to GI rules and one of only a handful of product names 
permitted to be used generically with a geographical qualifier. Yet, there is no 
concrete evidence pointing to the institutionalization of Cheddar as a generic term.  
The cases of Parmesan and Cheddar are illustrative of the competing interests 
at stake within the debate over the protection of geographical food names, what 
happens when such attempts conflict with claims of genericity, and the ambiguous 
                                                          
1
 GGIs will also short-handedly be referred to as ‘generics.’ 
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and complicated nature of generic names.
2
 This issue is important because the 
generic use of geographical names has long been and continues to be one of the most 
contentious issues within the GI debate where the distinction between GI and generic 
terms is becoming an increasingly important issue in international negotiations. A 
claim of genericity is often the first line of defense against the proposed registration 
of a contested GI. And more than mere semantics, such a distinction is of significant 
importance to producers, manufacturers, consumers, and policy-makers all over the 
world because it means the difference between the restricted versus the open use of 
certain popular terms in domestic and global markets. The generic issue also reflects 
the concerns and preferences of different actors and institutions in various countries 
and is linked to larger, politically-charged debates surrounding the liberalization of 
agricultural trade, appropriate assistance for farmers and rural communities, the need 
to protect or preserve the use of certain terms in an open trading system, and the role 
of governments and the market. The conflict over generics will help shape the future 
of food marketing, trade, and the evolution of GI regulations and is of significance 
for the study of international trade and policy amidst the increasing globalization of 
food markets. Yet, despite these implications the topic of GGIs has received little 
academic attention.  
Considering its rising importance around the world, the lack of attention to 
the generic issue from scholars and analysts is surprising. This thesis seeks to fill this 
gap by using the dispute over cheese as a lens to generate more in-depth 
understanding of the international politics of generics within the GI debate. Its aim is 
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 ‘Genericism’ has various meanings and I employ a number of forms of the concept throughout this 
thesis. For one, it refers to the process whereby a formerly source-indicating term becomes generic. 
More specifically, I use it to refer to a set of ideas that serve as a legitimating strategy through which 
actors argue that certain food names within the GI debate are generic. Finally, genericity and 
genericness are used interchangeably to refer to the state or quality of being generic. 
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to deconstruct the complex rhetorical strategies and counter-claims processes 
employed by actors within the debate and makes an original interdisciplinary 
contribution to the multidisciplinary literature on GIs. Cheese presents a suitable 
product category through which to examine this phenomenon because their names 
are currently the most internationally contested. According to one United States (US) 
trade official “right now cheese is the big issue” (Personal interview, April 10, 
2013). Additionally, cheese is a fascinating product in its own right. Much like wine, 
it is more than just a simple everyday food. It arouses passion in those who produce, 
sell, and consume it and has been central not only to the diets but also the 
spirituality, culture, and political-economy of civilizations for millennia. Due to its 
keeping properties cheese has long been traded far and wide and well-known 
production processes and techniques have been embedded in different areas across 
the globe (Dalby 2009; Kindstedt 2012). In today’s world what a cheese is called is 
much more than what a cheese is called – it involves everything from how a product 
is perceived in consumers’ minds to how names and products are intertwined with 
everything from identity, culture, and the social relations of production within a 
territory to business, industrialization, and trade.  
1.2. Contestation and interests 
This thesis explores the struggle over GGIs between the EU and its ‘New 
World’ (NW) opponents because that is where the majority of recent tension has 
arisen. The GI debate is said to be distinct from other intellectual property conflicts 
that tend to pit countries in the ‘Global North’ against those in the ‘Global South.’ 
Instead, it is characterized as a conflict between the ‘Old’ and ‘New Worlds’ as 
developing countries have aligned themselves on both sides of the fence (WTO 
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n.d.).
3
 The issue began two decades ago when GIs entered the sphere of multilateral 
discussion during the Uruguay Round (UR) of trade negotiations and were 
institutionalized in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) as a type of intellectual property where they are defined as “sign[s] 
used on goods that have a specific geographical origin and possess qualities, 
reputation or characteristics that are essentially attributable to that place of origin” 
(WIPO n.d.). The Articles enshrined in TRIPS were born of political compromises 
intended to balance conflicting interests and resulted in hierarchical levels of 
protection for different GIs. As a concession to the EU a stronger level of global 
protection was afforded to wine and spirit designations. To appease NW countries a 
weaker level of protection was established for food and agricultural products. Certain 
exceptions were also included barring the protection of generics within individual 
Member territories. 
Since the TRIPS agreement was signed the EU and its allies have pushed for 
stronger global protection of food GIs, many of which are cheese names, and the 
creation of a legally-binding multilateral register in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). A primary motive for such moves has been “to prevent more geographical 
indications from becoming generic” (TRIPS Council 2001) as a result of improper 
overuse around the world. The EU considers the generic use of GIs in non-EU 
countries to be akin to counterfeiting and a threat to legitimate producer rights in the 
areas of origin. This is because once a term becomes generic its geographical 
distinctiveness is lost, its reputation eroded, and the owners lose the right to have it 
legally protected. The EU and its producers have a targeted interest in the success of 
extension endeavors because GIs like Parmesan and West Country Farmhouse 
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 Perspectives of NW countries to be explored in this thesis include the US, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Argentina.  
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Cheddar carry considerable economic and cultural value. They are also considered to 
be important tools to protect consumers and help marginal producers compete in a 
more globalized market environment. In addition, GI schemes are a fundamental 
element of European food and agricultural quality policy and over a thousand food 
product names have already been registered. But the EU has consistently faced stern 
resistance from many NW countries who consider extra protection for foodstuffs to 
be unwarranted and view GIs as unnecessary and unfair market interventions. NW 
actors fear that if this higher protection were to be realized they would be forced to 
relinquish countless terms used to market food products.  
In recent years as no substantive progress has been made to extend protection 
at the multilateral level, the EU has made attempts to reclaim or ‘claw back’ the 
exclusive use of many widely-used product names through various proposals, 
bilateral, and ‘Stand Alone’ trade agreements to prohibit others around the world 
from using certain terms that originated in Europe. Several NW countries have 
already reluctantly given up the generic use of valuable wine and spirit terms 
through bilateral agreements, often in exchange for benefits such as greater market 
access. For example, the EU negotiated the phasing out of the use of numerous wine 
and spirit terms (such as Burgundy, Champagne, Chianti, Port, and Sherry etc.) with 
South Africa in 1999 (Europa 2002), Canada in 2003 (Government of Canada 2004), 
the US in 2006 (Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Trade Bureau 2005), and Australia in 
2008 (Australian Government 2010). But the EU has also begun incorporating 
protection for food GIs in more current negotiations. Cheeses have featured 
prominently in these attempts in part because they account for the largest single 
category of food GIs in the EU with 216 registered [see Appendix A] and represent 
the highest valued category of food products (Chever et. al. 2012: 8). The EU’s 
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moves are highly controversial because some of the names they are looking to 
protect are considered generic, or open to public use, in other countries. In the 
multilateral context generic use was cited as having “the potential to cause the 
greatest unease in negotiations for increased international protection” of GIs (Evans 
and Blakeney 2007: 283, emphasis added) and this continues to be the case.  
An interesting feature of the generic issue is that it only affects a small 
number of terms. But these are terms that resonate very strongly with a large number 
of actors given their widespread use and “they are the ones that have a big impact” 
(Personal interview, April 9, 2013b). NW actors have a focused interest in generic 
names because they are widely-used, recognizable, and highly valuable commercial 
and marketing resources for communicating product information. This is particularly 
the case where cheese is concerned and over time it has become typical in various 
countries to define cheeses not by areas of origin but according to generic types or 
styles – Asiago, Cheddar, Gorgonzola, Gruyère, Parmesan etc. – in composition and 
method of production, which conflicts with European attempts to secure protected 
designations for many of these names. There are also international cheese standards 
mandated by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) that suggest the 
genericness of particular cheese names, some of which the EU is attempting to 
register and could potentially protect in future trade agreements. In response to these 
moves NW resistance has turned into outright hostility and dairy industries in 
countries all over the world have issued a call to arms and launched a number of new 
initiatives and consortiums to counter what they perceive to be a European threat to 
their legitimate right to use generic cheese terms in commerce.  
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1.3. Globalization and the dairy industry 
The dispute over generics must also be situated within the recent history and 
context of the globalization of the world food economy, which has been one of the 
most important factors in driving the international protection of and backlash against 
GIs. Food has travelled across regions, countries and continents throughout history; 
however many have argued that we are witnessing a new phase in the global 
regulation of food that is characterized by an increased “pace and scale of change 
and the systematic manner in which it is executed and organized” (Lang 1999: 170). 
This is marked by a shift towards the liberalization of markets and dismantling of 
national institutional and regulatory structures in food and farming sectors (Ufkes 
1993), more flexible and extra-local systems of production, calls for greater market 
access and competitiveness, the corporate pursuit of higher profits around the world, 
and new forms of international food governance and harmonization through 
institutions such as the WTO (McMichael 1992, 2005, 2009). Here, dominant 
discourses championing the free market rule and states are told to open up their 
markets or risk jeopardizing their long-term food security and ending up WTO non-
compliant.  
Food and agriculture remain highly sensitive subjects in international 
negotiations where they have been deemed the “ultimate deal-breaker” (Broude 
2005: 4) and are at the heart of the collapse of numerous multilateral trade talks. In 
fact, Broude (2005: 4) states that around “40% of the disputes initiated in the WTO 
relate to edible products.” Calls for liberalization are underscored by a persistent 
refusal of the EU and US to significantly reduce subsidies and widen access to their 
markets. And it is these two major agricultural powers that have been spearheading 
the opposing sides in the generic debate. There is evident tension over global power 
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in the food system and the WTO is becoming increasingly marginalized as the world 
fractures into competing groups with opposing world views on how the international 
food and agricultural economy should be governed and regulated.  
The dairy industry is a notable example of these trends and in recent years 
there has been a shift towards domestic and international trade liberalization and 
policy reform (OECD 2004).
4
 A hugely important industry, dairy has traditionally 
been and in many cases continues to be one of the most heavily protected 
agricultural sectors in most countries around the world (OECD 2004: 4). The 
justification for this distinctiveness and substantial protection is based on the 
industry’s sensitivity to economic changes, the perishable nature of milk, high 
employability and labor intensiveness of milk production, large prevalence of 
“small-scale producers,” strength of dairy “cooperatives,” and its perceived 
importance for maintaining and developing the countryside (Douphrate et. al. 2013: 
188-89). In order to shield domestic producers and consumers from international 
market fluctuations, governments have intervened through the use of import tariffs 
and restrictions, income and price supports, production quotas, the purchase, storage 
and disposal of surpluses, and export subsidies. But such practices have been 
criticized for negatively impacting international trade and prices, distorting 
competition, and leading to overproduction, chronic surpluses, and the import-
dependence of developing countries. There are attempts to phase out many of these 
practices following commitments institutionalized in multilateral agreements; 
however results have varied (Langley et. al. 2003; Friedmann 1982, 1992, 1993; 
Dobson and Cropp 1995; Bailey 2005). To illustrate, European dairy policy is 
increasingly taking a more market-oriented approach. Once the biggest spender of all 
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 By the dairy industry I am referring to the agricultural sector dedicated to the production and 
processing of all milk-based products, including cheese. 
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WTO members (de Gorter, Ingco, and Ruiz 2002: 4), the EU has significantly 
reduced its export subsidies (Muhammad and Kilmer 2008; Matthews 2012) and 
milk quotas are set to expire in 2015 (Defra 2008). Nevertheless, many barriers 
remain. 
Though many processed products may be included under the umbrella of the 
dairy industry, cheese is currently the reigning champion and more is being produced 
and traded than ever before (OECD 2004). Major players in the global cheese trade 
in order of volume include the EU, US, New Zealand, and Australia, but dairy 
production is increasing in other countries as well (Hollister 2013). At the top, the 
EU and US “dominate global cheese production with a two-thirds share of the total. 
Together they are responsible for 55% of expected additional cheese output” 
(OECD/FAO 2011: 164). With consumption levels of cheese in more developed 
markets saturating, many multinational companies and producers have set their 
sights further afield and are jockeying to secure a wedge of new markets.
5
 Global 
demand for cheese is rising significantly, driven primarily by changes in 
consumption and emerging markets in countries such as China and other parts of 
Asia (Chappatta 2011; Yu and Liu 2012; Han 2013). And with the appearance of a 
widening consumer base it is no secret that the power of food names to differentiate 
adds value in the global marketplace. Thus, cheese is shaping up to be an 
increasingly lucrative yet highly competitive global market as previous importers, 
such as the US, have become strong net exporters (Stephenson 2013).  
Despite a potentially optimistic outlook these changes are occurring at a 
rapid, and for some, disturbing pace. Globalizing processes have profound and 
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 According to Zenith International (2008), “Global demand for dairy products has risen by 15% from 
40.9 million tonnes in 2003 to an estimated 47.0 million tonnes in 2008” – with cheese commanding 
the biggest share. 
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complex political, economic, and cultural effects on food systems that are 
exacerbated by changes in domestic and international policies and agreements. For 
many, this reality has been difficult to swallow. The appearance of dairy farmer 
protests is a regular occurrence in European news where powerful media images 
display hordes of tractors descending on Brussels and disrupting traffic, fresh milk 
being dumped and sprayed at police forces, and herds of sheep being marched 
through cities such as Paris to contest the market volatility, low milk prices, and high 
costs of animal-rearing that is forcing small farmers out of business. And no one can 
forget when French farmer Jose Bové led a group of demonstrators in the 
dismemberment of a McDonald’s in France in part as a protest against an exorbitant 
US import tax on Roquefort cheese that was levied in retaliation for France’s refusal 
to import hormone-treated beef, and in part against the hegemony of capitalism and 
its negative effects on farmers and consumers (Diamond 2001; Northcutt 2010). 
Elsewhere in the world such as in Canada, farmers have marched on Parliament to 
draw attention to the negative consequences that would be wrought on family dairy 
farms if certain international trade deals are signed. And in the US dairy farmers are 
speaking out against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. But it is 
not only milk farmers who are affected, cheese sales also respond to fluctuations in 
global prices and, “Unlike milk, which is seen as a staple, cheese is regarded as a 
luxury, and sales tend to drop off dramatically during a recession” 
(Cendrowicz 2009) and can have disastrous effects on producers.  
Consequently, it is not only financial gain but also jobs and livelihoods that 
are at stake within the continuous globalization of food industries and the insecurities 
of producer groups can be mobilized and have powerful effects on policy-making. In 
the EU, institutionalized mechanisms such as GI schemes are viewed as one means 
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of insulating producers from the potentially harsh effects of adaptation and 
competition wrought by more open markets and are an integral aspect of European 
food policy. However, for others they are seen as nothing more than an insidious 
form of trade protectionism.  
1.4. Research questions 
This thesis addresses three main research questions designed to increase the 
understanding of the politics of GGIs: 
 First, how and why are European and NW actors competing over the status – 
protected or generic – of cheese names? 
 Second, why is this struggle manifested in the case of Parmesan but not of 
Cheddar?  
 Third, how can we better understand genericism within the context of the GI 
debate? 
1.5. Arguments 
As well as broadening the understanding of genericism within GI policy and 
challenging the tacit assumptions associated with it, this thesis aims to demonstrate 
how a broader framing of discursive and rhetorical processes gives a more 
sophisticated reading of the relationship between food production and forces such as 
globalization. It does so by sufficiently addressing the research questions, which are 
driven by three main arguments. First, I contend that the debate over food names has 
gained additional salience in the multilateral arena because it has been framed by 
parallel discursive processes of ‘gastro-panic’ concerning the threatening effects of 
the protection of food names on the one hand and their generic use on the other. 
Here, European and NW actors compete by using language to persuade relevant 
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audiences of the need to take action against a perceived threat through policy 
changes or other arrangements in order to secure the exclusive or open use of terms. 
In doing so they also frame their arguments in ways that are consistent with 
particular agricultural ‘paradigms,’ which are naturalized worldviews encompassing 
shared ideas, values, and norms that shape how actors identify problems in the agri-
food sector and ways to address them, such as through the conferral or invalidation 
of exclusive rights. These international actors are not only motivated to secure access 
to the use of cheese names purely for profit-maximizing purposes but also in order to 
maintain a sense of security amidst the perceived insecurity brought about by the 
increasing globalization of dairy industries, trade, and international norms and 
regulations.   
Second, I argue that the appearance of a gastro-panic is dependent upon the 
active endeavors of actors invested in its success who are guided by differing 
worldviews that affect whether or not they perceive the outside use of a term to be a 
threat. Thus, no struggle has emerged surrounding Cheddar because its widespread 
use has not been interpreted as a threat to the ‘original.’ This is a result of its 
genericity being naturalized by producers and governments as indisputable fact or 
common sense and occurs within a market liberal context that preserves the openly 
competitive use of the term where any protectionist attempts to restrict it might 
otherwise be viewed as a threat. And third, I assert that within the GI context 
genericism may be understood in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it is a highly 
complex and unstable concept. Its definition, how it is measured, where, and in what 
context is still a matter of debate at national, EU, and multilateral levels. It is 
therefore a dynamic and socially-constructed concept subject to ongoing negotiation 
and contestation rather than a static condition that is determined with a confident 
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degree of objective evidence and finality. On the other hand, it may be used as a 
strategic discursive device aimed at blocking the successful registration of proposed 
product names as GIs. 
1.6. Gastro-panic 
Following from the research questions, the dispute over the protection or 
non-protection of cheese names is a negotiated and contested area within bilateral 
and multilateral discussions and current focuses alone are insufficient to understand 
the complexity of the contemporary GGI debate. GI regulations and their 
institutionalized generic exceptions are practical but also inevitably political, thereby 
warranting more in-depth examination of the discursive and rhetorical strategies 
involved in shaping the outcome of product statuses. Therefore, in this thesis I 
develop a theoretical framework that engages with the varied meaning constructions 
and rhetorical strategies permeating the dispute over cheese names. Within this 
framework I operationalize the concepts of moral panic, securitization, and 
Barthesian myth in order to conceptualize what I refer to as the ‘gastro-panic’. These 
concepts were chosen for their ability to act as critical tools that draw attention to the 
socially-constructed nature of phenomena in society and provoke challenge to taken-
for-granted ways of seeing the world, and also for their complementarity in 
reconciling certain limitations inherent to each concept. I argue that the use of food 
names has gained additional salience on the global agenda because it has been 
framed by countering political constructions of ‘gastro-panic’. 
I am aware that the various empirical contexts in which moral panic and 
securitization have been used do not afford it perfect transferability to the GGI 
context. First, the particular panic under consideration does not have the veritable 
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features of a genuinely moral panic. Issues surrounding food are rarely the subject of 
moral panic analyses (Beardsworth 1990; Monaghan, Hollands, and Pritchard 2010; 
Saguy and Almeling 2005) and are generally disputed by critics whose aim is to 
tighten the applicability and boundaries of the concept. Yet, the controversy 
surrounding a number of food issues, including GGIs, fulfils the majority of criteria 
advance by theorists. Difficulties in applying moral panic to empirical cases 
involving food lie in its use as a unified term. The traditional usage of the qualifying 
adjective moral limits the meaning of the noun panic by denoting particular 
qualities. One way of overcoming this limitation is by substituting ‘gastronomy’ for 
‘moral’ as the defining feature of the panic because the purpose of the adjective is to 
enhance the general requirements of the panic construction, not define it. 
Second, in this thesis I do not seek to engage directly with or make a 
contribution to the literature on food security or to employ a literal reading of 
securitization theory. Securitization in its purest form is posited to take security 
issues somehow beyond normal politics. But the issue surrounding GGIs is not likely 
to be taken out of the political arena in the same extreme way as, say, serious threats 
to national food security and the debate over GGIs has remained intrinsically 
political. This is because food security deals with access to sufficient, culturally-
appropriate food and has over time also taken form as a widely-used discourse 
employed as a means of rationalizing certain national and global policies assumed to 
prevent and alleviate hunger. It is its own distinct area of study and within security 
studies has been defined as an aspect of human security at a more individual level 
(Paris 2001: 90). In this thesis I am not using a literal application of moral panic or 
securitization but rather an analogical one that draws attention to how similar 
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structures of language are used to enhance the urgency of the issue and legitimize 
political exceptions made with regard to the use of food names.  
Thus, I am not interested in language for its own sake but in what actors’ 
chosen language can tell me about the process through which competing 
perspectives within the generic dispute have politicized GGIs in the product category 
of cheese. I define gastro-panic as a discursive strategy of demarcation and 
legitimation that actors use to (re)construct the cultural, economic, and political 
boundaries surrounding food production and consumption. They do this by appealing 
to a logic of security in order to persuade an audience that a cherished referent object 
within the food system, such as a food name, requires protection from an existential 
threat. This then legitimates the instigation of certain exceptional measures to 
provide such protection. Gastro-panic represents a boundary-maintaining and 
creating mechanism used by claims-makers to legitimize their normative and 
material interests in attaining or blocking the protection of food product names. The 
gastro-panic functions as more than a discursive construction and can also have real 
practical effects on policy-making and the distribution of resources through the 
cheese names themselves. 
The use of certain language is affected by and can affect social relations and 
be used to advance particular and sometimes conflicting ideologies, meanings, and 
worldviews that are understood and represented differently in different contexts 
(Wood and Kroger 2000; Paltridge 2012; Jones 2012; Shi 2007). The gastro-panic is 
a linguistic process that takes form through Barthes’ concept of myth. When I refer 
to myth it is strictly in the Barthesian sense as opposed to its use in common 
vernacular which implies that something is potentially false, unfounded or mistaken, 
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or an invented or imaginary legend or fable. Myth is a type of speech or mode of 
communication. Essentially, it is a type of discursive process that distorts and 
naturalizes certain worldviews, ideologies, and interpretations to appear as 
indisputable facts or common sense. Anything that can be spoken about or 
communicated through a discourse may become myth because it is not the objects 
themselves that are most important but rather the messages and meanings they 
convey. Myth is composed of beliefs and representations that sustain and legitimate 
current power relationships and promote the values and interests of dominant groups 
in society. It is also intentional, contextual, and varied and is uncovered by focusing 
on the evolving meanings attached to certain signs, such as food names. 
As myth, the gastro-panic simultaneously allows a focus on certain aspects of 
the GGI situation, such as behavior deemed threatening, while shrouding others. 
Myth naturalizes a view of generic producers as counterfeiters on the one hand and 
EU producers as aggressive protectionists on the other. By ensuring that the situation 
is perceived in one way rather than another, the gastro-panic articulated by each side 
in the debate prevents us from paying attention to other aspects of the situation that 
might be inconsistent with it. The overall effect of the gastro-panic is to problematize 
a food and/or agricultural issue in order to enhance its political salience and secure 
its placement on the policy agenda.  
Gastro-panic is an appropriate tool for thinking about the global politics of 
cheese because it acts as a critical lens through which to draw attention to the 
socially-constructed nature of the GGI debate and provoke challenge to taken-for-
granted and entrenched ways of viewing the issue. The intention of the research is 
not to focus on how special interest groups in the cheese sector, for example, 
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influence GI policy and their various lobbying activities. Rather, the focus here is on 
analyzing and deconstructing the various rhetorical and linguistic processes used by 
opposing sides to secure the right to use particular cheese terms. A critical study of 
myth is “not just the denunciation of particular ideological positions, but the analysis 
of how their messages are constituted, how they come to persuade” (Moriarty 1991: 
22). This becomes important when considering that the GGI issue is fundamentally a 
competition over the meaning of signs – the food names themselves – and a struggle 
over cultural representations whereby actors attempt to fix and naturalize particular 
meanings and worldviews surrounding their use. 
1.7. Food Studies 
This research is firmly anchored in the emerging field of food studies. The 
study of food is nothing new and in fact Miller and Deutsch (2009: 3) state that: 
“There are many fields that study food itself – its production (agricultural sciences, 
meat and poultry science, aquaculture); its chemical, physical, and biological 
properties (food science, biochemistry); its physiology when consumed (nutrition); 
and its preparation (culinary arts). And while offshoots of these fields – such as 
cultural and community nutrition, agro-economics, and food marketing – come into 
play in food studies, they are their own distinct fields of study.” 
Here it is possible to know what food studies is not but what food studies is 
continues to be the subject of energetic academic debate. Nevertheless, attempts 
have and are being made to pin down its main tenets. Miller and Deutsch (2009: 3) 
differentiate food studies as “the study of the relationships between food and the 
human experience” while the NYU Steinhardt (New York University 2013) program 
on food studies states that it “emphasizes the ways individuals, communities, and 
societies relate to and represent food within a spatial, cultural and historical context. 
Food studies examines the political, economic, and geographic framework of food 
production, while attending equally to the study of consumption, including 
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gastronomy…” In essence, it attempts to understand food through more than its 
materiality to encompass abstract and cultural features. Food constitutes more than 
simple sustenance or providing one of the world’s most lucrative industries. 
Anthropologists (Döring, Heide, and Mühleisen 2003: 2) and others have highlighted 
its centrality to the human cultural experience (Counihan and Van Esterik 2013; 
Montanari 2006; Goldstein and Merkle 2005). It is also an important aspect of 
identity (Mintz 2002; Scholliers 2001; Wilson 2006), community (Mintz 2003; 
Wells, Gradwell, and Yoder 1999), and carries significant symbolic weight (Mintz 
1994; Owen Jones 2007). I would also argue that the field has emerged through 
recognition that many complex phenomena involving food cannot be sufficiently 
explained when constricted by disciplinary boundaries.  
Thus, in recent years it has been possible to distinguish a “food studies turn” 
in academic research whereby a multitude of scholars have engaged individually 
and/or collectively in the exploration and interrogation of food at a level that has 
contributed to the development of a new field. Food studies is not just a passing fad 
but its existence can be evidenced by the growing number of university programs 
around the world (Spiegel 2012), associations, societies and networks, and academic 
journals and texts that embrace its interdisciplinary perspectives [see Appendix B].  
What is unique about food studies is that it embraces an interdisciplinary and 
holistic approach to the critical examination of food issues within multiple societal 
contexts, analyzing its findings using a wide range of perspectives, theories, 
methodologies, and disciplines (Albala 2013; Atkins and Bowler 2001; Miller and 
Deutsch 2009; Koç, Sumner and Winson 2012). It is especially useful when 
undertaking distinctly food-related research or where the position of food is of 
primary importance, such as is the case with GGIs. Methodologically, food studies 
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research differs from traditional research in three ways. First, it actively seeks to 
bring the long-neglected intellectual inquiry of food to the fore of a wider range of 
disciplines (Miller and Deutsch: 7); second, it is inherently interdisciplinary and 
bridges traditional boundaries between academic disciplines and schools of thought; 
and third, it is an analytical perspective that places food at the center of analysis, 
using it as a lens through which to explore, analyze, and understand phenomena 
within society, both past and present.  
This research places the dispute over cheese at the center of analysis in order 
to better understand the contested politics of generics within the context of the 
contemporary GI debate. It takes a qualitative approach, which critically interprets 
and understands the nature of GIs and generics as social constructs rather than 
relying upon more objectivist approaches that attempt to rationalize, test, and 
explain. The meanings surrounding the use of cheese terms are constructed by and 
between various individuals and groups in international society. They are subjective, 
contextual, varied, and constantly evolving. At the same time, I take an interpretative 
approach that seeks to understand the perspectives of both sides of the issue in a 
balanced manner. 
This approach is especially pertinent considering that ever more GIs are 
being awarded based on abstract reputational and cultural rather than scientifically 
verifiable geographical links to the place of origin (Gangjee 2006; Hughes 2006-
2007: 358-68) and the generic status of terms is being negotiated through 
international agreements rather than empirically assessed. For instance, in many 
cases the geographical terrain within a demarcated region of origin is highly 
variable, thus calling into question the essential land/quality link that underlies GI 
protection. This was the case with Feta cheese, which can be produced within the 
21 
 
entire territory of Greece. The genericness of Feta has been called into question by 
numerous countries in the EU and around the world yet rights to its use were 
awarded to Greek producers. Gangjee (2006: 9) states that, “As one moves away 
from ‘natural’ features, the argument that GIs are a commercially or politically 
expedient monopoly in a term, with arbitrary production boundaries, becomes 
increasingly difficult to ignore.” This view recognizes that the policy and practice of 
food name protection and non-protection is socio-culturally, economically, and 
politically embedded with meanings, values, and norms being highly contextualized. 
As a result, it is also a “site of negotiation and contestation” (McDonald 2008: 67) 
whereby competing interests define, shape, and drive change.  
1.8. Case study 
Within the framework of food studies and as a means of better exploring the 
complexity of GGIs, my research design involved carrying out a comprehensive case 
analysis of the dispute over cheese names and focused on the illustrative examples of 
Parmesan and Cheddar. This debate is a case of negotiated and contested 
international agri-food politics and generics themselves are exceptions to GI rules. 
Case study proved particularly appropriate since my research questions seek to 
address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the contemporary (Yin 2009: 4) dispute over cheese 
names. An in-depth case study also allowed for a more detailed illustration and 
examination of the complex relationships between a diverse range of actors from 
“micro,” “meso,” and “macro-levels” (Simons 2009: 25) and enabled me to 
document the diverging perspectives and contested viewpoints and demonstrate the 
influence of key actors and interactions throughout the narrative. 
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In this research the dispute over cheese represents the primary unit of 
analysis because it can be considered an “outlier” case within the context of GIs 
(Thomas 2011: 77). Due to the complicated issue of genericism, it is interesting by 
virtue of its difference from and exception to GI norms and regulations. A general 
belief also persists that “wine is not cheese” (Brink 2007: 5) and dairy is perceived 
as being “different” and not as easy to change (Personal interview, April 11, 2013). 
For example, this argument asserts that while wines are now being marketed through 
alternative means such as grape varietals, fewer substitutes for widely-used cheese 
terms are considered to exist. I limit the investigation to the issue of foodstuffs, 
specifically cheese, because there are separate regulations for wines and foodstuffs 
both in the TRIPS agreement where the latter is afforded a lower level of protection 
and within the EU (Fontaine 2013) where different rules and definitions apply. 
Furthermore, within the case study I examine what Yin (2009: 31) refers to as 
“embedded units” or the comparative cases of Parmesan and Cheddar. Rather than 
focusing on embedded cases that could be directly replicated, I deliberately selected 
Parmesan and Cheddar because they offer contrasting situations in demonstrating the 
politics of genericity. Parmesan has been protected within the EU despite 
considerable contestation and was referred to by one informant as the “poster child” 
(Email interview, May 20, 2013) of the international dispute over cheese names. 
Additionally, one interviewee stated that, “The US industry and US trade have been 
lobbying against the GI concept for many years, and the main name behind this has 
been Parmesan…the generic issue is really about a handful of mostly cheese 
names…in the end, this is 80% about Parmesan and a couple of others” (Personal 
interview, May 24, 2013). On the contrary, Cheddar has been for the most part 
unconditionally accepted as a generic name, which allows it to be used all over the 
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world or registered with a geographical qualifier. Thus, the two cheeses form an 
integral part of the broader context and serve to illustrate contrasting situations at the 
heart of the generic dispute. Such a “nested” (Thomas 2011: 152) structure is useful 
in that it draws attention to the more micro-level food-centered focus and at the same 
time locates the cheeses within the wider intentional politics of generics and GI trade 
regulations.  
A number of scholars have demonstrated how to design a systematic, 
disciplined, and concise case study (Yin 2009; Simons 2009; Thomas 2011). With 
case study, comprehensiveness, relationships, and processes rather than 
generalizability and causation are the ultimate objectives and, “The aim is 
particularization – to present a rich portrayal of a single setting to inform practice, 
establish the value of the case and/or add to the knowledge of a specific topic” 
(Simons 2009: 24). At the same time it is not prevented from being used as a means 
of informing related phenomena in varied contexts (Berg 2004: 259). The cases of 
Parmesan and Cheddar are each important in their own right and could also be used 
to appraise the genericity of other contested cheese terms. 
1.9. Methods 
Case study is unique in that it supports the collection of a diverse range of 
empirical data and the utilization of various methods for their collection and 
analysis. In exploring the case of GGIs I have drawn on written policy material and 
other documents, websites, blogs, artifacts, observations, and semi-structured 
interviews and discussions. I began by collecting documents that included official 
policy regulations and legislation, press releases and memos, newspaper and 
magazine articles, speeches, written testimonies, hearings, reports, and statements. I 
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also scoured the internet for dairy industry and cheese websites and blogs. 
Furthermore, I examined cheese-related artifacts such as labels and packaging and 
conducted observations through visits to two Parmigiano-Reggiano and one Cheddar 
production site, numerous supermarkets, and three international food and cheese 
festivals including the Slow Food Salone de Gusto and Terra Madre (Turin 2012), 
Global Cheese Awards (Frome 2013), and World Cheese Awards (Birmingham 
2013). 
Furthermore, I deemed the use of interviews to be essential to shed light on a 
topic only marginally covered in the literature and to understand the point of view of 
interviewees on each side of the debate. In order to identify an appropriate interview 
sample, I conducted “purposive sampling” (Bryman 2008: 458). In other words, 
rather than pursuing research participants on a random basis, my goal was to isolate 
key individuals and groups who were relevant to the research questions. To do this I 
began by increasing my knowledge of the subject through an extensive literature 
review. During this phase I familiarized myself with the important issues and 
empirical realities that required broader theoretical explanation. Thus, I started my 
theoretical work with an idea of what I intended to theorize but also wanted to 
develop a framework that generated greater understanding of the empirical realities. 
For this a “theoretical sampling” approach (Bryman 2008: 459) proved most useful. 
This ongoing approach entails choosing additional participants to reflect an evolving 
theoretical focus and fosters an internal negotiation between the theory and the 
empirical realities over the course of the research. It also ensured a large variety of 
interviewees. In addition, there were two occasions where I took advantage of a 
“snowball sampling” (Atkinson and Flint 2011) approach to get in touch with 
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difficult to access contacts through referrals from previously-established 
interviewees. 
The basic criteria I used to identify whether an interviewee was appropriate 
included whether they had been directly involved in international negotiations or 
research on GIs or work within the cheese industry and are familiar with the 
implications of the generic issue. I conducted 24 interviews and 2 short discussions 
with stakeholders and actors that included cheese-makers, cheese consortiums and 
associations, academics, dairy lobbyists, cheese festival organizers, and 
representatives of state, EU and multilateral organizations across four continents 
(EU, UK, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, US, Australia, and Argentina). I considered my 
sample to be saturated (Bryman 2008: 459) when I had interviewed actors at each 
level of the debate and could adequately demonstrate variation and relationships on 
each side. Most interviews were performed in person, however due to time and 
geographical constraints some were conducted by phone or email. Semi-structured 
interviews were selected to allow a greater degree of flexibility and freedom in the 
direction of the interview while still being able to address central themes identified 
through the literature and policy documents on GIs and generics.  
Finally, I performed a thematic analysis of the data in order to tease out the 
main themes that form the basis for the empirical chapters (Braun and Clarke 2006; 
Bryman 2008). This widely-used method of analysis proved useful as it is not 
wedded to any particular theoretical framework. I began by performing a read-
through of all my collected data in order to become thoroughly familiarized with it. 
Next, I engaged in the generation of initial codes followed by a search for relevant 
themes. Themes were chosen that captured important elements in relation to the 
research questions and not necessarily based on the frequency of their appearance. 
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The research questions evolved throughout the coding process; however, my analysis 
was also theoretically-driven as it reflects my analytic interest in the area. I then 
reviewed, refined, and defined the themes and produced the final write-up. My 
analysis provides a rich thematic description of the entire data set in order to 
highlight the predominant themes, which was useful when investigating an under-
researched area such as GGIs.  
1.10. Contribution 
Research on GIs has burgeoned in recent years but has been overwhelmingly 
concentrated around the legal and intellectual property approaches to the issues and 
the differences between sui generis and trademark systems of protection (O’Connor 
2004; Echols 2008; Calboli 2006; Agdomar 2008; Kazmi 2001; Gangjee 2012). And 
although the GI debate involves numerous countries, research has mainly centered 
on the transatlantic conflict that pits the philosophical (Marette, Clemens, and 
Babcock 2008), cultural (Echols 2005), and legislative (Echols 2008) differences and 
competing interests of the EU against those of the US (Creditt 2009; Zacher 2005; 
Niska 2004; Chen 1996; Goldberg 2001; Josling 2006). At the same time, various 
studies have emphasized the benefits of utilizing GIs as marketing tools, citing 
methods for their implementation in the EU (Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban 
2010a; Parrott, Wilson and Murdoch 2002; Whirthgen 2005) and developing 
countries (Das 2007; Mawardi 2005; Rangnekar 2009; Vivas-Eugui 2005) as a 
mechanism for promoting and sustaining regional and local development. In 
addition, many scholars have devoted attention to the construction of GIs as 
indicators of quality within European agricultural policy (Parrott, Wilson, and 
Murdoch 2002; Ilbery and Kneafsey 2000a; Ilbery et. al. 2001; Desquilbet, Hassan, 
and Monier-Dilhan 2005; Loureiro and McCluskey 2000). They are also the subject 
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of an increasing number of international conferences, receiving much press and 
attention.
6
  
But amidst this eruption of interest there is little focus on exceptions to GI 
norms, which is encapsulated by generics. A good deal of scholarship has been 
devoted to the genericism of trademarks rather than GIs (Burgunder 1985; Levy 
2005; Desai and Rierson 2006). And the small body of literature on GGIs has mainly 
been limited to the areas of law and economics (Benavente 2010; Gangjee 2012) 
with some detailed attention to the issue being concentrated in the product category 
of wine (Lindquist 1999; Kazmi 2001; Craven and Mather 2001; Kemp and Forsythe 
2007; Rose 2007; Zahn 2012), which was the first to receive extra protection in the 
WTO and experience a clawing-back of terms previously used generically. Gangjee 
(2007) extends this focus by exploring the contentious case of Feta cheese as a 
means of better understanding generic use in the context of European law. 
Additionally, Rangnekar and Kumar (2010) examine the problematic case of 
Basmati rice, a widely-imitated “transborder” GI between India and Pakistan that has 
been at risk for becoming generic. They draw attention to the wide array of interests 
and other aspects involved in establishing the genericity of a term. These instances 
aside, the growing political, economic, and cultural salience of GGIs, particularly in 
the world of cheese, makes it especially important to further interrogate the 
meanings, assumptions, and political processes that underlie notions of GI 
genericism within a global context. In a world of increasingly globalized markets 
and multilateral regulations, the framework for the treatment of GIs and generics is 
                                                          
6
 For example, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has organized six international 
symposia on GIs since 2003. As well, the Organization for an International Geographical Indications 
Network (OriGIn) held its sixth General Assembly on GIs in 2013, the same year that the eleventh 
international congress of the Asociación de Antiguos Alumnos de Magíster Lvcentinvs (AAAML) 
was devoted to GIs and trademarks, and a workshop on GIs as cultural property took place at the 
University of Tübingen.  
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still under construction and the decisions made could have significant impacts on 
producers and consumers all over the world. 
This thesis seeks to bring the current controversies around the genericity of 
cheese terms into focus and makes a contribution to the multidisciplinary literature 
on GIs and the current international policy debates surrounding GGIs. In order to 
capture the complexity of the issue as a whole, the study utilizes a problem-focused 
food studies approach. This concentrates the research around the generation of 
knowledge, for example through a better understanding of genericism and the 
counter-claims processes employed in the conflict, as well as its practical 
implications regarding the development of international GI policy and practice. At 
the same time, it ensures that the contribution is not restricted to any particular 
discipline or body of literature. The GGI issue rests at the nexus of agricultural 
policy, intellectual property, and trade. In order to reflect this complexity, it was 
necessary for the study to engage with literature from these areas as well as a number 
of other disciplines that have touched on the GI debate. Then, to generate a more 
holistic understanding of the GGI issue, I developed an interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework based on concepts derived from sociology, international relations, and 
culture studies in order to examine it. 
Hence, this thesis makes an interdisciplinary contribution to the 
multidisciplinary literature on GIs in two important ways. First, it addresses a gap in 
existing research on GIs by widening the theoretical and empirical understanding of 
the conflict over GGIs and generating a better understanding of genericism in the 
context of GI politics. It does this by expanding the analysis beyond a transatlantic 
focus to encompass broader perspectives from NW actors and by interrogating the 
issue through the lens of cheese, specifically the innovative comparison of the highly 
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contested case of Parmesan and the uncontested case of Cheddar. While wine has 
been at the center of earlier debates over generic status and received some coverage 
in the literature, many agreements phasing out the usage of wine terms have already 
come to pass. This has for the most part been begrudgingly accepted by the sector. 
But cheese names are the subject of ongoing site of negotiation and contestation 
within contemporary global GI politics where the request for an extension of 
stronger protection to foodstuffs and the claw-back of generic food terms that 
constitutes the most current area of contention within the GI debate.  
Second, this research liberates the focus on GGIs from a primarily legalistic 
perspective by providing an in-depth examination of the political and discursive 
processes that influence the status of terms. Raustiala and Munzer (2007: 365) admit 
that the GI issue is “primarily driven not by philosophical arguments but by political 
interests” and a European lawyer whom I interviewed (Phone interview, April 20, 
2013) stated that history and politics preceded the legality of GIs and in reality the 
issue of name protection is “a question of compromise…and politics.” GIs and 
generics are, in essence, social constructs and what is generic in one region or 
territory might be protected in another. The established protected or generic status of 
a food name is often not the outcome of objective processes of definition and 
demarcation but rather the result of a political struggle where actors advocate 
competing meanings and worldviews in order to secure the “power to name” foods, 
to “create ‘official versions’” of food policy and regulations, and to “represent the 
legitimate social world” of food production, consumption, and marketing (Barker 
and Galasinski 2001: 56). It is therefore important to problematize the taken-for-
granted nature of opposing perspectives and analyze the processes of social and 
cultural construction within political negotiations because the decisions made have 
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concrete effects on the use of resources, in the form of cheese names, around the 
world and also affect the development of international regulations and markets.  
1.11. A seven course meal 
The chapters in this thesis have been carefully planned to complement each 
other intellectually and gastronomically and unfold as various ‘courses’ throughout 
the reading, much like in a formal dinner. Therefore, please note that the word 
‘courses’ will here forth be used in place of ‘chapters’. Following the first course 
starter in this introduction, the second course provides an overview of the flourishing 
literature that has been devoted to exploring GIs in recent years. It encompasses 
qualitative and quantitative sources at multiple levels from local to European and 
global perspectives. Its purpose is to provide an exhaustive context of the main 
issues and debates currently surrounding GIs as well as an overview of their 
historical evolution. In addition, it clearly exposes the gap in the literature and lack 
of focused research devoted to GI exceptions such as generics that this study aims to 
rectify. Then, the third course serves up an interdisciplinary theoretical synthesis of 
moral panic, securitization, and Barthesian myth, which I conceptualize as ‘gastro-
panic,’ that is used to inform the analysis in subsequent empirical courses.  
Next, the fourth course introduces the case of Parmesan, one of the most 
controversial names within the greater struggle over generic cheese terms, as a lens 
through which to examine the contested politics of food name protection. Parmesan 
is at the heart of a competition over meaning whereby opposing actors attempt to 
define the particularistic or generic nature of the name in order to secure its exclusive 
or generic use. The course presents the issue in depth from a perspective of 
terroirism underpinning the European struggle for global GI protection. I illustrate 
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how Italian and European claims-makers have framed the generic use of Parmesan as 
a threat to the original through a gastro-panic that is characterized by heightened 
concern over its generic use and imitation in countries around the world, hostility 
towards the ‘folk devils’ who continue to produce and export what are deemed to be 
fake and unlawful copies, and a consensus that increased protection within the WTO 
should be instigated to combat the problem. Actors frame NW use of the name as a 
threat projected to have serious consequences for the original producers in order to 
provide a foundation for political action and secure the exclusive use of Parmesan. 
Finally, I demythologize the gastro-panic in order to better understand why the issue 
has arisen in recent years. I demonstrate that although the protection of Parmesan has 
a long history, it has gained markedly greater political salience in recent years owing 
to socio-economic difficulties at the domestic level and major changes in the global 
cheese economy that have led to feelings of considerable insecurity on the part of 
producers. Gastro-panic politics surrounding Parmesan inform national, EU, and 
international debates on the future of GI and generic terms and are interwoven with 
demands for agricultural exceptionalism and multifunctionality, market intervention, 
and restricted competition in a proposed global free trade regime. 
In the fifth course the uncontested case of Cheddar, a name that for the most 
part has been uncritically accepted as the generic name for a type of cheese 
manufactured all over the world, is compared to Parmesan in order to better 
understand why no gastro-panic has arisen surrounding its use. It is also intended to 
address the lack of systematic discussion within the literature of terms that are 
considered to be generic, why, and how their status was determined. I deconstruct 
Cheddar’s genericity as a mythical social construction by drawing attention to 
various ambiguities and inconsistencies within the EU and internationally in order to 
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expose the dynamic and complicated nature of genericism. As I demonstrate, 
pinpointing solid evidence to verify the genericity of Cheddar is far from 
straightforward. The definition of genericism, how it is measured, where, and in 
what context are still a matter of debate both within the EU and at the multilateral 
level. I also determine that various differences in the approach to Cheddar help 
explain the absence of gastro-panic surrounding its protection. These include a lack 
of historical attempts to protect the name, differing ideological perspectives and level 
of government involvement, and the fragmented organization, cohesion, and 
approach of producer consortiums to GI protection.  
Following the two specific cheese cases, the sixth course broadens the focus 
on GGIs by using the debate over cheese names in general as a lens to understand the 
countering processes at play within the contested politics of food name protection 
and presents the issue in depth from a NW perspective of genericism. This course is 
meant to highlight the fact that gastro-panics are not simply one-sided affairs. 
Numerous groups representing the oppositional viewpoint of genericism have 
emerged to defend their right to use generic cheese names in commerce, thereby 
challenging the EU folk devilling process likening their production activities to 
illegal counterfeiting. I reveal how claims-makers from NW countries are competing 
with the EU through a countering discursive process of gastro-panic that is 
characterized by heightened concern over the attempted GI protection of cheese 
terms, hostility towards the aggressive European ‘folk devil,’ and a consensus that 
something must be done to combat the behavior. Within this discursive context 
actors frame EU efforts as a threat projected to have serious consequences for global 
dairy industries in order to provide a foundation for political action and secure the 
open use of terms. I then demythologize the gastro-panic through discussing the 
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motivations behind this response and addressing the various interests at play. I argue 
that these actors have mobilized a global defense of these terms not only to 
maximize profits but in an attempt to restore an existential sense of security during a 
time of perceived insecurity brought about by European pursuits, which occurs 
within the context of the increased industrialization and globalization of cheese 
production. These countering gastro-panic politics also inform national and 
international debates on the future of generic terms and are interwoven with demands 
for agricultural liberalization, market access, and open competition in a proposed 
global free trade regime. Finally, the seventh course concludes by highlighting the 
main findings in order to foster the digestion of the insights gained throughout the 
thesis and also offers suggested avenues for future research.   
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Second Course 
2. GIs and Generics in the Literature 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this literature review is three-fold. First, it is intended to 
provide an overview of the great deal of literature that has been devoted to exploring 
GIs in recent years, encompassing qualitative and quantitative sources at multiple 
levels from local to European and global perspectives. Second, it presents an 
exhaustive context of the main issues and debates currently surrounding GIs and an 
overview of their historical evolution, stemming from their origins in France to the 
European harmonization in 1992 until today. And third, it clearly exposes the gap in 
the literature and lack of focused research devoted to GI exceptions such as generics.  
Trends within the literature surround the conception of quality and the 
usefulness of the schemes for rural development and consumer protection. 
Additionally, the prominence of the international debate on GIs has led the area of 
law and intellectual property to dominate. Notable work has also explored the 
potential for GIs to be used as economic tools in developing countries and their role 
in international trade. A noticeable feature of academic and policy debates 
surrounding GIs has been a lack of focus on discursive and rhetorical constructions 
involved in GI politics. In addition, the issue of GGIs is briefly mentioned but rarely 
the sole subject of inquiry. 
The review is organized thematically into three main sections. The first 
section focuses on a historically-inspired narrative of the progressive 
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institutionalization of GIs from regional to global contexts in order to provide the 
foundation for their existence. The second section details the construction within the 
EU of GIs as indicators of quality. And the third section is meant to highlight the fact 
that, although GIs have been institutionalized at various scales of governance, this 
institutionalization has taken place in a divided political context despite attempts by 
the EU at an outward show of unity. Such contestation provides justification for the 
further scrutiny of GI protection. 
2.2. Institutionalization 
The protection of GIs originated in a particular regional context and has over 
time sky-rocketed up to the multilateral agenda. Their historical evolution has until 
recently been a much neglected area, despite Gangjee’s (2012: 14) claim that you 
cannot fully understand the contemporary GI debate “without appreciating its 
inheritance.” GIs reflect the creation and organization of governmental institutions 
responsible for overseeing and implementing policy at various multi-leveled scales 
of governance. Thus, in the following sections a historically-inspired approach to the 
literature displays how the institutionalization of GIs spread from its birthplace in 
France to the European level and finally made its way into the WTO. 
2.2.1. Regional level 
Although indicating the source of goods has a long history and numerous 
countries have established protection systems over time, the French were the first to 
regulate appellations of origin (Raustiala and Munzer 2007: 244) and establish one 
of the most well-known GI systems in the world – the Appellation d’Origine 
Contrôlée (AOC). The French system may be considered the most renowned, 
influential, and rigorous due to its success and the substantial effect it has had on 
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wine and food markets around the world (Charters 2006: 40; Barham 2003: 128). A 
main feature of the AOC system is the embeddedness of the concept of terroir, 
which refers to the interaction of geographical and cultural characteristics in a place 
of origin that determine a product’s uniqueness and legitimate the protection of its 
name (Jacobsen 2010; Trubek 2008; Vaudour 2002; Wilson 1998). Today AOC 
certifications are granted under the auspices of the Institut National des Appellations 
d'Origine (INAO), a body made up of national committees and regional offices that 
control and distinguish wines, spirits, and agricultural product designations. In a 
brief statement about the history and development of origin protection policies, the 
INAO (2006) explains: 
“History shows that the custom of naming products according to the place where 
they are manufactured or harvested is very ancient. However, it was not until the late 
19th century that the political powers in France, faced with the increasingly intense 
growth of domestic and foreign trade and above all the almost total destruction of the 
country's vines by phylloxera in 1870, decided to intervene.” 
The AOC system was initially designed to safeguard wine appellations and 
the history of protection is further explored by Charters (2006) who discusses how 
rapid economic and social changes in nineteenth and early twentieth century France 
had significant effects on the wine industry. The production of wine has been vital to 
the French economy for thousands of years (Revel 1982: 78) and calls to better 
protect the sector were underlined by an “agricultural depression” beginning in the 
1870s, religious anti-alcohol movements, increased international competition, and a 
large migration of people from rural to urban areas that led to nostalgic feelings for a 
more simple country life. Rioting was problematic and massive discontent spread as 
vineyards attempted to revive the industry (Charters 2006: 38-9). Over time the 
ability to identify, craft, and manipulate notable wine regions became a crucial 
means of increasing profits (Pitte 2002: 15). But difficulties arose as producers 
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attempted to falsify wines by adding value through phony labels mimicking 
reputable vineyards in order to guarantee economic gain amidst overproduction and 
lower-cost competition. While fraud was rampant in food products as well, wine was 
purported to be the product most in danger of falsification and most in need of 
protection (Charters 2006: 38-9).  
The French government justifies its historic intervention in the wine industry 
based on logical necessity that was the result of changing economic conditions and 
uncontrollable crises. The INAO (2006) further outlines the subsequent phases in 
instituting AOC policies and admits that in 1905 “there was recognition of the 
collective nature of the designation of origin as an integral part of the national 
patrimony.” The early 1900s witnessed a dearth of legislation attempting to rescue 
the struggling wine industry, guard against fraud, and protect geographical 
appellations. Following producer and governmental struggles, AOC policies were 
institutionalized in 1935. Protection was later extended to cheeses and other 
agricultural products and has remained an integral element of French agri-food 
policy until the present day (INAO 2006). Due to the accomplishments and highly 
evolved nature of the system, France has provided the focus for various academic 
case studies (DeSoucey 2010; Marie-Vivien 2009) and is often featured as an 
example of success “as a value added strategy…encouraging the preservation of 
rural heritage and the maintenance of traditional landscapes” (Barham 2003: 134) 
and a model for the adoption and further institutionalization of GI protection around 
the world. In fact, the AOC system provided the prototype for both European and 
global GI legislation. 
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2.2.2. European level 
Within the EU, the success of origin protection systems and their importance 
in various Member States
7
 as well as a desire to harmonize national systems already 
in existence led to the institutionalization of GIs at the EU level (European 
Commission 2007). The year 1992 marked the harmonization of Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) quality 
schemes that legally safeguard the names of traditional and specialty foodstuffs, 
wines, and spirits within the EU.
8
 PDO and PGI marks designate the names of 
regions, places, and in exceptional cases countries or other terms used to describe a 
food, agricultural, or beverage product.
9
 The schemes were set up to protect the 
genuine nature and reputation of products from imitations, contribute to rural 
development, and as a response to continuing consumer demands for higher-quality 
products. They are also reported to play an important role in safeguarding 
gastronomic traditions from the unforgiving forces of global change (European 
Commission 2007). To clarify, though PDOs and PGIs are also important for wines 
and spirits, they are treated differently from foodstuffs within the EU and separate 
rules and regulations apply. Since the latter is the focus of this research, the system 
afforded to wines and spirits will not be discussed. 
                                                          
7
 For example, the Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée in France, Denominazione di Origine Controllata 
and Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita in Italy, Denominación de Origen in Spain, 
and Denominação de Origem Controlada in Portugal. 
8
 The year 2006 also saw the institutionalization of the Traditional Specialty Guaranteed (TSG) 
scheme (Council Regulation No 509/2006). However, TSGs will not be discussed in this thesis 
because they do not confer exclusive property rights over product names and their emphasis is not on 
connecting names to geographical places of origin. Rather, they are intended to protect a product’s 
“traditional character, either in the composition or means of production” (European Commission 
2012b) and may be used by anyone who abides by a defined recipe or method. As well, the number of 
registered TSGs is small and only hovers around thirty-seven (European Commission 2012a). Becker 
(2009: 116) suggests that this could indeed have to do with the fact that TSGs do not offer similar 
“monopoly power” as PDO and PGIs, which makes them less attractive to potential applicants. 
9
 For more information see Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92. These regulations were succeeded 
in 2006 by Council Regulation (EEC) No 510/2006 and most recently in 2012 by Regulation (EU) No 
1151/2012. 
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The differences between PDOs and PGIs are illustrated in Figure 2.1 
(Adapted from European Commission 2012b). Under the legislation, a PDO 
guarantees that a product’s production process was performed entirely within a 
specified geographical area (European Commission 2012b). PDOs ascribe to the 
strictest definitional criteria and are classified as designations of origin, which means 
that the product’s “quality or characteristics are essentially or exclusively due to a 
particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors, and 
the production, processing and preparation of which take place in the defined 
geographical area” (Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, emphasis added). Conversely, a 
PGI is somewhat less exacting and ensures that only one aspect of a product’s 
production was performed in a particular area (European Commission 2012b). PGIs 
have more loosely defined criteria and are classified as geographical indications, 
meaning a product has “a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics 
attributable to that geographical origin and the production and/or processing and/or 
preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area” (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 510/2006, emphasis added). For the sake of brevity, the 
schemes will here forth be referred to as European Geographical Indications (EGIs) 
unless specific differentiation is warranted.  
     
 
Figure 2.1: PDO and PGI Schemes 
Covers products 
that are produced, 
processed AND 
prepared in 
geographical area  
Quality or 
characteristics 
essentially or 
exclusively due 
to the area 
Covers products 
that are produced, 
processed OR 
prepared in 
geographical area 
Possess specific 
quality, reputation 
or other 
characteristic 
attributable to 
area 
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The registration of a product name is subjected to a multi-leveled application 
process. To begin, a group of producers must outline the product’s precise 
definitions and specifications.
10
 Next, the application is examined by the relevant 
national authorities. Finally, it is sent to the European Commission for review where 
it may either be accepted or rejected. If accepted, a contestation period of around 
three months is provided to allow anyone to voice disagreement to a proposed name 
(European Commission 2012b) and it is often at this point that oppositional claims of 
genericity arise. If no resistance emerges producers are granted exclusive rights to 
the use of the name, which is protected from all “Misuse, imitation or evocation…” 
that also encompasses translations and “expressions such as ‘style’, ‘type’, ‘method’ 
etc. suggesting that the product is equivalent or associated with the original, and 
even if the true origin of the product is indicated…” (European Commission 2007). 
And once registered, a designation may never become generic. The majority of 
names of products destined for human consumption, unless deemed to be generic, 
are eligible for registration under the system. This includes types of meat, dairy, and 
fish products, fruits, vegetables, and cereals, oil, eggs, honey, beer, bread, pastry, 
cakes, confectionary, and more. A full list of EGI products may be accessed on the 
European Commission’s Database of Origin and Registration (DOOR) website 
(European Commission 2012a). There are currently over one thousand food and 
agricultural products derived from all over the European continent registered 
(European Commission 2011) and still more await confirmation.  
The harmonization of EGIs is legitimated based on their potential to prevent 
the counterfeiting of traditional products (Nicoletti, Platania, and Privitera 2007) and 
                                                          
10
 Producers both from within and outside the EU are entitled to use the system, though third 
country participation has thus far been minimal. 
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to provide tools for rural development (Whirthgen 2005) and consumer protection 
(European Commission 2007). According to Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch (2002: 
243), around seventy percent of registered products in Europe originate in “Less 
Favoured Areas (LFAs)” most likely “because such regions have, for a variety of 
reasons, failed to fully engage with the ‘productivist’ conventions that have 
predominated in the agro-food system in the second half of the 20
th
 Century.” Thus, 
a number of studies have been devoted to assessing the usefulness and benefits of 
EGIs in rural areas. Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban (2010b) focus on whether 
or not PDOs effectively sustain rural employment in France. They found that 
obstacles to market entry were less under the PDO label, thereby increasing the 
number of cheese companies and employees. At the same time, the increase in 
expenses required to abide by stringent manufacturing methods proved to be a 
burden that could cause some producers to leave the label. However, the advantages 
for employment were determined to compensate for this disadvantage. Furthermore, 
farmers are reported to benefit from higher prices for raw materials such as milk 
under PDO and PGI production. Chatellier et Delattre (quoted in Réquillart 2007) 
demonstrates how in 2000 the farmers in their study were able to command a fifteen 
to thirty percent higher price for their milk. Finally, as symbols of regional identity, 
gastronomic products can also serve rural areas as a means of promoting tourism 
(Bessière 1998). 
EGI schemes were not only designed to assist producers but also to ensure 
consumer protection. According to Tregear, Kuznesof, and Moxey (1999: 390-91), 
“The underlying premise of such policies is that consumers make ready and positive 
associations between places and foods, and, moreover, that they value such 
associations.” And without this EGIs gain no clout. As a result, numerous scholars 
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have focused research on ascertaining the level of consumer desire for origin 
products (Resano, Sanjuán, and Albisu 2012; Espejel, Fandos, and Flavián 2007; 
Espejel, Fandos, and Flavián 2008) and some studies have verified the attractiveness 
of origin-protected products and consumer willingness-to-pay (van Ittersum et. al. 
2007; Fandos and Flavián 2006; Scarpa, Philippidis, and Spalatro 2005). Dimara and 
Skuras (2005: 96) find that Greek wine consumers place high importance on 
information connecting a product to its origin and attribute the current interest in 
origin products to its satisfaction of a “current ‘nostalgia’ for ‘real’, ‘healthy’, 
‘authentic’ and ‘wholesome’ way of life and an expression of cultural identity.” 
Other research has also focused on how European consumers define (Vanhonacker 
et. al. 2010), perceive (Kuznesof, Tregear, and Moxey 1997; Tregear, Kuznesof, and 
Moxey 1999), and construct (Skuras and Dimara 2004) traditional and regional foods 
and how EGI labels might be used to strategically market products.  
2.2.3. Global level 
There have also been numerous attempts over time to institutionalize GI 
protection at the global level. GIs have served partly or wholly as the subject of 
international agreements stemming from the Paris Convention on Intellectual 
Property (1883), Madrid Agreement on indications of source (1891) and Stresa 
Convention for cheeses (1951), to the much more stringent and elaborate provisions 
detailed in the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and 
their International Registration (1957) (O’Connor 2004; Echols 2008; WIPO n.d.). 
However, in each case the number of signatories remained minimal.
11
 Thus, the 
significance of the TRIPS agreement mentioned in the first course is made even 
clearer by the fact that it applies to all 160 member states of the WTO. Goldberg 
                                                          
11
 For example, to date the Lisbon Agreement only has 28 participants. 
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(2001: 151) states that the TRIPS agreement represents substantial progress made 
towards securing global protection for GIs, which in only a short period of time has 
been greater “than in the prior attempts of the last hundred-plus years.”  
The literature devoted to GIs at the global level has been heavily focused in 
the areas of law and intellectual property where the majority of interest in their 
evolution has proliferated (Kazmi 2001; O’Connor 2004; Calboli 2006; Agdomar 
2008; Echols 2008). Normative critiques are evident as those in favor of greater GI 
protection tend to lean more sympathetically towards the European position, citing 
various benefits of increased protection for food products, reasons why opponents 
should accept stronger GI protection, and suggesting potential compromises to 
international disputes (Doster 2006; Hayes, Lence, and Babcock 2005; Waggoner 
2008; Addor and Grazioli 2002; Vittori 2009). Lang (2006) emphasizes that the 
European project should serve as an example for TRIPS of the successful 
liberalization of trade across national borders where competition has not been 
interrupted by the expansion of strong GI protection. In a world continuously 
oriented on a “free” trading system, he states that the protection of GIs becomes ever 
more crucial and that an extension of higher protection to foodstuffs is “long 
overdue” (Lang 2006: 510).  
A variety of claims have been presented in favor of strengthening 
international agreements and global institutions in charge of regulating and 
protecting GIs. The main arguments used by proponents revolve around aspects that 
concern consumers, producers, culture, and developing countries. First, it is claimed 
that the demand for quality-ensured and diversified food products continues to grow 
around the world (Babcock and Clemens 2004: 17). One study compared Country of 
Origin, GI, and EGI labels for olive oil in Canada and found that in general 
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consumers valued such labels for their indication of a product’s quality and were 
prepared to pay more for them (Menapace et. al. 2009). GIs are asserted to help build 
consumer confidence (Smallwood and Zeuthen 2008), which has become especially 
important amidst a string of reoccurring food scares (Addor and Grazioli 2002: 874).  
Furthermore, an increasing number of producers are becoming interested in 
the benefits (Babcock and Clemens 2004: 17) and market potential (Agdomar 2008: 
574) of the system. GIs possess significant branding power (Agarwal and Barone 
2005) and are innovative and legitimate tools that can be employed for the economic 
benefit of whole regions (Gutierrez 2005: 46, 49). Scafidi suggests that GIs “serve an 
attributional function by allowing communities to capture the additional economic 
value of authenticity…rather than just a grant of economic monopoly…” (quoted in 
Hughes et. al. 2007: 956). However, producers continue to worry about inadequate 
international legal protection and rising expenditures to enforce their rights, which is 
why stronger protection is needed (Vittori 2009). 
Next, it is argued that GI products are unable to be replicated outside their 
place of origin because specific physical and material components such as soil, 
climate, and environment afford them unique characteristics. But these features are 
also the result of established traditions involving immaterial components that include 
social and cultural capital that together are embodied by the notion of terroir. GIs are 
distinctive in that they are a collective phenomenon, which Agdomar (2008: 560) 
refers to as their “cultural component.” The role of the local community, culture, 
identity, and knowledge plays a large part in the production and essence of a product. 
As stated by Barham (2003: 129), GIs “hold the potential of re-linking production to 
the social, cultural and environmental aspects of particular places, further 
distinguishing them from anonymous mass produced goods…” Without the 
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economic advantages of the policies small producers would be unable to compete in 
a globalized business environment, might disappear, and important aspects of culture 
would be lost. GIs also “convey the cultural identity of a nation, region or locality, 
and add a human dimension to goods…” (Addor and Grazioli 2002: 874). 
Finally, one of the foremost areas of interest in the GI literature is the 
proposed benefit of increased protection for developing countries (Mawardi 2005; 
Das 2007). For many developing countries GIs could represent an avenue of entry 
into world markets (Vivas-Eugui 2005: 724) and a means to foster their own brands 
instead of basing their economic advancement on imitations (Guerra 2004: 18). In 
one such instance producers in the Indian state of Goa successfully created a GI by 
focusing on the collective cultural heritage of Feni liquor distilling (Rangnekar 
2009). In addition, they could be useful to help protect cultural and natural 
biodiversity (Bérard and Marchenay 2006; Guerra 2004) as well as local heritage 
(Jena and Grote 2010) and traditional knowledge (Downes 1998). 
2.3. Quality Constructions 
GI protection systems have been characterized as the “immaterializing of 
food and institutionalizing of quality” (Allaire 2003: 63). Quality is the new 
buzzword in European and international agri-food policy and a massive resurgence 
of concern for quality food has taken center-stage in recent years (Krissoft and 
Bohman 2002). This has been influenced by a string of food scares in the mid-1990s, 
which exposed the fragility of food production systems and shocked European food 
institutions into action (Knowles, Moody and McEachern 2007). Bergeaud-Blackler 
and Ferretti (2006: 11) describe how it was especially following the Bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis of 1996 that consumer health began to take 
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political prominence and the seeds of an original “European-style” food policy began 
to sprout and, “Consumer protection and public health came to be treated, not as a 
matter merely of facilitating market exchanges across Europe, but as politically 
relevant themes in themselves.” Within this context traditional and origin-assured 
foods have garnered extra attention as beacons of safety amidst a sea of potential risk 
because a product’s name acts as a “warranty of quality” (Blakeney 2005: 629). 
But fear and safety have not been the only motivating factors in the turn to 
quality. EGIs are embedded within what Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa (2002) 
term the “economy of qualities” whereby actors in the food system (re)qualify and 
actively construct various dimensions of quality in order to differentiate products 
(Deaton, Busch, and Samuels 2010; Stræte 2008; Cidell and Alberts 2006). Quality 
is an admittedly ambiguous (Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch 2002: 246) and contested 
concept (Ilbery and Kneafsey 2000a: 318; Ilbery et. al. 2001: 30). Nevertheless, in 
addition to health, safety, and taste the European Commission (2007) has defined 
various components of quality in the EGI policy context: 
 “Specific product characteristics, often linked to geographical origin or 
production zone (e. g. mountain areas), animal breed or production method 
(e. g. organic farming) 
 Special ingredients 
 Particular production methods often resulting from local expertise and 
traditions 
 Observation of high environmental or animal welfare standards 
 Processing, preparation, presentation and labeling in ways that enhance the 
attractiveness of the product for consumers.” 
Traditional products are said to embody the abovementioned features and maintain a 
certain standard of quality that consumers desire and a number of studies have been 
devoted to analyzing the effectiveness of EGIs as quality signals (Desquilbet, 
Hassan, and Monier-Dilhan 2005; Loureiro and McCluskey 2000; Bureau and 
Valceschini 2003).  
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Additionally, Ilbery et. al. (2005: 123) elaborate on how within the quality 
construction framework other elements are used to differentiate food and agricultural 
products, which they term “PPP schemes” that employ a combination of “product, 
process and place.” These schemes are constructed based on complex producer 
motivations stemming from a “Territorial development rationale (schemes as 
interventions)” that links products to places, developing a niche market to safeguard 
“livelihoods, build territorial identity and secure community cohesion” to a “Critical 
rationale (schemes as a form of opposition)” where certifications are used to 
emphasize the positive attributes of products that set them apart from “the perceived 
negative consequences of product standardization, mass marketing, environmental 
degradation, and health and safety concerns” (Ilbery et. al. 2005: 118-19). However, 
the authors contend that the labels are protectionist since their main purpose is 
merely to prevent product names from becoming generic and that “they are not 
quality labels in their own right, neither do they contain mandatory baseline 
environmental standards” (Ilbery et. al. 2005: 129). 
Réquillart (2001: 13) asserts that traditional products cannot be preserved 
without both the “public interventions” that “feed the ‘social construction of quality’ 
of regional products” and the “private interventions” that stem from producers’ 
promotional efforts. Ilbery et. al. (2001) provide an empirical investigation of the 
latter through an overview of how producers use regional imagery to market quality 
products in particular ‘lagging rural regions’ of Greece and Finland. Their results 
point to highly variable conceptions of the meaning and interpretation of quality, 
thereby complicating its use as an effective marketing device. In fact, producers 
appeared to be less focused on marketing and were more interested in distinguishing 
their products through highlighting particular small-scale production methods, 
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expertise, and the use of superior ingredients. This presents a significant issue for 
EGI schemes “where there is an implicit assumption that the linking of products to 
specific places is an automatic guarantee of quality” (Ilbery et. al. 2001: 38). 
Nevertheless, these findings are important for the study of EGIs because they 
provide further evidence that not all EGI producers can simply be reduced to “profit 
maximizers” (Ilbery et. al. 2001: 31).  
Finally, Gilg and Battershill (1998: 39) are not convinced that the growth in 
quality food markets presents a formidable affront to an increasingly rigorous 
industrialized food system, only providing disorganized assistance to a select few. 
Those who choose to employ the system face multiple difficulties related to costs 
that are the result of strict technical requirements (Bouamra-Mechemache and 
Chaaban 2010a). Marescotti (2003) examines the case of the ‘Cherry of Lari’ in 
Tuscany and finds that it was external actors rather than the producers themselves 
who were most concerned with attaining a quality label. Much traditional production 
in Europe is small-scale in nature. On top of that, producers are confronted with a 
costly and complicated application process and pressure to maintain stringent 
standards. As a result, she concludes that origin labels might not be the most useful 
means of sustaining small producers. Along similar lines, Bowen and De Master 
(2011) argue that it is crucial to question the power relations that cement taken-for-
granted beliefs surrounding concepts such as ‘heritage’ and ‘tradition’ which may be 
strategically used by dominant actors to exploit quality markets. They examine case 
studies of products in France and Poland and find that, while there is potential for 
these policies to benefit regional development they may also “(1) reduce the 
diversity of available products, (2) create static notions of culture and (3) 
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fundamentally change or distort the character of products in promoting the shift from 
local to extralocal markets” (Bowen and De Master 2011: 75). 
2.4. Contestation 
The institutionalization of origin policies appears on the surface to be a 
unified and organized governmental response to solve a variety of issues plaguing 
producers of traditional products and consumers in both developed and developing 
countries. However, such institutionalization has ensued in a fractious and complex 
political context in which contestation endures despite attempts at outward shows of 
unity on the part of the EU. 
2.4.1. Regional level 
The history of French AOC development is far more complicated than a mere 
recognition of the essential national connection to patrimonial designations and 
effective intervention by the government. A more thorough look at the history and 
development of origin protection reveals the complexity of vested interests involved 
in shaping AOC institutions. A dual struggle occurred in the food and wine industry 
in France in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the one hand was 
an attempt to put an end to the adulteration of common food and drink products 
(Stanziani 2007). On the other hand was a battle to protect the sanctity of products 
from the usurpation of names and reputations, such as the dilemma over the rights to 
‘Champagne’ and to preserve added value through class distinctions. Kolleen Guy 
(1999, 2001, 2002, 2003) investigates how private actors such as producers and 
merchants were pivotal in the struggle underpinning the call for appellations to 
differentiate products. The name ‘Champagne’ was used to promote particular 
connotations with quality, prestige, and French identity, and merchants encouraged 
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the notion that inexpensive Champagne was inauthentic to disguise their own self-
interest and promoted the importance of guarding wine as a nationwide patrimonial 
mission in order to persuade the government to take action (Guy 1999: 238). Guy 
(2003: 192) states that “by evoking soil, history, and tradition, the wine producers 
made what were essentially social and cultural constructs appear ‘natural’ and, 
therefore, justly protected by a rational set of regulations. Products of the terroir, 
whether or not they were actually consumed in France, became an important aspect 
of the idea of ‘Frenchness.’”  
In addition, according to the INAO (2006) an AOC “identifies an 
unprocessed or processed agricultural product, which draws its authenticity and 
typicity from its geographical origin.” The INAO (2006) clarifies the authenticity 
claims by stating that an AOC assures a product’s intimate connection with its 
“terroir,” which it states is a “clearly defined geographical area” encompassing 
“natural” and “human” components whose unique features may not be replicated 
elsewhere (INAO 2006). But despite being institutionalized, terms such as terroir, 
authenticity, and typicity continue to be ambiguous and heavily debated (Alcock 
2005; Hudgins 2005; Whitings 2005). This testimonial also implies that 
distinguishing an AOC product area is simple when it continues to be a highly 
disputed and difficult process (Hood 2008; Charters 2006: 104). When calls for 
demarcation began, designated production areas were “constructed rather than 
found” (Gangjee 2012: 102) and disagreements between regions campaigning for the 
rights to appellations abounded while actors with vested interests helped to shape the 
very definitions consistent in the AOC today (Guy 2001). As well, early appellations 
were criticized because they “reflect[ed] the political efficiency of local authorities 
and interests more than the actual quality of the wines” (Teil 2010: 256).  
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To continue, the very notion of terroir providing the basis for French AOC 
policies is a very contested and politicized term. Scientists generally approve of the 
assertion that differing ecological areas have an effect on wine (Guy 2002: 42). But 
what is generally disputed is its socially constructed nature (Barham 2003) and the 
inclusion of abstract elements “that recognizes the joys, the heartbreaks, the pride, 
the sweat, and the frustrations of its history” (Wilson 1998: 55) and even refers to the 
wine maker’s “soul” (Guy 2002: 42). Vaudour (2002: 120) attributes terroir to a 
shared recollection of a population in a particular area that has evolved over time 
into a normative judgment and expectation of a product’s taste. However, this 
conception is overly simplistic and does not take into account the complicated 
interaction of “French tastemakers – journalists, cookbook writers, chefs – and taste 
producers – cheese makers, winemakers, bakers, cooks…” who contribute to 
actively defining it (Trubek 2008: 21).  
2.4.2. European level 
To return to Gangjee’s historical narrative regarding the evolution of GIs, one 
of the most striking features relates to his disclosure of little-known disputes that 
were integral to the creation of the PDO/PGI divide under European law. The 
contemporary GI chronicle portrays a cooperative and collective Europe as the 
ultimate defender and promoter of protection for traditional products everywhere, 
whereas an overlooked reality reveals that “the European divide that was bridged 
relatively recently, appears to have faded from memory” (Gangjee 2012: 226). The 
PDO was the only scheme in existence until 1991 because of disagreements that 
permeated the debate mainly between northern and southern countries. It was 
rejected by the European Parliament and returned only to emerge with what would 
turn out to be the less-strict PGI. The separate PDO/PGI schemes materialized in 
52 
 
order to resolve a political dispute between French and German protection models, 
reflecting the “terroir logic premised on a qualitative link” that is central to the 
French system and the “communicative logic premised on the reputation link” that is 
fundamental to the German system (Gangjee 2012: 231). Thus, the split was devised 
as a means of conciliating diverging national interests while maintaining the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole. Profeta et. al. (2009: 633) suggest that such a 
division is ineffective and should be abolished. 
The tension between France and Germany and the ultimate policy 
compromise reflects an important issue. European agricultural policy, of which the 
EGI system is an important part, is not as uniform and seamlessly harmonized as it 
may seem. Rather, it is a highly differentiated system divided along state lines where 
national and sub-national actors actively influence and shape policy based on 
domestic interests and concerns. It has been demonstrated that decision-making in 
the area of agriculture is greatly influenced by the political and economic interests of 
individual Member States (Runge and von Witzke 1987; Mahe and Roe 1996; 
Daugbjerg 1999; Greer 2005). The interests of EU Member States concerning the 
composition of common agricultural policies differ widely depending on the 
“structural and income differences in their farming sectors” (Olper 1998: 466) as 
well as the overall “role of agriculture in society,” particularly reflecting the growing 
tension between maintaining agricultural enterprises in borderline rural areas and the 
shift in the direction to more industrialized and productive systems (Grethe 1999: 
205).  
Webber (1999: 61) contends that European integration theorization in the 
area of agricultural policy “under-estimates the continuing significance of the 
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member states, especially France and Germany, as political actors in Brussels and 
over-estimates the extent to which they have ceded power to supranational bodies 
such as the Commission.” He demonstrates how national governments driven by 
differing preferences and reflecting pressure from national interest groups have 
exerted control within EU decision-making in the agricultural sector. One of his 
cases is devoted to occurrences in the early 1990s, the same period during which 
EGI schemes were harmonized. He shows how the Commission has acted more as a 
“mediator” to resolve conflicts between disagreeable Member States rather than an 
“independent policy formulator” in its own right (Webber 1999: 59). 
Agriculture in the EU is characterized by a multilevel governance structure 
where states are only “one among a variety of actors contesting decisions that are 
made at a variety of levels” (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996: 346). These actors are 
driven by different priorities, agendas, and strategies and interact through the 
formation of coalitions, policy networks, and bargaining processes (Landau 1998) in 
an attempt to adapt policy to suit and protect their own agricultural interests. 
According to Greer (2005: 32), while “supranational policy programmes are highly 
sensitive to national demands” the development of policy “is structured by the 
important network relationships between governments and rural stakeholders at the 
national level.” Regarding the latter, the defense of agricultural interests by sub-
national groups at the national level is conceivably more significant and influential 
than at the EU level. At the national level highly organized agricultural lobbyists 
possess significant and disproportionate power that enables them to exert influence 
on policy and convince national representatives to block reforms and concessions in 
both EU and international negotiations (Keeler 1996). At the international level state 
officials try to protect national interests through closely monitoring the negotiating 
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agenda. Conflicts between Member States restrict the EU’s negotiating flexibility 
and affect the evolution of and decisions made in agricultural trade negotiations 
(Woll 2009). 
Food is a contested medium within the EU and conflicts have arisen from 
sociological processes as well as differences in national agricultural policies and 
preferences. DeSoucey (2010) develops the concept of “gastronationalism” whereby 
the production and consumption of food is employed to delimit and preserve 
nationalist identities within the context of Europeanization, which in turn also affects 
its production, marketing, and protection under EGI schemes. And while nationalist 
sentiments towards food redraw boundaries between Member States, Becker (2009) 
notes that differing agricultural strategies do as well and also affect the enthusiasm 
for EGI schemes. Each country can choose from a variety of food quality initiatives 
to suit their needs, which include ‘collective quality marks’, ‘geographical 
indicators’ (EGIs), ‘food quality assurance schemes’ and ‘organic production’ 
(Becker 2009: 127). His study finds that countries in the Mediterranean region are 
heavily oriented towards EGIs while Germany, the UK, Ireland, and Belgium placed 
emphasis on quality assurance. Austria and the Scandinavian countries were more 
organic-oriented while central and east European countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Hungary are jumping on the EGI 
bandwagon. 
Ultimately, it is important to keep in mind that not all Member States have 
placed EGI schemes on their list of national priorities. This becomes even clearer 
from a look at the European Commission’s (2014) DOOR database in which three-
fourths of all EGI registrations derive from southern countries such as Italy, France, 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Such a division is also reflected in the cheese names 
55 
 
consistently put forward for protection in EU bilateral negotiations [see Appendices 
C and D].  
These national differences are in part due to varying climactic conditions but 
also to variations in national agricultural systems. Many countries especially in 
northern Europe were opposed to the harmonization of EGIs at the European level 
because “the northern perspective on quality marks often rested on an assumption 
that they are an unjustified market intervention, distorting trade and competition 
within the Community food market” and that the schemes “represent a spurious 
construction of quality” (Parrott, Wilson and Murdoch 2002: 248). Countries such as 
the UK whose historical consumption pattern has not developed a strong link 
between regions and their respective products have been slow to take on the system. 
Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000b) show that producers in the UK adopt the system more 
to protect their business interests from competition than to increase profits because 
they do not feel that the certification system is desired or widely recognizable by 
consumers. 
To continue, research conducted by Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch (2002) 
presents evidence that the contestation permeating origin protection within Europe 
could also be attributed to differences in national cultures. They suggest that a 
geographical divide pits the more economically efficient “‘north’, where more 
functional and aspatial approaches to food quality dominate” against a more 
territorial, social, and culturally-embedded ‘south’ whose approach “is based upon 
pre-existing agricultural and gastronomic traditions and can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the perceived threats posed by globalization and EU harmonization” 
(Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch 2002: 256). They admit that this is an over-simplified 
characterization and that further complexity exists within the various European 
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regions. But it is important in that it highlights fundamental cultural tensions that 
exist to complicate the legislation and treatment of EGIs within the EU.  
Furthermore, national divides within Europe are evident when considering 
consumer preferences.  Roosen, Lusk, and Fox (2003) find that consumers in France, 
Germany, and the UK desire to know the origin of beef, especially following the 
BSE scares. However, consumers in the UK still give priority to price, indicating a 
possible resistance to purchase costlier EGI products. They remind that informing 
consumers of the origin of a product is different from capitalizing on the premium 
prices of EGI-labelled products. Additionally, Halkier et. al. (2007) reinforce that 
there cannot be a unified conception of consumers within Europe because of national 
differences. Their study highlights the differences in discursive framings of 
consumers in Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal and concludes that “references 
to the European consumer are misleading” (Halkier et. al. 2007: 380). This is 
supported by a Eurobarometer (EC Special Eurobarometer 2004: 56) survey where 
European consumers were asked whether an EU guarantee of the origin and 
traditional methods of a product would affect their confidence in it. In 1999 forty-six 
percent of people expressed interest in an origin guarantee and forty-eight percent in 
a tradition guarantee. Yet, the results were spread unevenly across Member States 
with a higher proportion of confidence unsurprisingly emanating from southern 
countries such as Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Italy and a lower number from 
countries such as Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria. 
Additionally, other research has relayed negative or disinterested perceptions 
of EGI products (Bonnet and Simioni 2001). Hassan, Monier-Dilhan, and Orozco 
(2011) directed an empirical study of the price elasticity of a French PDO cheese that 
contests the broad acceptance that PDOs signify high-quality for most consumers in 
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the cheese sector. The price elasticity of PDOs was shown to be similar to normal 
products, therefore suggesting that “globally, consumers are not more but less loyal 
to PDOs than to standard products” and that an increase in price leads to a significant 
decrease in demand (Hassan, Monier-Dilhan, and Orozco 2011: 15). Likewise, a 
survey of Greek consumers’ willingness to pay finds that while over eighty percent 
of respondents approve of the benefits of PDO labeling, only ten percent had ever 
heard of it. The authors conclude that the labels could prove ineffective without a 
devoted promotional operation (Fotopoulos and Krystallis 2003). These findings are 
supported by the same Eurobarometer (EC Special Eurobarometer 2004: 51-3) 
survey and indicate that quality labels are not well-known. Survey results from 1996 
and 1999 show that eighty percent of respondents had never seen or heard of PDO 
while PGI fared worse with eighty-six percent. Awareness was generally low across 
Member States, with some exceptions in countries such as Italy and France. 
Moreover, much like in France the apparent ease to which products are 
registered under the EGI system overlooks the crucial yet contentious aspect of 
demarcating production boundaries for products, and the division between PDO and 
PGI designations within European legislation complicates this further. Through the 
example of the Melton Mowbray Pork Pie PGI in the UK, Gangjee (2006) focuses 
on a product whose link to the geographical origin is considerably weak and whose 
production area has spread in order to display the difficulty in drawing distinct 
boundaries around products where no concrete rules exist for doing so. He declares 
that for: 
“products based more on ‘reputational’ links to their places of origin, constructed 
around cultural, historical or socio-economic moorings rather than on scientifically 
verifiable natural features, establishing clearly defined boundaries has become more 
problematic. As one moves away from ‘natural’ features, the argument that GIs are a 
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commercially or politically expedient monopoly in a term, with arbitrary production 
boundaries, becomes increasingly difficult to ignore” (Gangjee 2006: 9).  
These boundaries will turn out to be ever more essential as the amount of EGIs 
protected by the system increases. 
The Melton Mowbray example leads to a related issue regarding the 
designation of products as generic. Gangjee (2007) is one of few scholars to tackle 
the issue of genericism in an EU context. Through the case of Feta cheese he 
demonstrates the complications that arise when producers attempt to register a 
product that others outside the region consider to be generic. The protection of Feta 
under the EGI system has been contested in court on multiple occasions by 
producers in European Member states outside of Greece who used the contestation 
mechanism to lodge a complaint against its registration. A complicated legal battle 
ensued that ultimately resulted in the registration of Feta as a PDO based on 
evidence that consumers still acknowledge its place of origin to be Greece. The 
decision of the case highlighted the “competing interests at stake” (Gangjee 2007: 3) 
that ultimately favored producers over consumers. Gangjee (2007: 18) also notes that 
on occasion EGI registration “outcomes are influenced by political concessions.”  
2.4.3. Global level 
Calls to extend the protection of GIs and to create a multilateral register have 
also led to a contentious atmosphere within world trade negotiations. As with the 
split between PDO and PGIs in the EU, the different degrees of protection 
represented by Articles 22 and 23 in the TRIPS agreement were the result of a 
political compromise “granted solely for the political reason of persuading the 
European Communities (EC) to join consensus on the Uruguay Round package, 
despite strong opposition from many countries” (Das 2007: 37). Consequently, this 
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is indicative of why many opponents remain “suspicious” (Teil 2010: 269) of an 
extension whilst arguing that current protection is sufficient and that participation in 
a multilateral register should be voluntary, not obligatory (WTO 2008).  
The further multilateral institutionalization of GIs has been resisted by 
numerous countries. In 1999 and 2003 the US and Australia confronted the EU in the 
WTO, citing the internationally non-compliant and discriminatory nature of GI 
policies. Handler (2006: 79) states that such a move was a strategic counter to what 
they believe to be the EU’s protectionist intentions, while Charlier and Ngo (2007: 
181) cite the resistance as a means of preventing the EU from imposing their policies 
“on an international model.” While the EGI system was found to be internationally 
compliant, this dispute resulted in a change within policy structures that from 2006 
allowed third countries to register and directly object to proposed names (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 510/2006). It also resulted in the creation of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel (Josling 2006: 352).  
Although the GI debate involves many countries, a main focus within the 
legal, intellectual property, and trade literature has been on the transatlantic conflict 
that pits the philosophical (Marette, Clemens, and Babcock 2008), cultural (Echols 
2005), and legislative (Echols 2008) differences and competing interests of the EU 
against those of the US (Creditt 2009; Zacher 2005; Niska 2004; Chen 1996; 
Goldberg 2001). The EU protects GIs through a collective sui generis system while 
the US prefers individual trademarks (Beresford 2007). As well, within the context 
of the shift towards the further liberalization of agricultural trade, GIs feature 
prominently in European agricultural reform strategy (Goldberg 2001: 144; Hughes 
2006-2007: 339) but are considered by the US to be an unnecessary barrier to trade 
and a threat to business interests (Josling 2006: 360). Other differences in 
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approaches are evident as the EU utilizes GIs as an agricultural policy tool to 
promote quality and rural development and the US views it as an issue of property 
rights (Marette, Clemens, and Babcock 2008: 456).  
Whereas literature devoted to further GI institutionalization tends to support 
the European position, the controversial nature of EU proposals is reflected in 
oppositional arguments against it (Bowers 2003). Monten (2006) asserts that the 
protection of GIs under TRIPs was an important and worthwhile milestone in 
multilateral negotiations but that attempts to extend more stringent protection are 
not. She also affirms that the EU’s intentions are positive in easing the transition 
from quantity to quality within their agricultural policy but that their self-interested 
perspective blinds them to the “realities that such policies cause for ‘new world’ 
countries” (Monten 2006: 346). Hughes (2006-7: 386) supports this assertion by 
making the case that the EU’s extensionist ambitions are unjustified on the basis that 
there is “no convincing evidence of how the terroir inputs work, no convincing 
evidence that consumers can detect the allegedly unique outputs, and plenty of 
evidence that the geological and climatic factors that are important to artisanal food 
production do not line up with the appellations that have been created.” Such 
conclusions are echoed by Raustiala and Munzer (2007: 340) who determine that GI 
protection is useful in its current form but that extended protection beyond wines and 
spirits is unjustified and unsupportable by various theories of property. 
Another area of contention surrounds the issue of generics, which according 
to (Gangjee 2007: 1) “has persisted as the single most controversial issue in 
Geographical Indication (GI) law for over a century.” The issue is touched upon in 
the literature focused at the global level but is limited mainly to the areas of law and 
economics (Benavente 2010) as well as being concentrated in the category of wine 
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(Kazmi 2000). With regard to the former, Rangnekar and Kumar (2010) examine the 
complicated nature of GIs at the global level through the case of Basmati rice, which 
has been imitated by those seeking to capitalize on its reputation and high value and 
incorporated into trademarks and patents thereby putting it at risk for genericization. 
Basmati is also problematic due to its position as a “transborder” GI between India 
and Pakistan and the authors draw attention to the wide array of interests and other 
aspects involved in establishing the genericity of a term. Regarding the latter, Kemp 
and Forsythe (2007) present the case of Champagne as a means of discussing 
conflicts between GIs and trademarks while Lindquist (1999) uses wine as a lens to 
show how the US has failed to comply with GI provisions in the TRIPS agreement. 
Still others investigate bilateral trade agreements that have affected the use of 
generic wine terms in various countries (Craven and Mather 2001; Rose 2007; Zahn 
2012). 
To continue, opponents of GIs argue that many details have been overlooked 
in the haste to secure extended protection and revolve around issues of structure, 
consumers, producers, culture, and developing countries. They have pointed out 
flaws and difficulties in the implementation, consistency (Staten 2005: 245), and 
transparency (Profeta et. al. 2009: 624) of GI systems along with imprecise and 
varying definitions (Torsen 2005: 60). Beresford (2007) argues that the focus should 
remain at the national level to ensure fully functioning and compliant systems before 
further protection is considered at the global level. On a different note, skeptics point 
out that if the threat of globalization has created a need to safeguard goods through 
further intellectual property rights such as GIs, it has at the same time increased their 
financial worth. GI advocates who at once bemoan globalization’s relentless 
standardization are at the same time motivated to support international arrangements 
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that enable them to profit from it (Raustiala and Munzer 2007). With regard to 
consumers, GIs could actually prove more rather than less perplexing as, “It is often 
hard to market a similar product with a different name without using or referencing a 
well-known GI” (Raustiala and Munzer 2007: 362) and decreased supply might also 
lead to a rise in prices and leave consumers in a worse position (Das 2007: 40). Chen 
(1996: 62) dismisses GI protection as “designed primarily to maximize producer 
incomes and only secondarily, if at all, to protect consumer expectations.” 
Additionally, a number of those countries opposed to GI extension 
historically received countless numbers of immigrants who brought their cultural 
traditions with them, including names and terms because, “As food technology 
migrates, the terminology migrates” (Hughes et. al. 2007: 976). They argue that it 
would be “culturally insensitive” to try and repossess immigrant traditions that have 
long been used and are now considered to be “acquired rights” (Das 2007: 41). At 
the same time, many such terms have become generic (Hughes 2006-7: 353-54), 
handed down through generations of European immigrants (Cox 2003). Broude 
(2005) also confronts the argument advocated by many GI proponents that the legal 
protection of GIs will help prevent the standardization and disappearance of cultural 
diversity. In a unique article addressing the often overlooked role of culture in the 
international regulation of GIs, he describes how legitimating their further extension 
through the argument that they act as preservation mechanisms for culture is 
misguided and unnecessary and declares that “it is not GIs that uphold culture, but 
rather culture that upholds GIs” (Broude 2005: 32). Culture is repeatedly used to 
legitimate protective measures, which have nonetheless been shown to be futile in 
counteracting cultural change over time. Ultimately, Broude (2005: 26) holds that, 
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“The safeguarding of cultural diversity is thus at the mercy of market forces, with or 
without legal GI protection.”  
Finally, the usefulness of GIs for developing countries is contested and the 
translation of GI systems into different international contexts is far more complicated 
than it is presented. The role of the state in GI systems differs globally and there is a 
greater degree of state involvement in countries such as India who are newer to 
embrace the system. On the contrary, it is more withdrawn in established GI 
countries such as France where the approach has shifted to allow for more agency for 
producers (Marie-Vivien 2009). Still, in some developing countries the state is 
absent and benefits for rural communities are lost at the hands of more powerful 
actors. Bowen (2010) demonstrates how differences in national GI policies and state 
involvement in France and Mexico significantly affects the potential for GIs to 
positively influence rural development. France has one of the oldest GI systems in 
the world while Mexico is relatively new to the system. The state is involved in 
providing monetary support for producers in France; however the government’s 
involvement in rural development in Mexico has diminished. She concludes that 
without governmental support to help small producers, GI protection may never 
benefit them. 
El Benni and Reviron (2009) also recognize that focusing on products that 
are already well-known outside their place of origin does not offer any insights into 
the usefulness of GIs for lesser-known producers in developing countries. Along 
similar lines, Kur and Cocks (2007: 1011) claim that GI protection is pointless 
without more of a focus on “fostering brand awareness.” Others stress that a 
multilateral arrangement will not accrue instantaneous advantages to developing 
countries (Vivas-Eugui 2005) and that building a recognizable product reputation is 
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hard work (Hughes et. al. 2007) and occasionally benefits only a few producers 
rather than entire regions (Callois 2004/6). In some cases GIs could also impose 
more obligations and costs than reap benefits (Williams 2002). This situation is 
highlighted in an empirical study of tequila carried out by Bowen and Zapata (2008: 
117-18), which illustrates the possible drawbacks of GI protection. Ironically, their 
study found that the tequila GI registration did not in fact benefit small communities 
but instead led to ecological deterioration and financial exclusion at the hands of 
powerful external players. At the same time, with regard to traditional knowledge 
Zou (2005: 1174) reminds that “protecting the biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge of developing countries involves complex political, social, and economic 
undertakings that may be best dealt with through venues other than international 
trade.” It is also surprising in the literature that despite the intense focus on GIs as an 
economic tool, few empirical analyses of their economic effects and consequences 
have been performed in developing countries where heavy emphasis has been placed 
on their potential benefits. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this course I demonstrated how the protection of GIs has undergone a 
progressive institutionalization over time. What began as a social and economic 
struggle in early twentieth century France resulted in the creation of AOC 
certifications that inspired the creation of origin protection schemes in other 
countries, prompting the EU to harmonize the systems in order to ensure the free 
movement of goods across national borders. The EU has also been the main advocate 
for GI protection globally, which has resulted in attempts to strengthen and extend 
protection. In addition, they promote EGIs as an important mechanism to ensure 
quality, contribute to rural development, and inform consumers. At the same time, 
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this institutionalization has not occurred without contestation. The development of 
GI policies at various scales of governance reveals the divisions and complicated 
interests that have interacted to socially construct a scheme that is not yet fully 
embraced around the world. Differences in cultures, agricultural policies, and 
consumer preferences within European Member States contribute to an EU that is 
divided on the EGI issue. And at the global level, divisions between countries are 
further entrenched. Opposition to the system abounds as actors consistently argue 
against extended GI protection and emphasize its inconsistencies. 
A thorough overview of the literature on GIs and generics reveals a number 
of key themes within this historical evolution. These surround the prominence of law 
and intellectual property studies within the international debate, the conception and 
construction of quality, and the usefulness of the schemes for rural development and 
consumer protection. Notable work has also explored the potential for GIs to be used 
as economic tools in developing countries and their role in global trade. Still, a 
noticeable feature of academic and policy debates surrounding GIs has been a lack of 
focus on the discursive and rhetorical constructions involved in GI politics. In 
addition, the issue of GGIs is briefly mentioned but rarely the sole subject of inquiry. 
For that reason, in the next course I introduce a theoretical framework designed to 
investigate the neglected issue of GGIs that is derived from the concepts of moral 
panic, securitization, and myth. These concepts combine into what I term a ‘gastro-
panic’ rhetoric that is evident in the discourse of EU and NW actors involved in the 
generic dispute. I argue that the politics of generics are framed by parallel 
constructions of gastro-panic that pits competing sides against one another and 
enhances the political salience of the perceived threat of generic use on the one hand 
and GI protection on the other.  
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Third Course 
3. Moral Panic, Securitization, and Myth: Theorizing the Gastro-
Panic 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The debate over GIs is a continuously evolving and contested area within 
bilateral and multilateral discussions. The majority of recent literature has centered 
on GIs as a legal and intellectual property issue (O’Connor 2004; Echols 2008; 
Calboli 2006; Agdomar 2008; Kazmi 2001), specifically focusing on the different 
protection mechanisms such as the distinctions between sui generis and trademark 
systems. As well, much attention has been paid to the utility of GIs as a means 
through which to ensure high quality and promote rural development (Bouamra-
Mechemache and Chaaban 2010a; Parrott, Wilson and Murdoch 2002; Whirthgen 
2005; Parrott, Wilson and Murdoch 2002; Ilbery and Kneafsey 2000a; Ilbery et. al. 
2001; Desquilbet, Hassan and Monier-Dilhan 2005; Loureiro and McCluskey 2000) 
and as a potential tool for developing countries (Das 2007; Mawardi 2005; 
Rangnekar 2009; Vivas-Eugui 2005). However, more in-depth examinations of the 
discursive and rhetorical constructions involved in GI politics along with exceptions 
to GI rules, such as GGIs, have been largely neglected. 
I argue that these focuses alone are insufficient in understanding the 
complexity of the contemporary GI debate. Thus, my aim is to develop an 
explanatory framework that engages with the varied meaning constructions and 
discourses permeating the dispute over generics, which are evident amidst the 
negotiated and contested terrain that encompasses international decision-making in 
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the area of agriculture and foodstuffs. I begin by examining the concepts of moral 
panic, securitization, and Barthesian myth. Moral panic refers to the heightened 
concern over a perceived threat and demarcation of a ‘folk devil’ and is used as a 
means of beginning the analysis and the main foundation from which the gastro-
panic will be built. I then introduce the theory of securitization developed by the 
Copenhagen School (CS) in order to conceptualize moral panic as a food system 
security issue and draw attention to processes of legitimation. I finish by elaborating 
on an aspect of meaning-making that characterizes and flourishes in a moral panic 
and must be deconstructed – that of Barthes’ conception of myth – where I will be 
able to distinguish the competing mythologies of terroirism and genericism that 
underlie competing discourses over the status of particular food names. Throughout 
the chapter I highlight the main limitations of each approach and demonstrate how I 
overcome the shortcomings of each concept. Then, I expand on the notion of gastro-
panic through a synthesis of the three approaches, which will guide the discussion 
and empirical analyses in later courses.  
3.2. Moral Panic 
In my investigation of the politics of generics within the GI debate I develop 
an explanatory framework that takes the concept of moral panic as its starting point. 
I second Critcher’s (2008: 1138) assertion that moral panic is best used as “an ideal 
type: a means of beginning an analysis, not the entire analysis in itself.” The 
explanatory value of moral panic is generally attributed to its role in clarifying the 
“normative contours” and “moral boundaries” within societies (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda 1994: 30). But because it “is not conceptually rigid or inflexible” (Goode 
and Ben-Yehuda 2011: 33) and can be enhanced by numerous theories to describe 
and elucidate a wide range of cases, it may also be used to illuminate how the 
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various boundaries within the generic debate that designate food name protection – 
social, political and economic – are actively constructed. At the same time, David et. 
al. (2011: 227-8) suggest that, “The power of the term has resided as much in the 
concept’s ability to provoke challenges to taken-for-granted ways of seeing, as it has 
in providing a unified way to view the world.”  
3.2.1. The limitations of moral panic 
Issues surrounding food are rarely the subject of moral panic analyses and are 
generally disputed by critics whose aim is to tighten the applicability and boundaries 
of the concept. Food-related issues where it has been used tend to revolve around 
food scares such as BSE (Beardsworth 1990) and obesity (Monaghan, Hollands and 
Pritchard 2010; Saguy and Almeling 2005). However, these cases have been 
criticized for overlooking the essential ‘moral’ aspects of the panic (Thompson 1998: 
Preface vii; Critcher 2008: 33), lacking the presence of a clear folk devil, or focusing 
on regulating one’s self as opposed to controlling others (Critcher 2008: 29). 
Nonetheless, scholars continue to question whether the powerful social reactions 
stirred up by food scares qualify (Murji 1999: 414) and why certain issues such as 
the public outrage over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) have not yet been 
the target of analysis (Hunt 2001: 56), since it could be argued that both cases 
display the essential features of a moral panic. 
I contend that food issues should be brought to the center of moral panic 
analysis, which will be elaborated through the dispute over generics. Cohen (2011: 
242) opines that the most significant areas for possible moral panic eruptions in the 
future will center around “immigration, migrants, multicultural absorption, refugees, 
border controls and asylum seekers” because they are “more political, more edgy and 
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more amenable to violence.” Empirical cases such as the environment and, I would 
add, food issues that are less receptive to analysis are so because they lack clear folk 
devils and are “more politically ambiguous and intellectually difficult” (Cohen 2011: 
242). But the knowledge gained by applying moral panic to these cases should not be 
underestimated and they should not be discarded simply because they do not 
perfectly fit the moral panic mold. In fact, one of the main challenges of moral panic 
analysis is to figure out how to help it mature, to alter the mold in such a way that 
permits it to be useful for problematic cases such as climate change (Rohloff 2011). 
Food and agricultural issues have consistently been and will continue to be highly 
politicized sites of panic in the future.  
The concern surrounding generics and GIs is not a moral panic in a 
traditional sense. Thus, I am aware that the various empirical contexts in which the 
moral panic concept has been used do not afford it perfect transferability to this 
context. However, I argue that the use of food names has gained additional salience 
on the global multilateral agenda because it has been framed by parallel political 
constructions of panic concerning the threatening effects of the generic use of food 
names on the one hand and the threat of their exclusive protection on the other. The 
particular panic under consideration does not have the veritable features of a 
genuinely moral panic, yet the controversy surrounding it fulfils the majority of 
moral panic criteria advanced by conventional and revisionist theorists alike. 
The literature indicates that certain empirical cases surrounding food persist 
in puzzling scholars because they are capable of exhibiting the characteristics of a 
moral panic, yet any attempt to include them within its realm of analysis has been 
challenged. This begs the question whether the difficulties in applying the moral 
panic concept to certain food issues arise from its application as a unified term. The 
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traditional usage of the qualifying adjective moral limits the meaning of the noun 
panic by denoting particular qualities. This has previously been criticized as 
exclusive and others have called for its broadened use to encompass more varied 
cases (Critcher 2008: 1137). This custom has also disqualified non-moral food issues 
from fitting comfortably into the moral panic framework.  
Therefore, it may be possible to separate the moral from the panic because 
the purpose of the adjective should be to enhance the general requirements of the 
panic construction, not define it. The essence of moral panic analysis also rests in its 
usefulness as a tool to interrogate the panic aspects embodied in social reactions to 
conditions or events that are perceived as threatening various orders – political or 
economic – and not just the moral order. Therefore, simply identifying the general 
parameters of a panic does not inevitably make it a moral panic in nature and it could 
be possible that not all panics are by definition moral panics. After all, it is necessary 
to know more about the veritable content of a panic before applying the moral panic 
concept in its entirety. Thus, the general explanation of how a panic is constructed 
may be retained and new qualifying adjectives attached that better fit varied 
empirical cases. Since GIs and generics are not distinctly moral issues, I will discuss 
the possibility of re-configuring moral panic as a gastro-panic. This will be further 
enhanced through the inclusion of the CS notion of securitization and Roland 
Barthes’ concept of myth, which will be further explained throughout this course. 
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3.2.2. Exploring the ‘gastro’ in gastro-panic 
Gastronomy forms the basis and content for the ‘gastro’ in gastro-panic.12 
While modern gastronomy may be associated with popular TV chefs and gourmet 
magazines or construed as food snobbism – it is much more than that. It is not an 
overstatement to say that gastronomy encompasses all things food and drink, both in 
study and in practice. Szanto (2011: 3) explains that it “concerns itself with 
relationships and connections – the complex dynamics of food, people, and 
environments.” Gastronomy is a holistic discipline (Scarpato 2002), a science (Hervé 
2002; Van der Linden, McClements, and Ubbink 2008), a practice (Santich 2004), 
and a much-debated term that has evolved throughout history. Its usage was revived 
in early nineteenth-century France (Scarpato 2002: 93-4) and the pioneers of 
gastronomy in Europe felt they were serving a higher purpose through advancing a 
“discourse of aesthetic taste, a cultural field opening onto the material pleasures of 
appetite” (Gigante 2005: xvii). Long reserved for the upper classes, gastronomy was 
eventually liberated from the elite domain and popularized amongst the middle 
classes in France as “the art of good eating” (Scarpato 2002: 94).  
The definition of gastronomy has continued to expand and one of the most 
well-known gastronomers of the early twentieth century, Jean Anthelme Brillat-
Savarin (1949: 61-2), muses that:  
“Gastronomy is the intelligent knowledge of whatever concerns man’s 
nourishment…The subject matter of gastronomy is whatever can be eaten; its direct 
end is the conservation of individuals; and its means of execution are the culture 
which produces, the commerce which exchanges, the industry which prepares, and 
the experience which invents means to dispose of everything to the best advantage.”  
                                                          
12
 The word itself has been around since antiquity (Santich 2004: 16) and is rooted in the Greek 
language where ‘gaster’ refers to the ‘belly or stomach’ and ‘nomas’ to the ‘law of a subject’ (Bode 
1994: 127). 
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Here, gastronomy assumes a political-economic dimension through the consumption, 
production, distribution, and trade of food and drink. What is more, it encompasses 
the anthropological study of food habits (Arnott 1975) and the culture-specific norms 
and rules of eating and drinking. As such, it is a “socio-cultural practice” that 
provides a rallying point around which identities coalesce (Hjalager and Richards 
2002: 4, 3) and a manifestation of “cultural expressionism” that contributes meaning 
and value to life (Hegarty and O’Mahony 2001). It has also become “a contemporary 
cultural resource” (Scarpato 2002: 102) at the heart of both tourism (Van Westering 
1999; Hjalager and Richards 2002; Kivela and Crotts 2005) and commerce and is 
used as “a way to study the earth and probe why products have appeal…it is a 
method and set of tools for creating and giving value to food, and for preserving its 
culture and heritage” (Capatti 2008: 9).  
In summary, gastronomy may be used as a lens through which to better 
understand the complex dynamics of the food system – from production, processing, 
distribution and marketing to purchasing, preparation and consumption – and how 
these processes are culturally specific and linked. By food system I refer to Tansey 
and Worsley’s (1995: 1) definition that highlights the interrelatedness of three 
important components that include the: 
(1) “Biological: the living processes used to produce food and their 
ecological sustainability.” 
(2) “Economic and political: the power and control which different groups 
exert over the different parts of the system.” 
(3) “Social and cultural: the personal relations, community values and 
cultural traditions which affect people’s use of food.”  
In this way a gastro-panic cannot be a food scare because its broadened focus does 
not allow it to be confined to the context of food safety and health (Knowles, Moody 
and McEachern 2007). Rather, it could also emphasize the concern over the 
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disappearance of regional food and drink products, gastronomic diversity, and eating 
habits at risk due to encroaching industrial systems, globalization, and a fast-food 
way-of-life (Slow Food 2012). Gastro-panic involves the perceived and expressed 
anxiety over a wide range of elements within the contemporary food system, how 
this concern is manifested in political and public discourse, and the concrete effects 
it has on policy and governance.  
I define gastro-panic as a discursive strategy of demarcation and legitimation 
that actors use to (re)construct the cultural, economic, and political boundaries 
surrounding food production and consumption. They do this by appealing to a logic 
of security in order to persuade an audience that a cherished referent object within 
the food system requires protection from an existential threat and that certain 
exceptional measures are legitimate to provide such protection. Gastro-panic 
represents a boundary-maintaining and creating mechanism used by claims-makers 
to legitimize their normative and material interests in attaining or blocking the 
protection of food product names. It is itself a form of myth that simultaneously 
allows a focus on certain aspects of a situation, such as behavior deemed threatening, 
while shrouding others. By ensuring that a situation is perceived in one way rather 
than another, the gastro-panic prevents us from paying attention to other aspects of 
the situation that might be inconsistent with it. The overall effect of the gastro-panic 
is to problematize a food and/or agricultural issue in order to enhance its political 
salience and secure its placement on the policy agenda. This is important because 
according to Greer (2005: 34), “At times of crisis or on matters of high policy, 
agricultural issues can rise to the top of governmental policy agendas and involve 
high-level intervention from heads of government and other senior ministers.”  
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The gastro-panic functions as more than a discursive construction and can 
also have real practical effects on policy-making and the distribution of resources. In 
this way it functions similarly to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) conception of 
metaphor because it is not only prevalent in the language of actors but also structures 
their everyday practice. The gastro-panic is not simply talked about in terms of what 
is perceived to be threatening but also partially structures much of the actions 
performed in international negotiations where the right to use a food name has the 
potential to be won or lost. There competing actors consider the opposition to be a 
threat to their interests and they defend their positions, use and plan their own 
strategies, organize proposals, and mobilize supporters to influence policy and 
government action. The discourse pervading the gastro-panic thus serves a clear 
political-economic purpose: the deployment of language acts as an exercise of power 
through which it can be a useful means of persuading an audience (Charteris-Black 
2011), or generating a consensus, that actions must be taken to deter a threat.  
The use of certain language is affected by and can affect social relations and 
be used to advance particular and sometimes conflicting ideologies, meanings, and 
worldviews that are understood and represented differently in different contexts 
(Wood and Kroger 2000; Paltridge 2012; Jones 2012; Shi 2007). When I refer to the 
gastro-panic as a discursive process I am viewing the situation through Barthes’ 
concept of myth. Myth is a type of speech or mode of communication. Essentially, it 
is a discursive process that distorts and naturalizes certain worldviews, ideologies, 
and interpretations to appear as indisputable facts or common sense. Anything that 
can be spoken about or communicated through a discourse may become myth 
because it is not the objects themselves that are most important but rather the 
messages and meanings they convey. Myth is composed of beliefs and 
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representations that sustain and legitimate current power relationships and promote 
the values and interests of dominant groups in society. It is also intentional, 
contextual, and varied and is uncovered by focusing on the evolving meanings 
attached to certain signs, such as food names. 
As myth, the gastro-panic simultaneously allows a focus on certain aspects of 
the GGI situation, such as behavior deemed threatening, while shrouding others. 
Myth ensures that generic producers are unquestionably viewed as counterfeiters on 
the one hand and EU producers as aggressive protectionists on the other. By ensuring 
that a situation is perceived in one way rather than another, the gastro-panic 
articulated by each side in the debate prevents us from paying attention to other 
aspects of the situation that might be inconsistent with it. The overall effect of the 
gastro-panic is to problematize a food and/or agricultural issue in order to enhance 
its political salience and secure its placement on the policy agenda. Now that gastro-
panic has been defined it is important to consider how it was derived from the 
concepts of moral panic, securitization, and myth. 
3.2.3. Defining moral panic 
Moral panic refers to an outbreak of concern that arises over the appearance 
of objectionable behavior (Cohen 2002: 1) that is perceived as violating or 
threatening the “status quo”– the current social, political (Patry 2009: 138) or 
economic order (Critcher 2011). During a moral panic the division between the 
normal ‘us’ and deviant ‘them’ becomes more pronounced as claims-makers portray 
those allegedly responsible for the undesirable behavior, otherwise known as “folk 
devils,” in a negative light (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 30). At the same time, 
calls are made demanding action be taken to control the deviants to prevent their 
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behavior from reoccurring or leading to more disastrous consequences (Cohen 2002: 
26, 38-9). Ultimately, the collective agreement as to the unacceptability of folk 
devils’ behavior justifies any measures taken to control and prevent it. This could 
include the creation of additional rules and regulations or the withdrawal of “rights 
and liberties previously enjoyed” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 31-2, 27). 
The epistemological underpinnings of moral panic derive from a 
constructivist perspective whereby the threat of a folk devil’s behavior is not 
objectively apparent but takes form through the “quality bestowed upon it” (Young 
2009: 7, original emphasis). This quality is communicated by “claims-makers” that 
includes individuals, interest groups, campaigners, and others who “call attention to 
a troubling condition” (Best 2011: 47). Claims-makers profess to represent and 
promote the needs, preferences, and/or interests of others (Saward 2010: 36-8) in an 
attempt to influence policy-makers to take decisions in a particular direction and can 
have a decisive impact on policy and practice. Thus, the identification of deviance in 
society is generated through a process of social delineation and construction that may 
in turn be used as a means of facilitating punishment for said deviance (Cohen 
2002). In other words, according to Howard Becker (1963: 9, original emphasis) it is 
the claims-makers who “create deviance by making the rules whose infraction 
constitutes deviance…” and assigns them to specific individuals or groups who are 
thereafter marked as “outsiders.” This is solidified through a process of sensitization 
that “entails the reinterpretation of neutral or ambiguous stimuli as potentially or 
actually deviant” (Cohen 2002: 59, 62). 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b: 33-45) sum up five essential ‘criteria’ that 
must be fulfilled in order to identify a moral panic. The first three include concern 
over behavior deemed to be threatening, hostility towards those involved and 
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consensus that something must be done to control it. Within a panic concern and 
hostility are directed towards the folk devil and their demarcation and denunciation 
as an ‘other’ is fundamental (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 29). Through the use of 
a number of linguistic methods including symbolization, which shapes stereotypes 
associated with them (Cohen 2002: 27), as well as metaphors (Patry 2009: 43) and 
myths (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 25), folk devils are portrayed by the 
opposing side in a negative light. This negativity is exacerbated by claims-makers 
who emphasize the seriousness of their behavior and indicate its unavoidable re-
occurrence if action is not taken. In addition, “disaster” analogies eliciting fatalistic 
“prophecies of doom” and imaginative allusions as to what might ensue as a result of 
the behavior, emotive symbols and fear that the behavior is spreading like a virus 
through the whole of society may become evident  (Cohen 2002: 19, 26, 38-9, 40, 
46). 
Consensus in a gastro-panic can be established by analyzing the appearance 
of “organized, collective action or campaigns on the part of some of the members of 
a society to do something about, call attention to, protect, or change (or prevent 
change in) a given condition…” as well as “the introduction of bills in legislatures to 
criminalize or otherwise deal with, the behavior and the individuals supposedly 
causing the condition” and “public discussion of an issue in the media in the form of 
magazine and newspaper articles and television news stories…” (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda 1994a: 152). Where GIs are concerned, a multitude of claims-makers 
including producers consortiums, lobby groups, states, the EU, and reflected in the 
media are spearheading a campaign to ensure that more is done to protect certain 
interests at the global level where the EU is actively advocating for the multilateral 
strengthening of GI legislation to control the unfair use of names around the world. 
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Similar campaigns and media coverage has emerged in NW countries to call 
attention to the EU’s actions and institutionalize the preserved use of generic terms. 
Two additional elements of disproportionality and volatility are important 
criteria of moral panic but require further clarification. First, moral panic is 
traditionally defined by its disproportionality or what David et. al. (2011: 221) refer 
to as the concept’s “built-in hypothesis.” Disproportionality contends that so-called 
disruptive behavior is met with a response that is out of proportion to the actual harm 
that would be incurred from it (Cohen 2002: xxviii). Because of the slippery terrain 
through which the analyst must traverse in order to make hard claims about what 
constitutes objective reality in this sense, it has been highly criticized by a number of 
scholars as one of the most troublesome aspects of the moral panic concept (Ungar 
2001; Garland 2008; Rohloff and Wright 2010; Waddington 1986).  
Nevertheless, Goode and Ben Yehuda make a claim for retaining 
disproportionality as a constitutive component of moral panic (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda 1994b: 38) and I agree that it should not be abandoned because it is inherent 
to the use of moral panic as a critical tool. To do this Rohloff (2011: 635) proposes 
the exploration of “empirical cases that do not obviously fit the model of a ‘bad’ 
‘irrational’, ‘exaggerated and distorted’, ‘panic’” such as climate change (Rohloff 
2011; Ungar 2011) or in this case GGIs. In addition, another way to do this is to 
focus on Watson’s (2009: 431) conception of disproportionality as related to an 
imbalance in the allocation and revocation of rights that often results from a panic, 
which asserts that through the process of constructing deviance disproportionality 
occurs when: 
“(i) it becomes legitimate to withdraw rights from the groups that the dominant 
construction associates most directly with the deviant behaviour; or (ii) it becomes 
legitimate to assign extra rights to the groups that the dominant construction 
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associates with untainted behaviour. Either way, it is a strategy of social division 
built upon the asymmetric allocation of rights in favour of the group that 
successfully comes to define what counts as errant and/or proper behaviour.” 
Watson’s account of disproportionality differs from Cohen’s in the sense that it is not 
limited to the penalties directed towards folk devils through a withdrawal of rights. 
Rather, it emphasizes that a similar imbalance occurs when extra rights are granted 
to some groups but not others. With GIs disproportionality occurs through an 
imbalance between the rights granted to certain privileged food producing groups 
relative to their revocation from others. Thus, the conferral of asymmetric rights 
whereby producers of protected foodstuffs are granted rights that producers of 
generics are not is an alternative way of ensuring disproportionality. 
Furthermore, the volatility of moral panic needs to be addressed. Some 
scholars have taken issue with the tendency to use moral panic as a model to 
understand singular, short-term, and explosive events without considering the 
influence of broader historical and social processes (Rohloff and Wright 2010: 405; 
Hunt 2011: 57). In order to overcome this various researchers have attempted to 
embed moral panic within ongoing historical and social processes and to avoid a 
direct focus on the irrationality of the concept (Hier 2002, 2008, 2011; Critcher 
2008; Hunt 2011). As a result, revised conceptualizations of moral panic define it as 
a “heightened campaign or sense of concern about a particular issue (or set of 
issues)…” (Rohloff 2011: 636) that “operate[s] to (re)affirm a sense of existential 
security in moments of perceived insecurity” (Hier 2011: 524). These re-
conceptualizations enable me to situate the gastro-panic within the context of the 
continuously globalizing agri-food system where heightened concerns over food-
related issues are a regular occurrence.  
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Moral panic in the case of GIs is evident when considering the heightened 
concern over the generic use of protected product names, the conduct of which has 
come to be deemed as usurpation, counterfeiting, “agropiracy” and even “theft of 
culture” (Agdomar 2008: 581, 562) and the hostility directed towards the illegitimate 
producers and companies who use abuse them. Nicoletti, Platania, and Privitera 
(2007: 4) declare that such misuse is an increasingly treacherous “phenomenon of 
international proportions, and that besides having serious economic and social 
repercussions they jeopardize the regular functioning of the market and deceive 
consumers, there is an urgent need for legislative measures, provisions and initiatives 
to limit their effect…in the international context in which they operate.” Producers 
who have potentially utilized geographical labels outside of the region of origin 
unnoticed for years are sensitized and targeted as counterfeiters and rule-breakers 
who justifiably deserve to have their name rights revoked due to the inauthentic 
character of their products, while the producers of genuine, quality origin products 
deserve full rights to the use of the name. 
It is important to emphasize that moral panic is not simply a one-sided affair. 
McRobbie (1994: 114) describes how contemporary folk devils may “fight back” 
and that various “social movements, pressure groups and other voluntary 
organizations” have emerged in their defense. These groups not only represent 
opposing viewpoints that challenge the folk devilling process but also play a role “in 
actively defining the political agenda” (McRobbie 1994: 115). Consequently, the 
gastro-panic is essentially “a battle between cultural representations” (Cohen 2002: 
xxxiii) where competing actors make claims and counter-claims in an attempt to 
establish dominance over the other through a “discursive strategy of demarcation” 
that crystallizes boundaries between what constitutes admissible and inadmissible 
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behavior (Watson 2009: 431). What is interesting in the context of this debate is that 
a slew of claims-makers from NW countries including dairy associations and 
consortiums, lobby groups, and state officials have emerged to defend the use of 
generic cheese terms in global commerce and are actively taking steps to influence 
international negotiations and agreements. These actors re-frame the debate through 
a countering discourse of gastro-panic that effectively reverses the folk devilling 
process through constructing EU attempts to restrict the use of generic product 
names as a threat projected to have serious consequences and through purifying 
producers of generic products of any wrong-doing.  
Following the clarification of disproportionality, volatility, and the 
countering processes of gastro-panic, the various criteria and examples from the GGI 
debate are outlined in Table 3.1 (Adapted from Goode and Ben Yehuda 1994b: 33-
45; Watson 2009: 431; Rohloff 2011: 636; Hier 2011: 524). 
Table 3.1: Moral Panic Criteria and the GGI Debate 
Moral Panic 
Indicators 
Description 
Concern Heightened in relation to certain group behaviors and its 
supposed consequences. 
e.g. EU concern over generic use/abuse of particular food 
names versus NW concern over EU attempts to restrict 
generic use. 
Hostility Toward particular group or category engaging in behavior 
perceived to be responsible for threat. 
e.g. EU hostility towards ‘counterfeiting’ producers versus 
NW hostility towards ‘aggressive’ behavior of EU. 
Consensus Agreement by involved actors that threat is real, serious, 
caused by behavior of group members and that something 
must be done to control it. Varies, could be articulated by 
small or large groups. 
e.g. Demonstrated on both sides through the appearance of 
discourse manifested in the language of various campaigns, 
lobby groups, dairy consortiums and associations, states and 
supranational bodies, and media discussion. 
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Disproportionality Occurs through an imbalance between the rights conferred to 
certain groups relative to their revocation from other groups. 
e.g. EU calls for exclusive use rights to be granted 
asymmetrically to European producers versus NW appeals to 
unfairness in order to reverse it.  
Volatility Temporary campaign that operates to (re)affirm a sense of 
existential security in moments of perceived insecurity. 
Concern can be long-lasting but peak at various moments over 
time, then disappear or become institutionalized in social 
movement organizations, legislation etc.  
e.g. Movement to institutionalize protection for or 
preservation of use of food names, either GI or generic, within 
the context of continuously globalizing dairy systems. 
3.2.4. Why do moral panics occur? 
The use of the term ‘panic’ has been criticized as conveying the inherent 
irrationality of the concept (Cohen 2002: xxvii). But moral panics are rational 
processes that do not occur naturally in society; their materialization and influence is 
dependent upon the active endeavors of claims-makers invested in their success 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 79-80). According to McRobbie and Thornton 
(1995: 560), moral panic can be used strategically “by politicians to orchestrate 
consent, by business to promote sales in certain niche markets, and by media to make 
home and social affairs newsworthy…” and the role of the folk devil might serve as 
“a tool to accomplish social, political, or commercial objectives” (Patry 2009: 138) 
such as the protection of domestic food producer and business interests. Because of 
this intentionality the work of many researchers involves interrogating different 
types of actors – from grassroots, interest-group, and elite dimensions – and 
problematizing their claims in order to tease out their core motives, interests, and 
agendas in generating and sustaining a moral panic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 
32, 124; Thompson 1998: 15).  
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But moral panics are not only purposeful, they are also contextual. Research 
indicates that they are evoked in “troubled times, during which a serious threat is 
sensed to the interests or values of the society as a whole or to segments of a society” 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b: 32, original emphasis) or appear amidst “transitions 
in the social, economic or moral order…” (Garland 2008: 13). Scholars have 
underlined that food can become a potent “political symbol particularly in periods of 
great economic and social change” (Leitch 2010: 440). Recall from the introduction 
the discussion over the impacts and insecurity born of the continuous liberalization 
of the dairy industry brought about by the pressures emanating from European 
integration and globalization. Such structural processes have spurred the formation 
of campaigns, consortiums, and attempts to affect the use of food product names in 
one’s favor and could explain the appearance of parallel processes of gastro-panic 
surrounding GGIs. 
In order to institutionalize punishment for perceived deviant behavior, 
proponents from both sides also actively employ a number of devices. First, they 
appeal to legitimating values or the enforcement of “existing rules or attempting to 
enforce new rules” (Cohen 2002: 91). This is evident in EU attempts to extend GI 
protection globally and NW attempts to institutionalize an international methodology 
for determining generic status. Next, actors take action through enterprise as a means 
of publicizing the importance of GIs and generics, especially for developing 
countries, in order to attain the backing of various countries and supporters around 
the world. Lastly, an element of power is crucial (Cohen 2002: 91). According to 
Lenski (1966: 57), “Institutionalized power takes many forms, but it always involves 
the possession of certain enforceable rights which increase one’s capacity to carry 
out one’s own will even in the face of opposition.” Countries and producers around 
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the world disagree over whether certain names should be exclusively or openly used. 
Nevertheless, both sides have made efforts to institutionalize their respective norms 
within international agreements.  
3.3. Security and the Copenhagen School 
The purpose of the next section of the framework is to resolve certain 
limitations of the moral panic concept and to further develop Hier’s (2011: 524) 
assertion that moral panics “operate to (re) affirm a sense of existential security in 
moments of perceived insecurity.” As is the case in the majority of moral panic 
research, Hier restricts his analysis to the societal realm and conceptualizes moral 
panic as a type of moral regulation. However, through the notion of gastro-panic I 
attempt to broaden the applicability of the concept to encompass a wider range of 
issues within the food system. I do this by demonstrating how the gastro-panic may 
be formulated through conceptualizing moral panic as a food system security issue 
using the language of securitization advanced by the CS. Thus, I begin by discussing 
what I mean by food system security. I also define security and what constitutes a 
security issue. This is followed by an overview of the CS, its broadened notion of 
sectors, and securitization. 
3.3.1. Food: a non-traditional security issue 
In this framework I conceptualize moral panic as a food system security issue 
rather than a food security issue, which I explain further in this section. There is an 
extensive body of literature devoted to the study of food security (McDonald 2010; 
Rayfuse and Weisfelt 2012; Chiarolla 2011; Almas and Campbell 2012; Carolan 
2013; Lawrence, Lyons, and Wallington 2011) but conceptualization of the concept 
has evolved over time. Maxwell (1996: 155) states that since the 1970s food security 
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has been re-focused “from the global and the national to the household and the 
individual; from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective; and from 
objective indicators to subjective perception.” It has moved beyond an emphasis on 
secure access to a sufficient amount of food simply as a source of nutrition and 
means of survival to encompass its social and cultural appropriateness, quality, and 
political significance (FAO 2008; Koc and Dahlberg 1999; Ganapathy, Bliss Duffy, 
and Getz 2005; Carr 2006). Food security has mostly been approached as its own 
area of study and has only recently entered the sphere of security studies as a non-
traditional security object (Wiggins and Slater 2010). Very few scholars have 
utilized an international relations security perspective to explore issues of food and it 
has mainly been integrated as a fundamental aspect of human security at a more 
individual level (Paris 2001: 90). This is especially limiting considering that food 
security has become a prominent focus of government policy and rhetoric in many 
countries around the world.  
When zeroing in on security as its own concept it is possible to see how it 
might translate into other areas related to food. Security itself is a widely debated 
term, declared by W.B. Gallie (1956) to be an “essentially contested concept.” 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research it is defined as a means towards 
assuring a degree of protection for “social, political and economic (spaces) 
communities” (Clements 1990) that provides relief from “threats to cherished 
values” (Williams 2013: 1) and objects. The focus of security can be to ensure 
“survival” or deal with a number of existential crises and concerns (Buzan 1991a: 
432-33). As a complement to the constructed nature of moral panic I am also 
utilizing a constructivist perspective of security that views it as “a social 
construction, meaning different things in different contexts. Security is also seen as a 
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site of negotiation and contestation; in which actors compete to define the identity 
and values of a particular group in such a way as to provide a foundation for political 
action” (McDonald 2008: 67). Furthermore, a security issue arises when a particular 
referent object, or that which is endangered and needs to be protected, is 
demonstrated to be at risk from an existential threat (Buzan et. al. 1998: 21).  
Therefore, we can consider insecurity as occurring when some aspect of the 
food system is perceived to be threatened. It could be said that a number of 
alternative food movements (Goodman 2003, 2004; Wiskerke 2009) including fair 
trade (Raynolds, Murray, and Wilkinson 2007), food sovereignty (Wittman, 
Desmarais, and Wiebe 2010), organic (Raynolds 2000), local (Starr 2010), and 
Community Supported Agriculture (Adam 2006) schemes have emerged in response 
to the perceived threats prompted by the increased globalization and industrialization 
of the food system. In addition, there has been emerging recognition that the 
diversity of food products, production methods, and cultures has a legitimate right to 
survive and should not be reduced to commodities. In many ways traditional 
foodways and food products have become cherished referent objects in need of 
protection from global forces. This may be evidenced through the flurry of attempts 
to secure United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) protection for gastronomic heritage and culinary practices in recent 
years,
13
 the cataloguing and reinvigorating of “endangered” foodstuffs by popular 
                                                          
13
 Despite initial rejections and a declaration by UNESCO president Chérif Khaznadar that, “There is 
no category in Unesco for gastronomy” (Sciolino 2008), in 2010 the “Gastronomic Meal of the 
French” (UNESCO 2010a), the “Mediterranean diet” (UNESCO 2010b), and “Traditional Mexican 
cuisine” (UNESCO 2010c) were controversially declared to be world intangible cultural heritage. 
Italy has also discussed a bid for protecting the Pizza Napoletana (Kington 2011) and students in 
London are campaigning to get London pubs there as well (Kingston University London 2012). But 
what is interesting about these attempts is that they do not only focus on a finished product, the food 
or cuisine itself. They incorporate a respect for the traditions, know-how, skills, and social interaction 
that encompass each element of the food chain from farm to table, including aspects of production 
and consumption.  
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social movements such as Slow Food (2013), and the increased visibility and 
protection of GIs. But insecurity also occurs when corporate or other interests are 
perceived as being endangered by forms of protectionism erected within a more 
market-oriented food system. 
These movements also indicate that there are many who hold an insecure 
view that globalizing processes threaten the state by eroding national food 
sovereignty and reduce the ability of governments to have control over their 
domestic production; threaten economies with foreign-produced commodities, unfair 
competition and the reduction of jobs; threaten cultural identities and traditional 
eating habits with powerful inflows of fast food and McDonaldization (Ritzer 2010); 
threaten the environment by destroying biodiversity; and threaten individual food 
safety through the import of non-traceable tainted foodstuffs. These phenomena 
emphasize an important focus on a broadened conception of insecurity in the food 
system that moves away from lack of intake, access, and availability and might more 
usefully be conceptualized as ‘food system security.’ Security in this context may 
then be viewed through the lens of gastronomy discussed in the first section in order 
to broaden the concept to encompass the survival and preservation of traditional 
industries, the maintenance jobs, incomes and livelihoods, profits and interests, food 
cultures and identities, environment and landscapes, and safety. 
Specific to the generic debate, food names can be considered as referent 
objects whose use is perceived to be endangered by competing actors. On the one 
hand, GIs are seen as being under threat of genericide whereby a product name loses 
the connection to its place of origin and becomes un-protectable and open for use by 
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everyone. On the other hand, generic terms are seen as being under imminent threat 
of being restricted through GI protection. Food names are considered to be powerful 
security tools and the protected use of a name is designed to aid in the “economic 
and cultural survival” (Agdomar 2008: 600) of niche producer groups through 
preventing the erosion of reputations attached to a food name and the free-riding and 
open use of their terms. But unprotected use of a name also aids in the survival of 
companies who have long relied on generic terms to market their products.  
To continue, security is achieved through different means and reflects two 
approaches; the first views it in its commoditized form as the result of amassing 
power and resources and the second sees it as serving more of a liberating function 
through the cooperation and interaction of agents (Williams 2008: 6). GIs and 
generics represent a culmination of both approaches. GIs are valuable economic and 
cultural resources that can be used to market and add value to products, leading to 
increased premiums for producers (Bramley, Biénabe, and Kirsten 2009: 114). Once 
awarded, they are legally protected intellectual property rights that ensure the 
exclusive use of producer groups within a designated area. At the same time, many 
proponents argue that they should be prized for their collective value because it is the 
producers themselves who draft the rules and specifications of their products, which 
therefore “empowers communities” (Rangnekar 2009: 14). Conversely, generic 
names represent important and valuable marketing tools for distinguishing 
recognizable types of products and a multitude of actors have arisen in cooperation 
to defend their use on a global scale.  
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3.3.2. Broadening the agenda: the CS 
Such a broadened application of security would not be possible without 
contributions made by the CS. Traditional perspectives of security in International 
Relations have tended to be restrictive until the CS struck at the heart of traditional 
security analysis – its focus on the military sector and the state. Though it did not 
occur without criticism (Knudsen 2001; McSweeney 1996), members of the CS 
including Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have considerably broadened the 
conceptualization of security. First, Buzan (1991b) developed four additional 
“sectors” within which threats to states could arise – political, economic, societal and 
environmental, which are illustrated in Table 3.2 (Adapted from: Buzan et. al. 1998: 
22-3). Sectors serve as “lenses or discourses” (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1157) 
through which differing perspectives and “types of security concerns…” that 
constitute actors and issues may be illustrated (Buzan et. al. 1998: 168). Though 
separated analytically, actors, objects, and threats appear and interrelate across 
sectors (Buzan et. al. 1998: 167).  
Table 3.2: Security Sectors 
Sector Referent Object (s) 
Political Legitimacy, sovereignty, norms, rules, institutions 
Societal Identity, tradition, culture 
Economic Firms, trade, production, resources 
Environmental Ecology, sustainability 
Second, the CS was unsatisfied that the state remained the center of analysis 
as the sole referent object. In later work they argued that society and the identities 
that constitute it were, “The principal focus of the new insecurity” (Wæver et. al. 
1993: 2) thereby endorsing the candidacy of non-state referent objects. As a result, 
attention may be paid to a wide array of threats that can emerge in numerous areas in 
the name of a diverse range of referent objects other than the state (Buzan et. al. 
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1998: 5). Moral panic is for the most part restricted to the societal sector where 
society, composed of its norms and values, is the referent object perceived to be 
threatened by the behavior of deviant folk devils and few attempts have been made 
to target other aspects such as economic factors (Critcher 2011). The multi-sectoral 
approach therefore expands the investigation to a variety of discourses within the 
gastro-panic and necessarily includes a wider range of interrelated concerns that 
traverse the GGI dispute. 
It is important to emphasize again that security is inherently a site of 
negotiation and contestation and through it “there will always be winners and there 
will always be losers” (Roe 2012: 261). Boundary-construction and preservation are 
fundamental to the pursuit of security and enables the differentiation of security 
communities. While such demarcation is important, Clements (1990) states that, 
“Delimiting specific territorial or even ideological boundaries has been one of the 
principal sources of conflict over the years especially when there are incompatible 
claims for the same space.” Actors may appeal to security strategically to legitimate 
exceptional measures intended to block an unwanted development, or as a means of 
reinforcing the status quo. Vuori (2008: 93) points out that “the construction of 
security issues can be utilized for a range of political purposes, from raising an issue 
on the agenda of decision-making to legitimating policies, deterring threats…” 
This is certainly the case where food names are concerned because security 
by way of acquiring a GI to protect it from outside use creates an imbalance that 
results in insecurity for those who have been using it generically. On the contrary, 
the right to use a name generically is also interpreted as compromising legitimate 
producers by eroding a name’s reputation and misleading consumers. Either way, 
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food names represent a contested domain where different parties compete over and 
claim entitlement to the right to their use and seek to fix their own political norms 
and rules within international society in order to secure it. In the next session I 
discuss the discursive processes through which this struggle is realized. 
3.3.3. Securitization 
Along with its expanded notion of sectors and referent objects the CS also 
introduced the analytical framework of securitization, initially developed by Ole 
Wæver. Securitization posits that designating an issue as a matter of security is an 
active political choice, thereby contesting the argument that threats exist objectively 
before language and simply waiting to be discovered (Wæver 1995: 65, 46). Rather, 
the thrusting of issues into the security field is a socially constructed and linguistic 
process or “speech act” (Wæver 1995: 55, original emphasis) performed by 
“securitizing actors,” which I will continue to refer to as claims-makers, through 
“securitizing moves” (Buzan et. al. 1998: 36, 24-5). Something becomes a security 
issue because it is presented as such and studies of securitization generally focus on 
political discourse (Buzan et. al. 1998: 25). In essence, actors invoke security by 
drawing attention to a threatening development perceived to endanger a cherished 
referent object that, following audience acceptance, legitimizes the right to deal with 
said threat using exceptional measures that may fall outside otherwise binding rules 
and conduct (Buzan et. al. 1998: 23-5). Not all issues must be presented “with a 
drama of urgency and priority” (Buzan et. al. 1998: 28) but are characterized by a 
specific rhetorical structure that can have significant political effects. 
At this point a note of clarification is needed. The CS asserts that 
securitization takes security issues somehow beyond normal politics and that de-
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securitization is a means of bringing these issues back into the political domain 
(Hansen 2012; Aradau 2004). However, food system security and GI issues are not 
likely to be taken out of the political arena in the same extreme way as, say, national 
security and the debate over GGIs has remained intrinsically political. In this thesis I 
am not using a literal application of the CS theory of securitization but rather an 
analogical one that focuses on how similar structures of language are used to 
legitimize political exceptions made with regard to the use of food names. 
Additionally, when I discuss countering processes I am not referring to de-
securitization but rather to the folk devil fighting back with a similar discursive 
strategy that frames the initial securitizer as the securitized. 
Moving on, there has been considerable debate surrounding what constitutes 
a successful act of securitization and traditional approaches have been criticized for 
placing too much emphasis on the moment of a speech act (Stritzel: 2007: 359) and 
downplaying the role of audience, context, and agency in determining its success 
(Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008). Here I am not exploring the factors 
contributing to the success of a speech act but how it is used in practice as a mythical 
discursive strategy of legitimation to achieve certain aims within the generic debate. 
For this task Balzacq’s (2008: 171-73) sociological approach to securitization as a 
form of strategic practice is most useful. He proposes that the purpose of 
securitization is to persuade a particular audience that a threat warrants exceptional 
measures be taken to mitigate it. This focus is distinct from traditional conceptions 
because it uses the power of words to meet an objective (Balzacq 2005: 178-79). The 
objective in this case is the right to the protection of or open use of particular food 
names. 
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To reiterate, security as a speech act does something – it securitizes, thereby 
establishing that the presence of a threat to the material or abstract survival of one or 
more referent objects warrants an exception be made to mitigate it. Essentially, it is a 
mythical discursive strategy of legitimation used by actors to frame an issue within 
the political arena in a particular way in order to convince an audience that such 
exceptional measures should be taken. As such, the task of securitization is to “gain 
an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), 
for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what 
conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful)” (Buzan et. al. 
1998: 32). Using the framework I can better understand the securitizing moves and 
processes by which various actors, in defense of GIs as referent objects declared to 
be endangered by globalizing market forces and generic name use, legitimate the 
preferential conferral of rights to those who produce them. At the same time, I can 
consider the counter-securitizing trends visible in the defense of the right to generic 
use and the securitization of GI protection. 
Following from that, the integration and liberalization processes that expose 
producers to ever more worldwide competition could constitute a threat to GIs and, 
“In a sense, it is certainly correct to say that GI protection is a reaction against 
uniformity, big conglomerations, and globalization” (Hughes et. al. 2007: 971) and 
“increasing threats from America and other ‘New World’ producers…” (Rose 2007: 
734). What are in fact being protected are not only the food names but the material 
and abstract well-being of a number of underlying objects. Thus, I expect to find that 
the food names themselves serve as primary referent objects in need of protection, 
which act as umbrellas encompassing a variety of secondary referent objects within 
the food system, the possibilities of which are displayed in Figure 3.2. The suggested 
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threats and referent objects are by no means exhaustive but act to guide the empirical 
questions and analyses in further chapters. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.1: Referent Objects and GIs 
Europe is an environment in which threats to farmers’ livelihoods and food 
cultures resonate strongly with many citizens and governments. Thus, food system 
security logic can be politically persuasive and used to legitimate economic patriotic 
or exceptionalist policies that effectively begin to raise barriers between national, 
European, and global economies. Such maneuvers create tensions in a global climate 
increasingly framed by a discourse of market liberalism and in turn become a threat 
themselves to the dominant paradigm. The move towards asymmetric rights afforded 
to GI producers could therefore be considered an exceptional measure because it 
challenges the openly competitive nature of free market relations on the basis that 
GIs require governments to suspend the norm of open market access and grant 
exclusive property rights (Charlier and Ngo 2007: 181; Chen 1996: 36).  
Securitizing processes in Europe are at odds with those who orient 
themselves on a more liberalist perspective, which has also come to be a main 
discursive force shaping the current global capitalist system. This perspective holds 
Primary Referent Object   Secondary Referent Object (s)    Threats…according to…Securitizing Actors 
          
Geographical 
Indication 
Market access 
Food production firms  
and jobs 
Traditional food product  
Food cultures/identities 
Food sovereignty  
Consumers 
GI norms and institutions 
Globalization, 
competition, and  
generic use 
Producer 
consortiums 
States 
EU 
95 
 
that insecurity is affirmed to be a natural aspect of market functioning (Buzan et. al. 
1998: 95-7), with innovation and efficiency being primary aims at the expense of 
those who cannot compete. Buzan (1991: 238) declares that, "The ever-changing 
conditions of market competition favor organizational flexibility over permanence." 
Hence, it might become difficult for those who subscribe to the liberal logic of free 
trade, efficiency, and open competition to be able to accept the special treatment of 
GIs and the state intervention that comes with it, especially when such protection 
threatens the use of valuable generic terms. The counter-securitizing discourses are 
evident as the threat is transformed into that of “trade protectionism” where food 
system security logic is used to further break down barriers between economies. In 
subsequent courses, I expect to find GI protection declared to be a threat to the 
generic use of particular food names along with other secondary referent objects 
indicated in Figure 3.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Referent Objects and GGIs 
3.4. Barthes and Myth 
Cohen reasons that moral panic is a struggle over cultural representations, 
which refers to the discursive processes through which meaning is generated and 
Primary Referent Object   Secondary Referent Object    Threats…according to…Securitizing Actors 
          
Generic Food 
Name 
Market access 
Business interests 
Right to generic use 
Immigrant food 
cultures/Identities 
Consumers 
Trademark rules and 
institutions 
Protectionism, bilateral 
free trade agreements 
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shaped. The dispute over the generic status of food names involves parallel 
constructions of gastro-panic where actors compete to demarcate and fix particular 
meanings to secure the use of product names. According to Hall (1997: 3), “we give 
things meaning by how we represent them – the words we use about them, the 
stories we tell about them, the images of them we produce, the emotions we 
associate with them, the ways we classify and conceptualize them, the values we 
place on them.” These meanings are important because they are not merely abstract 
notions but, “They organize and regulate social practices, influence our conduct and 
consequently have real, practical effects” (Hall 1997: 3) and are developed and 
deployed in concrete struggles over power, influence, and societal norms. GIs grant 
exclusive property rights to producers of food and beverage products and genericism 
invalidates those rights. And the legitimization for granting or revoking the right to 
use names greatly depends on the connotations attached to them and the negative 
and/or positive meanings attached to those who use them. It is not the names 
themselves that have changed but the meaning ascribed to and different worldviews 
that underpin them. 
In order to further interrogate the persuasive power of gastro-panic I utilize 
Roland Barthes’ conception of myth.14 Myth is important in the context of moral 
panic because while “myth-making characterizes all societies at all times…” at times 
of moral panic society is especially receptive to them (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
1994b: 25) and the gastro-panic itself can be viewed as a type of myth. Barthes 
presents a particularly convincing critical account of myth-making as an 
ideologically-driven discursive construction. To clarify, I must stress that when I 
                                                          
14
 A note of clarification: Barthes describes ‘myth’ in its singular form to designate the process itself; 
however a multitude of myths constitute all societies. I will be using the singular and plural forms of 
the word interchangeably. 
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refer to myth it is strictly in the Barthesian sense as opposed to its use in common 
vernacular which implies that something is potentially false, unfounded or mistaken, 
or an invented or imaginary legend or fable. According to Barthes (2009: 131) myth 
is a “type of speech” and a “system of communication” that surrounds everything 
from language and images to material objects such as food. Anything that can be 
spoken about or communicated through a discourse may become myth because it is 
not the objects themselves that are most important but rather the messages and 
meanings they convey (Barthes 2009: 131). In Barthes’ view myth is powerful 
because although it is socially constructed, it distorts and naturalizes certain world 
views, ideologies, and interpretations to appear as indisputable facts or common 
sense (Barthes 2009: 154). In other words, Moriarty (1991: 25) declares that, “Myth 
seeks to ground political and historical situations, and ideological alignments, in the 
realm of the natural.” 
Therefore, myth is a discursive process that “abolishes the complexity of 
human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences…it organizes a world which is 
without contradictions because it is without depth…” (Barthes 2009: 169-70). It is 
composed of beliefs and representations that sustain and legitimate current power 
relationships and promote the values and interests of dominant groups in society. As 
a result, it “reduces reality to the juxtaposition of two readily computable values” 
(Moriarty 1991: 27). The gastro-panic naturalizes a view of the opposing folk devil’s 
behavior as wrong and promotes binary oppositions through notions such as genuine, 
legitimate, authentic, and artisanal versus fake, illegitimate, inauthentic, and 
industrial to describe the characteristics of GI products and producers versus 
generics. Note however that many of the products protected under the GI system are 
industrially-produced (Hughes et. al. 2007: 971). Even within the French national 
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AOC system there are categories differentiating between farmer, artisanal, 
cooperative, and industrial cheeses (Villegas 2005: 67).
15
 On the other side, there are 
also artisan producers in various countries who use generic terms simply as a means 
of denoting particular styles or types of cheeses. As well, the meaning of concepts 
such as authenticity and genuineness are ambiguous and heavily debated (Alcock 
2005; Hudgins 2005; Whitings 2005) while the notion of legitimacy is constantly 
being negotiated and contested within the GI context (Smith 2006).  
Next, it is important to emphasize that myths, like moral panics, are never 
arbitrary (Barthes 2009: 150). Rather, their manifestation is the result of the motives, 
intent, and purpose of those who construct them (Barthes 2009: 142-43). They are 
contextual and sporadic, dissipate and alter with time and are often employed when 
meanings are inadequate to serve the needs of a community. They can be uncovered 
by focusing on the evolving meanings attached to certain signs and Barthes admits 
that food is consistently the subject of mythical discourse (Barthes 1961: 20-27). The 
generic use of certain cheese terms around the world has not always been considered 
improper behavior and the gastro-panic surrounding their use has intensified at the 
global level only in recent years. Additionally, today modern anxieties have led to a 
culinary nostalgia that emphasizes simple, traditional and rural foods, though “the 
flavorful survival of an old, rural society that is itself highly idealized” (Barthes 
1961: 24). A quick look into history reveals that many of the associations we attach 
to products that are now celebrated for their traditional, cultural, and artisanal 
characteristics are the result of contemporary constructions or successful marketing 
by self-interested actors (Boisard 2003; Guy 2003). Bromberger (2006: 89) states 
                                                          
15
 More specifically, “Fermier cheeses are farmhouse cheeses, using milk from the farmer’s herd or 
traditional methods. Artisanal cheeses come from independent farmers using their own or others’ 
milk. Coopérative cheeses are made at a dairy with milk coming from cooperative members. 
Industriel cheeses are produced in factories” (Villegas 2005: 67). 
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that, “Certified ‘traditional’ cheeses are now as much a reflection of market demands 
and modern collective representations of health and sanitation as they are of the 
‘traditional methods’ and locality that they purport to embody.” At the same time, 
West (2012: 9) reveals that the seemingly uncomplicated nature of many cheese 
names masks what are actually “the product of complex and often contentious 
histories.” 
Furthermore, myth is selective and only preserves and presents what are 
considered particularly suitable aspects of history (Barthes 2009: 151). Many origin 
products that represent long traditions and are purported to be cultural necessities 
edit out the significant social exclusion that led to their symbolic valorization. In the 
past, reputations were often the result of social exclusion signified by consumption 
habits and gastronomic histories are rife with divisions between the urban rich who 
could afford certain products (Pitte 2002: 71) and rural poor who remained tied to 
the land in the country side and produced most of their food for local intake (Roehl 
1976: 271). This “elitist model” at the source of the preference for certain goods 
helped form taste over time (Capatti and Montanari 2003: 115-16) and many 
products deemed traditional were aristocratic and unattainable for a majority of the 
population who remained tied to the land (Roehl 1976: 271). Conversely, many 
foods which were considered only fit for peasants in their day are now celebrated as 
unique, traditional, and highly sought after (Richards 2002: 3), which has led to an 
“aestheticization of peasant foods” that shadows the complex, difficult, and 
undernourished lives of those who historically consumed them (West and Domingos 
2012: 122). 
The abovementioned examples help demonstrate why deconstructing myth is 
crucial because it calls attention to the socially constructed nature of taken-for-
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granted cultural norms and values and the dominance of certain ideologies that can 
be used to serve particular interests. Here I focus on how the gastro-panic operates as 
myth because, “The critical study of myth is not just the denunciation of particular 
ideological positions, but the analysis of how their messages are constituted, how 
they come to persuade” (Moriarty 1991: 22). In the gastro-panic surrounding GIs, 
different social, economic, and political interests compete to invest meaning in food 
product names which are used to promote universal definitions of concepts such as 
quality and terroir on the one hand and generic on the other in order to legitimize the 
rights to use or prevent others from using them.  
3.4.1. Constructing myth 
For Barthes, myth involves various levels of meaning or orders of 
signification that must be explored through the more technical language of 
semiology. In the first order, or that of the language-object, an object acts as a 
signifier that embodies a particular meaning or signified (Barthes 2009: 135-6). 
When these two elements are merged together they become one and the same in the 
form of a sign. This is also related to what semiologists call the denotation or the 
literal meaning (Barker 2008: 79) and for words might be the definition that you 
look up in a dictionary. Such meanings are said to be “broadly agreed upon by 
members of the same culture” (Chandler 2013).  
In order to apply this to material objects such as food, Moriarty (1991: 25) 
points out that “society inevitably transforms functional objects into signs of their 
function…” For example, cheese is a sign in itself – it is a coagulated and 
compressed milk product. But when it is differentiated as a particular type or brand 
of cheese – as Parmesan, Cheddar, Roquefort or Gouda – it attains further 
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connotations. To illustrate, Parmesan is defined in the English Merriam-Webster 
(2013) dictionary as “a hard Italian cheese” and “a very hard dry sharply flavored 
cheese that is sold grated or in wedges.” However, an Italian dictionary defines 
Parmigiano as “hard cheese, semi-fat, a grainy paste, produced in Parma and Reggio 
Emilia” (Dizionario Italiano 2003-2014). Notice the nuanced differences in 
definitions, with one emphasizing the general type of Italian product and the other 
including its specific region of production.  
Next, a seemingly innocent sign can become the signifier in a second order of 
meaning. This is the order of myth, the metalanguage through which the sign 
becomes an empty form that is joined with a second signified and culturally 
significant concept (Barthes 2009: 137-8, 140). Together the form and concept 
constitute a signification (Barthes 2009: 142) where meanings are not the result of 
the sign itself but by how it is conceptualized or understood by a particular society. 
This level represents the broader connotations of the sign, which “involves meanings 
that are generated by connecting signifiers to wider cultural concerns” (Barker 2008: 
79) and reflects myth’s reliance on the socio-cultural and historical context in which 
it exists. Ultimately, it is when certain “connotations have become naturalized, that 
is, as accepted as ‘normal’ and ‘natural’, they act as conceptual maps of meaning by 
which to make sense of the world. These are myths” (Barker 2008: 79).  
The connotations for cheeses and those who produce them are widely 
variable according to the type and location of their production and consumption. 
Parmesan connotes quality, traditionality, and Italianness for a particular cheese 
with precise characteristics from a particular place in Italy and the EU that enjoys 
protected status, and producers of the cheese outside of this demarcation have come 
to symbolize counterfeiting folk devils. In other areas Parmesan represents a type of 
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generic hard cheese used in Italian dishes that can be produced anywhere by anyone 
using a multitude of different methods, and European producers attempting to secure 
its exclusive use have been demonized as aggressive and their actions illegitimate.   
For Barthes, this combination of the denotative and connotative functions of 
signs and orders of signification are what produces ideology and is what Fiske and 
Hartley (1978: 30) have called the “third order of signification.” The ideological 
level “reflects the broad principles by which a culture organizes and interprets the 
reality with which it has to cope” (Fiske and Hartley 1978: 30). Thus, significations 
act by concealing the operation of certain socio-economic structures, including 
regimes of ownership, orders, and ideologies that permeate each culture. For Italians 
and the EU, Parmesan represents the idea of terroirism, the belief that certain 
products essentially derive their characteristics from the places for which they are 
named and therefore cannot be replicated elsewhere. Such ideas serve those 
producers in the place of origin by legitimizing the conferral of property rights that 
excludes others from using a name based on the uniqueness of the product’s origin 
and characteristics. It also serves the overall aims of European agricultural 
exceptionalism by securing a new form of producer assistance. In contrast, for those 
on the opposing side Parmesan embodies the notion of genericism. The cheese 
becomes a form that carries the concept of genericness and blocks the registration of 
a particular name. The signification of genericism is one that bolsters global business 
interests by representing a widely recognizable type of cheese, deriving its 
argumentative substance from the wider context of market liberalism. Since Barthes’ 
(2009: 144) method requires the naming of concepts, terroirism and genericism are 
distinct mythological concepts at the root of GGI politics and will be further 
discussed in the next sections. 
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To continue, concepts can be represented by multiple forms, the repetition of 
which acts as a tip-off that a myth is at bay (Barthes 2009: 143). Both terroirism and 
genericism are signified by a multitude of products in different countries, with over a 
thousand protected names in the EU and a number of names used generically in 
countries such as the US, Australia, and others. As well, each sign may carry 
multiple meanings concurrently (Semetsky 2000: 201). The meanings of concepts 
are rarely stabilized or unproblematic in practice and because their meaning 
fluctuates, they are also inherently contested and according to Vološinov (1973: 23) 
the sign, or in this case the food name and those who produce it, “becomes an arena 
of the class struggle.” Thus, “Signification changes as social conventions and social 
struggles seek to fix meaning…The ideological struggle is the contest over the 
significance of signs. Here power attempts to regulate and ‘fix’ the otherwise 
shifting meanings of signs” (Barker 2008: 81). This is important because it 
emphasized “a sense that meaning was the outcome of politics and the play of 
power” (Barker 2008: 82). Cheese names are signs with varied meanings that are at 
the root of the struggle over the ownership of the terms themselves. As a 
consequence, actors are competing to fix their own ideas inherent to the use of 
cheese names in order to secure the rights to market them around the world.  
Within the context of the dispute over the generic status of GIs, I argue that 
there are two representations contending for dominance that frame competing 
perspectives surrounding the status of certain product names within the GI debate. 
Terroirism and genericism represent ideologies that legitimate the allocation of 
private rights to the use of food names – in the case of GIs and terroirism, or their 
revocation – in the case of generics and genericism, which are motivated by 
competing political, economic, and social interests. In this debate the struggle is 
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inherent to the way signs are defined and used by each side in the marketplace and 
actors’ attempts to fix preferred meanings. It also reflects wider conflicting 
viewpoints on the nature of agricultural production and markets and how agri-food 
economies should be governed and regulated.  
Following from that, claims-makers within the gastro-panic seek to persuade 
relevant audiences of the need to take action against a perceived threat through 
policy changes or other arrangements. In doing so they also frame their arguments in 
ways that are consistent with particular agricultural ‘paradigms’, which are 
naturalized worldviews encompassing shared ideas, values, and norms that shape 
how actors identify problems in the agri-food sector and ways to address them. The 
“Dependent Agriculture Paradigm” is argued to have dominated agricultural policies 
in post-Second World War Europe, the US, and other industrialized countries 
(Josling 2002: 253) and was underlined by an ideational framework of ‘agricultural 
exceptionalism.’ This concept rests on the assumptions that food and agricultural 
industries are somehow different or ‘exceptional’ in relation to other economic 
sectors and that their value lies beyond the commercial production of food to 
encompass non-marketable social, environmental, and even food security benefits 
that contribute to overall national interests and well-being, which therefore justifies 
preferential treatment and state intervention (Grant 1995; Skogstad 1998; Daugbjerg 
and Swinbank 2008, 2009; Coleman 2011).  
But terroirism and genericism are underlined by two new paradigms that 
Josling (2002: 254-8) terms the “Multifunctional Agriculture Paradigm” and the 
“Competitive Agriculture Paradigm.” The former has been embraced by the EU and 
maintains certain ‘exceptionalist’ features. The latter has been embraced by many 
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NW countries and is underlined by what Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2009: 12) term 
“agricultural normalism.” This concept is premised on the belief that agriculture 
should be treated as no different from other economic sectors and that problems 
within markets are the result of state protectionism. It encompasses a globally 
institutionalized set of ideas for agri-food markets that promotes increased 
liberalization and reduced state intervention, free trade, and greater market access 
thereby de-legitimizing any type of preferential treatment or state intervention such 
as the conferral of exclusive GI rights. The views of competing actors within the 
cheese sector are thus guided by particular policy paradigms that are naturalized as 
myth. 
3.4.2. Terroirism  
Terroirism is a neologism that derives its assumptions of reality from the 
ambiguous French concept of terroir, a widely discussed and controversial term with 
no universal definition or direct translation into other languages.
16
 Terroir asserts 
that certain products derived from historical places of origin are genuine and 
legitimate relative to similar products produced in different territories (INAO 2006). 
But the positive notion of terroir that undergirds the European GI system typifies 
what Scarpato (2002: 101) calls the “myth of global provence.” The meaning of the 
concept has evolved over time and it was used in the seventeenth century to describe 
                                                          
16
 I elected to use the French concept of terroir despite my focus on an Italian and English cheese 
name because according to Smith (2006: 6), “Although the other four southern states have played 
important roles in developing the EU’s programmatic model, the French approach to geographical 
indications has always been its dominant ideological inspiration.” Terroir was used to describe the 
product/place connection in quite a few of my interviews with British, Italian, and EU trade 
representatives (Personal interviews, March 13, February 22 and 27, and April 9, 2013). One Italian 
Parmigiano-Reggiano representative informed me that the word ‘typico’ is similar to terroir in Italian 
but that it is not synonymous. It is broader and incorporates more of the cultural and human elements 
of a product that comes from a territory with a history and characteristics that exist nowhere else. He 
stated that, “The product must be linked to geography and has a value and history beyond the product 
itself, a cultural tradition linked to a territory” (Personal interview, February 27, 2013). 
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product flaws such as an “earthy” flavor (Jacobsen 2010: 10) or in the eighteenth 
century to denote the negative characters of people in certain regions of France (Guy 
2003: 42). It was not until the nineteenth century that the positive connotations of 
terroir took on a nationalistic flavor to become naturalized as part of French cultural 
identity and, “The connection between geography and quality had become a widely 
accepted belief, if not to say myth, by the nineteenth century” (Guy 2003: 122). 
Originally used to link viticulture practices and particularistic geography to the 
quality of wine, terroir has since been de-localized from its patrimony in France and 
globalized as a universal marketing concept. It has become a catchword in 
gastronomic literature where it inspires the celebration of local and place-based 
foods and alternative food movements around the world (Trubek 2008; Jacobsen 
2010; Paxson 2010) and also in trade negotiations (Barham 2003; Josling 2006) 
where it takes on significant marketing and commercial importance and forms the 
conceptual foundation for GI protection schemes. Terroir is more than just a notion; 
it matters economically and culturally for both producers and consumers. 
To elaborate, terroir refers to the intimate connection between (1) material 
factors such as the natural, geographical, and ecological elements of a place (see 
Wilson 1998; Robertson 1994; INAO 2006) and (2) immaterial factors that include 
human, historical, mystical, symbolic, and cultural importance (see Guy 2003; 
Trubek 2008; Leynse 2006; Vaudour 2002; Deloire, Prévost, and Kelly 2008) and 
their combined impact on the uniqueness, reputation, and quality of food and 
beverage products. Many scientists generally approve of the assertion that differing 
ecological areas have an effect on products, especially wine (Guy 2002: 42) but what 
is most commonly disputed is the inclusion of the abstract human or cultural element 
(Wilson 1998: 55). The idea of terroir emphasizes that the distinct characteristics of 
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a place bestows unique qualities on wine and food products. And within the GI 
context it defines the crucial link between a product’s place of origin and its 
distinctiveness in the marketplace.  
Although, when terroir is used as a legitimating strategy or political tool to 
ensure the conferral of exclusive property rights to some producers over others it 
becomes terroirism. In the context of European multifunctional agriculture, 
terroirism legitimates government action in formulating and extending ‘economic 
patriotic’ agricultural policies that “seek to discriminate in favour of particular social 
groups, ﬁrms or sectors understood by the decision-makers as insiders because of 
their territorial status” (Clift and Woll 2012: 308). In the GI context this refers to the 
disproportionate privileging of ‘genuine’ producers over others through the conferral 
of exclusive property rights. ‘Multifunctionality’ is a defining feature of current 
European agricultural policy that plays an important role in the negotiating position 
of the EU in world trade negotiations and “developed partly in response to the threat 
which trade liberalisation presents to European agriculture” (Dibden and Cocklin 
2009: 163). The concept asserts that the value of agriculture lies beyond the 
commercial production of food to encompass “so-called ‘non-economic’ objectives” 
(Winters 1988) and “non-trade concerns” (Gössl 2008). These could include certain 
non-marketable social and environmental benefits such as sustainable and rural 
development, food quality, safety, and security, and the preservation of landscapes 
and cultural heritage that are perceived as threatened by the further liberalization of 
agricultural trade. Multifunctionality is a contested policy concept in the context of 
agricultural negotiations because it has been used to help justify government 
intervention and continued state support for agriculture in order to protect agri-food 
markets from external competition (Burrell 2001; Potter 2004; McCarthy 2005; 
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Kaditi and Swinnen 2006; Potter and Tilzey 2007; Dibden, Potter, and Cocklin 
2009). 
To continue, as noted by Barthes (2009: 177) it is difficult to know the 
“social geography” of mythologies; however it is conceivable to isolate “the lines 
which limit the social region where it is spoken.” Additionally, he observes that “a 
myth ripens because it spreads” but will often resist spreading to hostile 
environments (Barthes 2009: 177). Thus, it is plausible to argue that distinctive 
boundaries are evident when considering the divisions between those who are in 
favor of GI protection for product names and those who are against it. Terroirism 
itself has had powerful constitutive effects in some countries but not others and has 
been transplanted in different forms in various countries that have institutionalized 
GI protection regimes and norms. Yet, the myths promoted through GIs attempt to 
take root in very different cultural and ideological assumptions that have evolved 
throughout history and as a result are not universally accepted. The meanings 
conveyed through food products and their names are read in different ways and 
ultimately affect the enthusiasm for origin protection. As well, there is skepticism as 
to “whether or not appellation systems actually guarantee quality” or if GIs are 
mainly being used as an exclusionary tool to market and prioritize European goods 
(Charters 2006: 104, 109). This oppositional position has exposed a different reading 
of meanings surrounding product names through genericism. 
3.4.3. Genericism 
On the other side, genericism provides the ideational basis of oppositional 
calls to retain the generic status quo. I use the concept to refer to a set of ideas that 
serve as a legitimating strategy through which actors contend that certain food names 
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within the GI debate are generic. Benson (quoted in O’Connor 2004: 95) states that 
“when a product’s geographic name becomes accepted as signifying the type of 
product, rather than its geographic source, the name is considered generic and it 
becomes part of the public domain.” Generic terms are the antithesis of GIs because 
they can be used by anyone, anywhere, at any time, and may not be privately owned. 
The rationale behind this is that the protection of generic terms “would grant the 
owner of the mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe its goods as 
what they are” (McKeown 2011). Genericism may also be used as a political tool to 
block the terroirist conferral of exclusive name-use rights and preserve the open use 
of terms. 
However, there are distinct differences between systems of protection that 
must be explained and are illustrated in Figure 3.4. Presumably, according to rules 
and regulations in both trademark and GI systems of intellectual property protection 
a generic name may never be registered. I say ‘presumably’ and signify this 
uncertainty by dashed lines in the diagram because a declaration of the genericness 
of names is not a straightforward process in either system. Trademarks “are seen as a 
public good because it is claimed they avoid the protection of geographical names 
that have become ‘generic’…Generic names are therefore seen as a means of 
presenting the general characteristics of a product to the consumer. They are not seen 
as indications of a product’s source and, accordingly, should not be protected by the 
trademark or any other intellectual property right” (Smith 2006: 4). Once a term 
becomes generic its distinctiveness is lost and an owner loses the right to have it 
legally protected. It is therefore important to take steps to prevent genericization 
from occurring in the first place as it is very difficult and uncommon, though not 
impossible, for a term to be “recaptured” for exclusive use (Butters and Westerhaus 
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2004: 112). Genericity is supposed to be established on a case-by-case basis through 
court procedures using evidence from various sources including customer surveys, 
dictionaries, and media use (Stern 2008: 1). But there is no consistent methodology 
for determining genericness and it remains a dubious and constantly evolving state. 
Furthermore, charges of genericness are not easily defensible in court (Butters and 
Westerhaus 2004: 119-20), requiring extensive costs and litigation. Much more has 
been written about genericism in a trademark context than with regard to GIs, which 
is a gap I hope to fill with this research. In later courses I demonstrate how when it 
comes to GIs, genericism is just as complicated and multiple contested GIs have 
been awarded to food names that have been considered generic by others, such as 
Parmesan and Feta.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Genericism Processes in Trademark and GI Systems of Protection 
There are further differences when it comes to the genericity of names. In the 
EU, simply because a name is unprotected does not mean it is generic as genericity is 
a state-of-being all its own. Moreover, once registered a GI may never become 
generic while this is not the case in many countries around the world that protect 
geographical names through trademark systems. There, protected names can or have 
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already become generic through a process of genericide whereby they are established 
over time as the household term for a class of products (Butters and Westerhaus 
2004: 112). In these countries it is the task of the private owner of a mark, not the 
state as is in the case of the EU, to police the marketplace to ensure that competitors 
and consumers are using their marks in appropriate ways (Farnsworth 2004: 14). 
Nevertheless, Stern (2008: 7) asserts that, “Genericide…gives power to the public to 
seize a word as its own, despite any efforts of the owner.” In many countries such as 
the US “registrations can be cancelled at any time on grounds of genericism” (Bolter 
2010: 49). The irony here is that the more popular and widely used a name becomes, 
the more the owner risks losing the exclusive right to its use (Matthews Lawson 
2010). Many taken-for-granted terms such as Cheddar, Gouda, and Dijon are said to 
have succumbed to genericide.  
One could argue that genericide is merely part of the natural evolution of 
language and utilization of words that enter into common parlance. But what makes 
this process so controversial is that it results in the cancellation or dilution of 
privately-held rights to names that carry considerable financial and symbolic value. 
There is a constant worry that competitors will use names in order to free-ride on 
established reputations for their own products. Thus, a general insecurity pervades 
the marketplace and is illustrated through the various metaphorical themes 
surrounding discussions of genericism that take on fatalistic and fearful tones. This is 
because according to Farnsworth (2004: 14), a mark dies when it becomes generic 
and genericism “strikes at its very essence, its capability to differentiate competing 
goods and services, its commercial value.” Names that owners fail to ensure the 
proper “inoculation” (Butters and Westerhaus 2004: 112) for against the genericide 
virus could become its next “victims” (Bolter 2010: 48). No one is safe and anyone’s 
112 
 
names “could be next” (Matthews Lawson 2010). For the owner of a GI in a more 
globalized trade regime, genericism in other countries is considered a danger, a 
threat, a risk, and something that needs to be combatted to prevent from occurring in 
the future. It is also one of the main reasons the EU is seeking extra protection for its 
terms worldwide in order to ensure that they are not at risk for future genericide 
(Goldberg 2001: 150; Kur and Cocks 2007: 1012).  
Genericism can be used as a legitimating strategy or political tool to block 
the asymmetric conferral of exclusive property rights to some producers over others 
and preserve the open use of terms. NW actors are able to work within the 
competitive paradigm, which enables them to de-legitimize the preferential treatment 
of European producers as a form of protectionism that is inconsistent with globally 
institutionalized goals set for agri-food markets that include liberalization and 
reduced state intervention, open competition, and free trade. A generic term 
epitomizes these ideals in that its use is open to everyone and provides a category 
within which dairy industries may maximize their competitiveness. 
To sum up, while terroirism is controversial because it enables the exclusive 
ownership of food names by those in specific locales, genericism is controversial 
because it revokes or invalidates those rights. Terroirism may thus be defined as the 
process and discursive strategy of localization that ties or is used to tie the rights to 
the use of signs, in the form of food names, to producers and production in 
designated regions of origin through the justification that a product’s distinctiveness 
and characteristics can only derive from there. On the contrary, genericism is the 
process and discursive strategy of de-localization that invalidates or is used to 
invalidate private rights to release terms into the universe of public use. Within 
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gastro-panic politics arguments of terroirism and genericism afford significant 
power to those who wield them, the former as a means of legitimating the conferral 
of private property rights to group of producers and the latter to blocking the 
registration of names and terms as well as discrediting their private ownership.  
3.5. Synthesizing Moral Panic, Securitization, and Myth: Towards the Gastro-
panic  
The benefits of employing moral panic, securitization, and myth lie in their 
complementarity. Each may be used as a critical tool and also compensates for areas 
where the others are lacking in explanatory value. First, where moral panic 
traditionalists attempt to maintain a stronghold over the essential moral aspects of a 
panic, the broadened security agenda advanced by the CS allows an examination of 
panic constructions across a variety of sectors outside the societal, such as the 
political, economic, and environmental.  
Second, moral panic focuses primarily on the generation of negative images 
that result in the demonization of ‘them’, the folk devil, while neglecting a more 
focused look on the ‘us’ or what exactly is endangered or needs protecting, namely 
the proper behaving members of society. Securitization is important because it brings 
a focus onto the referent object, or that which is being protected, to the analysis. 
With GIs this is important, for example, because along with focusing on controlling 
generic name use claims-makers are simultaneously attempting to secure extra rights 
for genuine producers. Thus, I argue that one aspect of creating a folk devil might be 
through the positive construction of another, a ‘folk angel’ whose characteristics are 
glorified rather than demonized. It has been noted by some scholars that certain 
modern panics have less clearly defined folk devils (Ungar 2001), so perhaps one 
aspect of modern panics could be the creation of ‘folk angels’ and more ambiguously 
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defined ‘folk devils.’ In the GI case origin products are glorified and easy to define 
yet the existence of the ‘other’ or generic devil in this instance is less clear – anyone 
outside the location of origin qualifies. 
Third, moral panic research tends to focus more on the generation of images 
to the neglect of discursive processes that contribute to the demonization of folk 
devils and construction of threats (Critcher 2008; Hier 2002). Securitization 
therefore allows an exploration of the process as a type of linguistic discourse that 
displays how threats are articulated and how the cherished nature of the referent 
object is argued to justify extra protection. It also eases the burden on 
disproportionality advanced by conventional moral panic theorists by asserting that 
actors themselves decide what threatens their security (Buzan et. al. 1998: 34), and 
that it is not the task of the analyst to prove whether or not something really 
constitutes a threat. Fourth, moral panic interrogates the motives or intentions of 
actors, which is something in securitization that is often disregarded (Floyd 2010: 2). 
Fifth, where securitization theory is lacking in clarity, such as in designating what 
constitutes “exceptional measures,” moral panic satisfies with the notion of 
disproportionality. Disproportionality, or how rights are asymmetrically conferred to 
some groups over others, could constitute an exceptional measure within 
securitization. 
And sixth, Barthes enables me to interrogate the whole notion of the gastro-
panic as myth, a struggle over cultural representations whereby actors attempt to fix 
and naturalize particular meanings and worldviews surrounding the use of food 
names in order to accomplish a political aim. Myth also makes it possible to pinpoint 
the ideologies of terroirism and genericism that fundamentally underlie competing 
discourses within the debate while subjecting them to a “demythicisation” (Crotty 
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1998: 156) to ensure critical awareness of the interests and power relations at play in 
the determination of product statuses.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Together, gastronomy, moral panic, securitization, and myth constitute the 
gastro-panic. Gastro-panic may be defined as a mythical discursive strategy of 
demarcation and legitimation that serves to (re)construct the cultural, economic and 
political boundaries surrounding food production and consumption. Actors employ 
this discourse in order to persuade an audience that a cherished referent object (folk 
angel) within the food system requires protection from an existential threat (folk 
devil), and that certain exceptional measures are legitimate to provide such 
protection. Gastro-panics also represent a boundary-maintaining and creating 
mechanism used by claims-makers to legitimize their normative and material 
interests in attaining GI protection or preserving generic use. Exceptional measures 
in this regard could refer to the disproportionate allocation or revocation of rights in 
favor of the securitizing group.  
In order to investigate the gastro-panic constructions within the debate over 
GGIs I seek to interrogate a number of empirical questions. Who are the claims-
makers or securitizing actors that are advocating for terroirism and genericism? How 
is terroirism and genericism manifested in their discourse? How are folk devils, folk 
angels, and their behavior portrayed by each side? On what issues are these actors 
concerned, what is at stake, and what threatens? What is being protected and why? 
These questions guide the analysis in subsequent empirical courses, beginning with 
the contested case of Parmesan. 
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Fourth Course 
4. The King of Cheeses and Controversy: Gastro-panic and the 
Protection of Parmesan 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the EU Parmesan is synonymous with Parmigiano-Reggiano, a protected 
term that refers to a place-based product derived from a particular region of Italy. In 
many countries around the world, Parmesan is a generic term used to refer to a type 
of cheese that has lost its link to the place of origin. The term Parmesan is one of 
many translations derived from Parmigiano-Reggiano, an Italian cheese otherwise 
known as the ‘King of Cheeses’ due to its unique characteristics and worldwide 
fame. But Parmesan is also the ‘King of Controversy’ because while use of the 
generic term co-existed with Parmigiano-Reggiano within the EU and abroad for 
many years, claims-makers including Italian industry and trade groups, government 
officials, farmers’ unions, consortia, chefs, consumers, and the EU have declared that 
outside use of the name is having deleterious consequences for the original cheese, 
its producers, and consumers, and must be stopped. As a result these actors have 
made attempts to do whatever it takes to secure exclusive rights to the term at the 
global level, a move that has been highly criticized by dairy industries around the 
world.  
A puzzle is presented here because numerous countries outside of Italy such 
as Germany, Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the US 
have long produced and regulated generic Parmesan according to legal standards. 
Regarding production, Australia currently produces over 9,000 tons (Dairy Australia 
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2013: 37) and exports the largest amount (Klapper 2007) while in the US 
consumption and production have continued to rise over recent years (Cheese 
Market News 2004) with production reaching 11,000 tons in 2013 (USDA 2014). 
Some companies have been producing the product for many years, the Kraft (2013) 
website stating that their grated Parmesan product has been around since 1945. Dairy 
industries and companies within these countries are not willing to give up use of 
what they view to be a generic name and the TRIPS agreement protects their right to 
use formerly geographic terms that have become generic in their territory.  
Parmesan is an especially useful case to examine the contested politics of 
food name protection because its use has been the focus of international attention 
since 1996 and currently represents one of the most controversial names within the 
greater struggle over generic terms in the context of GI politics. According to one 
EU respondent, “The US industry and US trade have been lobbying against the GI 
concept for many years, and the main name behind this has been Parmesan…In the 
end this is 80% about Parmesan and a couple of others” (Personal interview, May 24, 
2013a) and one article asserts that the cheese is currently a “thorn in US-EU free-
trade agreement” (Ames 2013). As well, one NW respondent called Parmesan the 
“poster child” (Email interview, May 31, 2013) of the dispute as it is symbolic of the 
greater conflict over generic terms within international negotiations. 
The purpose of this course is to use Parmesan as a lens through which to 
view the contested politics of food name protection as a competition over meaning. 
In this case competing actors make claims and counter-claims in order to establish 
dominance over the other and win the right to demarcate the particularistic or generic 
nature of the name in order to secure its exclusive or generic use. More specifically, 
the course presents the issue in depth from the perspective of terroirism, the myth 
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underpinning European attempts to secure global GI protection. I argue that 
European actors appeal to a food system security discourse of gastro-panic in order 
to legitimate the exceptional conferral of exclusive rights to the use of Parmesan. 
They also pursue global protection for the name in an attempt to restore an 
existential sense of security during a time of perceived insecurity brought about by 
socio-economic difficulties within the region of origin and the increased 
industrialization and globalization of cheese production. 
I begin by drawing attention to the inherently contested nature of Parmesan 
by discussing 4 significant events at European and global levels. Then, I illustrate 
how Italian and European claims-makers have framed the generic use of the name as 
a threat to the original through a gastro-panic that is characterized by heightened 
concern over its generic use and imitation in countries around the world, hostility 
towards those who continue to produce and export what are deemed to be fake and 
unlawful copies, and a consensus that increased protection within the WTO should 
be instigated to combat the problem. Finally, I demythologize the gastro-panic in 
order to better understand the volatility of the panic or why the issue has arisen 
recently. I demonstrate that although the protection of Parmesan has a long history, it 
has gained markedly greater political salience in recent years owing to socio-
economic difficulties at the domestic level and major changes in the global cheese 
economy. 
4.2. Contesting Parmesan 
Because it is a PDO in the EU, the name Parmigiano-Reggiano and all 
translations, including Parmesan, may only be used for cheeses produced according 
to strict specifications within a legally designated zone in northern Italy 
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encompassing the provinces of Parma, Reggio Emilia, Modena, Mantua, and 
Bologna.
17
 The production process has been set by a consortium of producers and 
requires the cheese to be composed of local milk with no added preservatives, aged 
for a minimum of 12 months – with three typical maturation periods occurring at 18, 
22, and 30 months – and to undergo a quality-control inspection by experts in order 
to receive the official branding. This final stage is a prestigious moment in the life of 
the cheese because it graduates from a nameless form to be fixed with a signified – 
Parmigiano-Reggiano.  
Parmigiano-Reggiano is a premium product that consumers are willing to pay 
more for because of its high quality, which is largely due to producer commitments 
to traditional production methods. The added value helps cheese-makers stay afloat 
without compromising their methods and ingredients amidst pressure from 
competing products, many of which are cheaper and industrially-produced. But its 
high premium and “large share of the market may make it vulnerable to exogenous 
forces wishing to alter and standardise the product in order to capture part of its high 
added value” (de Roest 2000: 3). There are cases where counterfeiters attempt to 
forge the Parmigiano-Reggiano brand in order to take advantage of this value. 
Parmigiano-Reggiano producers and cheese-makers have long sought to prevent this 
from happening, which is evidenced from the timeline in Table 4.1, with protection 
for the name having been discussed since the beginning of the 20
th
 century. In 1934 a 
group of producers formed the Consorzio Interprovinciale del Grana Tipico, the 
                                                          
17
 As stated in Article 13.1 of Regulation (EC) No 1151/2012 of 21 November 2012 (which has 
replaced Council Regulations (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 and (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 
1992), registered names are protected against “any misuse, imitation or evocation, even if the true 
origin of the products or services is indicated or if the protected name is translated or accompanied by 
an expression such as ‘style’, ‘type’, ‘method’, ‘as produced in’, ‘imitation’ or similar, including 
when those products are used as an ingredient.” 
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“oldest organisation for the protection of a cheese” (Parmigiano-Reggiano 
Consortium 2004) as a means of defining the region of origin and protecting the 
cheese and its name from lower quality imitations both domestically and abroad. 
This was renamed the Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, which I will 
here forth refer to as the Parmigiano-Reggiano Consortium (PRC), in 1954.  
Table 4.1: History of Parmigiano-Reggiano Protection 
Year Event 
1934 Consorzio Interprovinciale del Grana Tipico formed 
1954 Consortium renamed the Consorzio del Formaggio 
Parmigiano-Reggiano 
1951 Parmigiano-Reggiano registered under Stresa Convention 
1955 Parmigiano-Reggiano protected in Italy as Denominazione 
di Origine Protetta (DOP)  
1969 Parmigiano-Reggiano registered under Lisbon Agreement 
1996 -
ongoing 
Germany initially proposes Codex standard for Parmesan 
in May  
1996 Parmigiano-Reggiano registered as Protected Designation 
of Origin (PDO) in the EU in June 
1999 -
2002 
Court Case Nuova Castelli, Parmesan declared to be 
translation of Parmigiano-Reggiano 
2003 Parmigiano-Reggiano is one of 41 names the EU proposes 
to claw back in the WTO, including all translations 
2003 -
2008 
Germany sued over use of Parmesan, which is eventually 
declared to be an evocation of the PDO  
2013 PRC forms collaboration to recognize Reggio-Emilia 
region as UNESCO “Intangible World Heritage”  
The first attempt at international legal protection for the name occurred in 
1951 with the Stresa Convention and subsequently in 1969 under the Lisbon 
Agreement. The Permanent Council of International Convention of Stresa for the 
Use of Appellations d’Origine and Denominations of Cheeses or simply the ‘Stresa 
Convention’ was the first international agreement devoted specifically to the 
protection of cheese names. Countries involved in to the Convention agreed to 
protect the names or designations of certain cheeses within their territory from 
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misuse.
18
 But what is interesting in this agreement is that there were two hierarchical 
levels of protection similar to what exists in Articles 22 and 23 in the TRIPS 
agreement today. Only four cheeses (Parmigiano-Reggiano, Gorgonzola, Pecorino 
Romano, and Roquefort) were granted extra protection in Annex A, which prevented 
any use of the name even if the source of production was clearly indicated. The 
cheeses in the second group in Annex B were allowed to be used by member 
countries if they complied with particular specifications (Peaslee 1979; Blakeney 
2009).
19
 This implied their “quasi generic” (O’Connor 2004: 35) nature and reflected 
their use outside the area of origin. The Stresa Convention has now been overridden 
by European PDO and PGI rules and some of the cheeses in Annex B have become 
protected designations, such as Danablu (PGI), Asiago (PDO), Esrom (PGI), Fontina 
(PDO), Fiore Sardo (PDO), Svecia (PGI), and Gruyère (PGI).  
Next, the Lisbon Agreement affords stronger international protection to 
product names that is similar to that within the EU. It is this level of protection that 
the EU would like to see extended to all agricultural products. The Lisbon 
Agreement was the first international agreement to also protect translations of 
Parmigiano-Reggiano such as Parmesan. It is administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) (1958) and Article 3 ensures “against any usurpation 
or imitation, even if the true origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is 
used in translated form or accompanied by terms such as "kind," "type," "make," 
"imitation," or the like” within the territories of the 28 signatories. The agreement 
also overcomes limitations of the territoriality principle in that terms protected under 
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 Parties to the agreement included Austria, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Switzerland, 
Norway, and Sweden. 
19
 Annex B cheese terms included Asiago, Brie, Caciocavallo, Camembert, Danablu, Esrom, Fiore 
Sardo, Fontina, Gruyère, Gubrandsdalsost, Herregaards, Emmental, Maribo, Pinzgauer Berkase, 
Provolone, Saint-Paulin, Sbrinz, and Svecia. 
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the agreement cannot be deemed to have become generic in other signatory countries 
as long as they are protected in the country of origin. 
But it was in 1996 when Parmigiano-Reggiano was registered as a PDO in 
the EU, the same year that Germany brought the status of the term Parmesan to the 
attention of the CAC, that questions surrounding the generic use of the translation 
were brought to the forefront of international attention. Use of the name Parmesan 
had spread within Europe and also around the world, less so by attempts to forge the 
compound name Parmigiano-Reggiano but more so through the genericization of 
translations. According to one interviewee, “Parmesan was tolerated in Italy for quite 
some time…Parmesan used to be considered different than Parmigiano-Reggiano 
and there was initially no conflict between them. But then they clawed back the term 
in Italy and in Europe” (Personal interview, April 11, 2013). Thus, attempts to 
protect it internationally have been met with resistance and controversy.  
Through examining 2 court cases within the EU and 2 proposals at the global 
level in the CAC and WTO, in this section I illustrate how Parmesan has been caught 
by myth. According to Barthes anything that can be spoken about or communicated 
through a discourse may become myth and in this case it is not the cheese itself that 
is most important but rather the messages and meanings it conveys and how it is 
conceptualized and understood by different societies. I draw attention to the 
contested nature of Parmesan by revealing how oppositional actors compete for 
dominance by employing parallel processes of meaning construction – that of 
genericism and terroirism – to demarcate and fix particular representations in order 
to secure exclusive protection for or open use of the name.  
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4.2.1. European level 
A few years after the registration of Parmigiano-Reggiano as a PDO in the 
EU, in 1999 the PRC brought a case against an Italian company that had been 
producing a dry, grated cheese under the label ‘Parmesan’ for export to other 
European Member States. The company was located within the region of origin and 
also produced cheese according to the PDO specification for sale domestically. 
However, the cheese sent abroad contained a mixture derived from various origins. 
The case sought to determine whether or not an Italian company could export cheese 
under the term Parmesan despite Italian law prohibiting any use of the name if the 
product did not abide by the production specifications (European Court of Justice v 
Bigi 2002).  
Germany, the biggest producer of the cheese after Italy (Smith 2008), was 
asked to comment on the case. They raised the argument that use of the name could 
not be considered misuse or evocation of the PDO because the name Parmesan had 
evolved over time to be understood by consumers, both in Germany and other 
Member States, as a generic term. Although they admitted that originally Parmesan 
constituted a translation of Parmigiano-Reggiano, it had come to take on another 
meaning in the everyday usage of consumers:  
“By ‘parmesan’, German and Austrian consumers mean a cheese that is grated, or 
intended to be grated, and used as a garnish for certain dishes. ‘Parmesan’ does not 
call to mind the name of a cheese originating from the Parma region, or more 
generally, from Italy. Rather, by ‘Parmigiano Reggiano’, German consumers mean a 
type of ‘parmesan’ of a particular quality, made in Italy, having an aromatic taste 
varying from strong to pungent, and requiring a certain time to mature (at least 12 
months)” (European Court of Justice 2002: 9, para 48). 
In describing what consumers meant by the term, Parmesan became an empty form 
in a mythical order of meaning that was joined with a culturally specific concept – 
that of a category of grated cheese. In this instance the meaning was the result of 
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how it was declared to be understood by German and Austrian societies. Thus, it 
becomes evident in this statement that the connotation of Parmesan as a type of 
grated cheese had been naturalized and acted as a conceptual lens through which 
German representatives viewed the issue. And since generic names may not be 
registered according to European legislation, here genericism emerged as a means of 
preventing the use of Parmesan from becoming the exclusive property of Italian 
producers.  
Ultimately, in 2002 the ECJ rejected the argument that Parmesan was a 
generic term as it was “far from clear” and not sufficiently proven by Germany 
(European Court of Justice 2002: 4, para 20). They also ruled that Parmesan was, in 
fact, a direct translation of Parmigiano-Reggiano and that once a European country 
had registered a name it may not be marketed anywhere in the EU or risk misleading 
consumers. But what is interesting is to notice how a competing meaning of 
Parmesan, guided by terroirism, presented itself in the language of the court: 
“The use of the term ‘Parmigiano’ immediately conjures up in the mind of the 
European consumer the cheese produced in that region of Italy and not an inhabitant 
of that Italian town” (European Court of Justice 2002: 9, para 52)  
They continued: 
“The designation of origin ‘Parmigiano Reggiano’ therefore refers to parmesan, the 
characteristic cheese, originating in a particular place (the town of Parma and its 
surroundings) and in that particular region (Emilia-Romagna)” (European Court of 
Justice 2002: 10, para 54). 
 
Notice the differing connotation of Parmesan as a particular cheese derived from a 
specific geographical area, which in this statement is claimed to be the result of how 
it is understood by European consumers regardless of a lack of empirical evidence. 
An alternative connotation of Parmesan was demarcated and confirmed and 
125 
 
terroirism was used as a means of localizing the term and legitimizing the exclusive 
use of the translation Parmesan for Italian producers.  
Shortly after Parmesan was declared to be a translation that must also be 
protected in the EU, in 2003 the European Commission confronted and eventually 
took Germany to court over its failure to clamp down on the production of Parmesan 
within its borders (Commission of the European Communities v Germany 2008). 
The German government held to its arguments that the term had succumbed to 
genericide. They also contended that Parmesan had an independent meaning separate 
from that of the registration Parmigiano-Reggiano, that the regulations only 
protected the compound term in its entirety, and that Parmesan had been produced in 
Italy up until the year 2000. One German dairy representative was reported as stating 
that, “The southern European member states want to use this regulation to turn back 
the time and they want to protect designations that have clearly become generic” 
(Associated Press 2007). 
The Commission’s response to Germany was that Parmesan could only be 
generic in the case that consumers stop regarding the name as related to its place of 
origin; in essence the connotation with Italy was lost. They argued that this had not 
taken place despite a lack of empirical evidence to the contrary; otherwise 
manufacturers would not need to use words and images connecting their products to 
Italy. The Commission also stated that singular elements of all compound terms were 
protected unless generic or declared to be ‘unprotected’ by their owners, which was 
not the case with Parmesan, and that all elements of a compound name are protected 
unless otherwise indicated.
20
 The production of Parmesan in Italy was irrelevant in 
                                                          
20
 A number of compound cheese names were registered along with Parmigiano-Reggiano under the 
European system in 1996 such as Camembert de Normandie, Emmental de Savoie, Brie de Meaux, 
Provolone Valpadana, Pecorino Romano, Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, Noord-Hollandse Gouda, 
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that it did not constitute genericity because the product was intended for export to 
countries where the term is not necessarily protected “in accordance with the 
principle of territoriality” (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 4, para 
38). This last point is especially interesting because in the current dispute over the 
use of Parmesan actors claim that the name is being abused in non-EU countries 
despite the recognition of territoriality under the WTO.  
In 2008 Parmesan was declared to be an evocation of Parmigiano-Reggiano 
restricted to the exclusive use of right-holders within the specified region of Italy. 
However, the burden of ensuring compliance with the regulations was held to be the 
responsibility of the PRC rather than the German government.
21
 The question of 
Parmesan’s genericity, though introduced, was never fully addressed and dismissed 
based on lack of evidence. While the PRC (2007) asserted that these cases 
demonstrated that Parmesan was clearly not a generic term, in actuality given 
enough evidence its genericness could still be proven.  
4.2.2. Global level 
The contestation surrounding Parmesan is also evident at the global level. A 
month prior to the registration of Parmigiano-Reggiano as a PDO in the EU, in 1996 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and West Country Farmhouse Cheddar cheese. But what differs about these names may be found in 
an annex at the bottom of the listed registrations where it was declared that protection was not sought 
for components of certain compound names including Camembert, Emmental, Brie, Provolone, 
Pecorino, Mozzarella, Gouda, and Cheddar (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1107/96). This meant 
that the compound term was only protected in its entirety and that the other parts could continue to be 
used as was the case with cheeses in Annex B of the Stresa Agreement. Since there was nothing in the 
annex citing that protection for Parmigiano or Parmesan was not sought, it was assumed that they 
were also protected. This point has been discounted by Hauer (2008: 389) who argues that “whether a 
single part of that designation is a generic name cannot depend on the applicant’s declaration of will 
but must exclusively depend on the actual facts.”   
21
 This has since changed in more recent revisions of the regulations. As stated in Article 13.3 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1151/2012, “Member States shall take appropriate administrative and judicial 
steps to prevent or stop the unlawful use of protected designations of origin and protected 
geographical indications, as referred to in paragraph 1, that are produced or marketed in that Member 
State.” Whereas previously the burden of ensuring compliance was placed on the consortium, today it 
is the responsibility of each Member State. 
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Germany submitted the first proposal to the CAC (Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme 1996: 12) to begin work on an international standard for Parmesan 
cheese. The CAC “develops harmonised international food standards, guidelines and 
codes of practice” (FAO/WHO 2014) to ensure food safety, protect consumers, and 
facilitate fair trading practices and has established a number of standards setting out 
the requirements, in terms of composition and quality, of certain cheeses.
22
 But far 
from a routine request, the proposal sparked a chain of discussion over the course of 
subsequent Codex sessions that crystallized into a permanent deadlock between 
those in support of and those against the creation of an international Parmesan 
standard. 
The situation within Codex is very important because it represents the first 
manifestation of contested politics surrounding Parmesan in an international 
institutional setting. On the one hand Germany, the US, and other supporters argued 
that Parmesan had long been generic, which was justified by the substantial 
international trade in cheese under the name and warranted a clear definition at the 
international level. The declaration of genericness acted to de-localize the term 
thereby legitimating the creation of a fixed definition through an international 
standard. This de-localization was further specified through evidence presented by 
the German delegation indicating that at the time Parmesan was manufactured in 11 
European and non-European countries and regulated by a legal standard in 6, 
consumed in 19, and that 64,620 tons were produced and 11,577 tons exported (Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 1999). 
                                                          
22
 Individual cheese standards include Mozzarella, Cheddar, Danbo, Edam, Gouda, Havarti, Samso, 
Emmental, Tilsiter, Saint-Paulin, Provolone, Cottage cheese, Coulommiers, Cream cheese, 
Camembert, and Brie (FAO/WHO 2011). 
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On the other hand, Italy, the EU, and other opponents continuously rejected 
the creation of a new standard on the basis that Parmesan could not be a generic term 
since Parmigiano-Reggiano and all translations, including Parmesan, were protected 
as a European PDO. In 2000, the EC employed a logic of terroirism to re-localize 
the meanings attached to Parmesan and discursively block the standardization of the 
name:  
“Consumers in Italy, as throughout the world, identify “parmesan” with the cheese 
produced in Italy in the indicated geographic origin….It is in fact a natural product 
with superior quality characteristics derived from the surroundings of its provenance, 
as well as the type of food used for the cattle. For all these reasons, the use of the 
term “parmesan”, a translation of the geographic name “Parmigiano”, is therefore 
truly misleading for consumers, who think they are buying a product with certain 
superior and natural qualities, instead of an altogether generic product. It is obvious, 
in fact, that the term “Parmesan” does not evoke, but coincides with, a geographic 
name (the adjective from the name Parma according to the local dialect)” (Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 2000).  
The argument again rests upon how Parmesan is perceived by consumers, not only in 
Italy but also the rest of the world, as relating entirely to the PDO. Notice how the 
cheese also assumes the status of the folk angel and the EU underlines its terroir, 
which gives it its ‘superior’ and ‘natural’ quality.  
In parallel with the indecision over Parmesan transpiring in the CAC, in 2003 
the EU pursued a controversial proposal in the WTO known as “claw-back.” The 
objective was to regain the exclusive use of 41 product terms listed in Table 4.2, 13 
of which were cheeses, for right-holders in the countries of origin and prohibit their 
outside use. This list represented what the EU viewed to be some of the most 
valuable, most abused, and most copied products abroad and included Parmigiano-
Reggiano and its translation Parmesan. When taking a closer look at the breakdown 
of the list it is also interesting to notice that the preferences of only 6 Member States, 
5 of which are Mediterranean countries, are taken into account. This reflects the 
differing interest in GI protection within the EU itself and will be discussed in more 
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detail further in the course. Nevertheless, in the multilateral arena the EU speaks 
with ‘one voice’ and justified the list based on the argument that the value of these 
terms was vulnerable to being eroded, especially since there was insufficient 
protection in the WTO and the Parmesan issue was being pursued within the CAC. 
In the previous course I discussed how generic names are viewed to be public goods 
in countries that protect intellectual property through trademark systems and that 
only in very rare cases may they acquire protection. With that said it is easier to 
understand why this proposal was profoundly contentious because it attempted to 
recapture terms from generic use around the world and eventually had to be 
abandoned. 
Table 4.2: EU Claw-back List 
Member 
State 
Wines and Spirits Cheeses Meat and Other 
Products 
Italy Chianti, Grappa di 
Barolo/del 
Piemonte/di 
Lombardia/del 
Trentino/del Friuli/del 
Veneto, dell'Alto 
Adige, Marsala 
Asiago, Fontina, 
Gorgonzola, Grana 
Padano, Mozzarella 
di Bufala Campana, 
Parmigiano-
Reggiano, Pecorino 
Romano 
Mortadella 
Bologna, 
Prosciutto di 
Parma, Prosciutto 
di San Daniele, 
Prosciutto Toscano 
France Beaujolais, Bordeaux, 
Bourgogne, Chablis, 
Champagne, Cognac, 
Graves, Médoc, 
Moselle, Saint-
Emilion, Sauternes 
Comté, Reblochon, 
Roquefort 
 
Spain Jerez/Xerez, Malaga, 
Rioja 
Manchego Azafrán de la 
Mancha, Jijona y 
Turrón de Alicante 
Portugal Madeira, Porto Queijo São Jorge  
Greece Ouzo Feta  
Germany Liebfrau(en)milch, 
Rhin 
  
Returning to the CAC, in 2005 and 2006 it was eventually maintained that 
territorial intellectual property regulations including GIs should not prevent the 
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pursuance of a new Codex standard for cheese and that Parmesan met all criteria for 
establishing a new standard. However, this position was dismissed by the EU as 
incomplete (Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 2005, 2006). They 
stressed that they “did not seek to use Codex procedures to prevent the use of 
“Parmesan” as a generic term in those countries where this was the case” (Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 2005) but that the Hard Grating Cheese 
standard would perfectly suffice and they could not compromise on a standard for 
Parmesan since the term was protected in the EU. In this instance the EU appeared to 
be respecting the territoriality of the generic use of Parmesan but at the same time 
had recently sought its exclusive protection in an alternative international forum, the 
WTO. These events therefore highlight the parallel and contradictory actions of the 
EU in two different institutional settings.  
In the end no resolution was ever reached and the Parmesan question has 
been placed in permanent abeyance, destined to gather dust on the shelves of the 
Codex agenda indefinitely. Though considering the current international outcry over 
the attempted protection of a number of generic cheese terms that will be discussed 
in detail in the sixth course, this issue may yet be revisited. The name is still 
considered by many to be “internationally recognized” (Embassy Wellington 2005) 
as generic on the basis that it is produced in numerous countries and attempts to 
widen its protection have been severely criticized (Sutton 2004; The New Zealand 
Herald 2005; Hough 2013). Parmesan is reported to be “one of the most widely 
produced cheeses globally, with approximately two-thirds of it manufactured outside 
of Europe…” (CCFN 2013b). And one NW dairy representative emphasized that 
although Parmesan did derive from Parmigiano-Reggiano, that they have come to 
represent two different things. She stated that, “Our producers of parmesan would 
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not see themselves as making an ‘imitation’ or counterfeit product. It is just another 
offering in that class of product” (Email interview, May 31, 2013). These actors 
argue for the co-existence of Parmigiano-Reggiano and Parmesan in international 
markets. 
The abovementioned cases are interesting because they rest on a set of 
clashing connotations contending for dominance. Basically, when a consumer is 
confronted with a product called Parmesan is the image brought to their mind that of 
the protected designation Parmigiano-Reggiano or a type of grated cheese that could 
be made anywhere? Parmesan is given meaning by how it is represented by each side 
in the debate. From the European perspective, the name is associated with a highly 
valued cultural product derived from a particular region of origin that is esteemed for 
its traditional character and production methods. However, from the opposing 
perspective the name is valued as a marketing device to indicate a generic type of 
widely-produced cheese. These meanings are not simply abstract notions but have 
practical effects because they are developed and deployed in concrete struggles over 
the power to influence and regulate use of the term in international negotiations. It is 
evident that Parmesan has been caught by myth because the meanings of the concept 
are unstable and problematic. They fluctuate and differ in varied contexts and as a 
result the name is inherently contested. Thus, Parmesan has become “an arena of the 
class struggle” (Vološinov 1973: 23) as competing sides within the struggle seek to 
fix its otherwise shifting meaning.  
As the Parmesan case illustrates, standards and norms are not easily agreed 
upon and particular difficulties arise in harmonizing dairy standards when different 
local realities and philosophical alignments exist. In these contexts seemingly 
insignificant factors such as whether a certain cheese is rounded or in blocks or 
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whether a country aligns politically towards a more market liberal or protectionist 
trade regime matters and could impede on the creation of a new standard. And it 
must be remembered that even though the EU takes a unified position within Codex, 
differing Member State perspectives make this very difficult. For example, Germany 
and Austria were reported to have walked out of a Codex meeting in 2004 in protest 
of the EU’s attempts to render the Parmesan standard proposal obsolete (Europolitics 
2014). With regard to Codex standards, one European dairy representative explained: 
“it’s not a basic recipe. I think it’s a little bit like, like a language. You can imagine 
that language existed before the grammar was written. And here most things existed 
in food…those things existed before the Codex standard was written. So the Codex 
standard tries to represent the reality. But like a grammar that has thousands of 
exceptions…you have more exceptions than real rules…to put it on paper, what can 
be seen as a common reality. And sometimes it just doesn’t exist. And certain 
standards don’t exist” (Personal interview, May 23, 2014). 
The competing realities within Codex represented parallel pursuits of security in 
which each side sought to prevent its right to a particular use of Parmesan from 
being eroded. The name could be considered a powerful security tool that has the 
potential to aid in the survival of the cheese-makers in the PRC by preventing the 
erosion of its reputation and free-riding on its use, but also in the endurance of 
companies who have long relied on the term to market their products. As a site of 
negotiation and contestation, security always results in winners and losers and 
regardless of the result of each case one side would view itself as the latter. Security 
by way of acquiring exclusive rights to a GI to protect it from outside use creates a 
disproportionality or imbalance that results in insecurity for those who have been 
using it generically.  
Therefore, actors discursively demarcated boundaries around fixed meanings 
of Parmesan as a means of preserving their respective status quos. Hence, the 
delimitation of ideological boundaries of terroirism and genericism became the main 
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source of conflict because there were incompatible claims over how the name could 
be used and who was entitled to use it to such an extent that no decision over a 
‘common reality’ of Parmesan was ever reached. A similar situation has occurred in 
the WTO where clashing ontological positions and exceptions have led to a deadlock 
within GI negotiations. Parmesan is clearly a widely-used and internationally 
contested term, so how is the conferral of exclusive rights to Italian producers being 
justified? In the next section I elaborate on the manifestation of a gastro-panic 
whereby European actors invoke security in order to demarcate threats to the cheese 
and its producers in such a way as to legitimate political action to secure its 
protection.  
4.3. The Counterfeiters Must Be Stopped 
In recent years, gastro-panic discourse has arisen surrounding the generic use 
of the term Parmesan and may be evidenced through the heightened concern 
emanating from claims-makers such as Italian lobby, industry and trade groups, 
government officials, farmers’ unions, consortia, chefs, consumers, and the EU over 
the international abuse of food product reputations and attempts to affirm the 
genericity of the term. These claims-makers frame the production of imitation food 
products such as Parmesan as a form of food piracy and securitize it as a threat 
projected to have serious political, economic, and social consequences that must be 
addressed with global solutions. By calling attention to the troubling condition and 
professing to represent and promote the needs, preferences, and/or interests of 
producers and consumers, they attempt to influence global policy through extended 
GI protection and the asymmetric revocation of rights to generic use around the 
world.  
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4.3.1. Concern 
Having secured the exclusive use of Parmesan for Italian producers within 
the EU, Agriculture Minister Paolo de Castro was quoted in an article stating that, 
“There is no more risk in Europe of finding Parmesan that isn’t Parmesan…Outside 
the European Union is another story” (Bodoni 2008). Fears have extended beyond 
the EU to the improper use of the name abroad where the global production and 
consumption of generic Parmesan is increasing. They view the problem to be that 
none of it is the real thing and fake versions evoking the original abound and are 
sold all around the world touting numerous translated names. Claims-makers express 
concern that such generic use is akin to free-riding on the fame and good name of 
Parmigiano-Reggiano and has disastrous consequences. Fake Parmesans take away 
market share from the authentic one, tarnish its image, erode its reputation, and 
mislead consumers. The PRC (2008) states that outsider “use of the name 
‘Parmesan’ during the last years has had a very negative impact on both the economy 
of the sector and the image or our unique cheese.”  
The appearance of a gastro-panic is firstly indicated by an outbreak of 
concern over behavior deemed to be threatening, in this case the generic production 
of Parmesan. A security issue has arisen as the referent object Parmesan, which is 
perceived to be endangered and in need of protection, is demonstrated to be at risk 
from the existential threat of counterfeiting. For producers of Parmigiano-Reggiano, 
Italy, and the EU, Parmesan and its translations are synonymous with Parmigiano-
Reggiano and thus their use outside the region of origin is akin to food fraud, food 
piracy, and counterfeiting, serious offences that are punished with hefty fines and 
even prison sentences. Acts of passing off generic Parmesan as the genuine article, 
securitized to as “illegal activities” (Parliamentary Questions 2012a) and acts of 
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“unfair competition” (Parliamentary Questions 2012d), constitute a threat and are 
estimated to be especially deleterious to the well-being of Parmigiano-Reggiano, 
which is said to be one of the world’s most imitated food products (WIPO 2011; 
Ciancio 2012; PRC 2012). For the cheese, the actions of counterfeiters are said to be 
severely damaging to its reputation, quality, and value (PRC 2004a, 2004c; 
European Commission 2003) thereby compromising its security by putting its very 
material existence and survival at risk (Berretta 2008). And due to the lack of 
international legal protection for food product names, actors assert that this 
phenomenon is only projected to get worse. 
An Italian Ministry for Economic Development (2012: 3) consumer guide 
distinguishes between two types of counterfeiting in the food sector. The first, “Food 
fraud, falsification and adulteration,” involves the substitution of ingredients or 
modification of a product and calls to mind the recent horsemeat scandal or the 
discovery of melamine in infant formula but also includes the passing off of sawdust 
or chalk for grated Parmesan or using water to dilute milk and wine. In many cases 
such practices can be deleterious to human health and compromise consumer food 
safety. But the fight against Parmesan fraud is less a defense against those who 
might adulterate the product and more against those who threaten the sanctity of the 
name. The second type of counterfeiting involves the “Falsification of a brand, 
protected geographical indication (PGI) or denomination of origin (PDO),” such as 
the utilization of the word Parmesan for cheese to trick consumers into buying 
something of lower quality that was not produced in the correct way within the 
specified region of origin.  
What is interesting is that the use of a GI outside its place of origin is placed 
in the same category of counterfeiting as dangerous substances. Both are illegal, with 
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one having a negative effect on human health and the other having a negative effect 
on the reputation, value, and image of the product. And the menace comes not only 
from counterfeiters within Italy who attempt to falsify the Parmigiano-Reggiano 
brand and label itself but particularly from foreign producers and manufacturers who 
continue to utilize the name generically within their territory and market it to others 
around the world. The Ministry states that in fact the second type of counterfeiting is 
most common abroad and, “The main offences encountered with regard to PDO/PGI 
foods relate to the unauthorised use of a protected name for identifying a generic 
product, irregular forms of labelling, the use of prohibited additives (in cheese for 
example)…” (Ministry for Economic Development 2012: 3, emphasis added).  
This discourse is not confined to Italy and is evidenced in the language of the 
EU who is also taking a hardline approach to counterfeiting and leading the 
campaign to secure extra protection for GIs such as Parmesan worldwide. The EU 
has conflicted with other countries in their attempts to employ legitimating values 
through enforcing new rules that would criminalize GI infringements abroad and 
enshrine new enforcement powers in agreements such as the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2011. In a recent campaign the EU expressed that, 
“Designed to defraud and deceive, counterfeit products pose a threat to European 
citizens and the European economy. Counterfeits’ poorer quality raises significant 
health and safety concerns, and their fraudulent business model puts thousands of 
jobs in jeopardy…” (European Commission 2013a). While this statement refers to 
counterfeit products as a whole, from shoes and bags to foodstuffs, it points to the 
considerable insecurity caused by the existence of counterfeits and highlights the 
serious implications in securitizing the generic use of Parmesan around the world in 
this way. First, it mythologizes the situation by reducing it to the juxtaposition of 
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readily computable values through an emphasis on the objectionable behavior as 
intentionally deceptive as opposed to unintentional. It also portrays the counterfeit 
product as worse in quality, creating a binary opposition of best versus worse. 
Second, it appeals to security by drawing attention to certain referent objects that are 
endangered and in need of protection – namely citizens and the economy – which 
these practices put at risk. 
The securitization of generic use and movement to institutionalize the 
protection of food product names is promoted by the EU because enhanced global GI 
protection would provide relief from threats to the survival of Parmigiano-Reggiano 
and its artisanal production system “while leaving producers safe in the knowledge 
that their produce receives its legitimate world-wide recognition” (European 
Commission 2002). The EU asserts that its valuable food product names are in 
urgent need of greater protection to eliminate pirating and unfair competition abroad 
and safeguard them from misuse, imitation, and usurpation, which incur significant 
costs to genuine producers and put them, and unsuspecting consumers, at a 
disadvantage (European Commission 2001; European Commission 2002; European 
Commission 2009). Producers are already “under pressure from the economic 
downturn, concentration of retailer bargaining power, and global competition…” 
(European Commission 2013) and the production of generic Parmesan is said to 
threaten the well-being of ‘legitimate’ producers and consumers (European 
Commission 2010) where according to a European Commission negotiator at the 
WTO agricultural talks: 
“On the one hand, the genuine producers suffer economic damage because valuable 
business is taken away from them and the established reputation for their products is 
compromised. On the other hand this situation also leaves the consumers with 
feelings of frustration because they do not receive the specific quality of product 
which the label suggest they are buying” (European Commisson 2001). 
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Unfair competition through generic use threatens their rights under European 
legislation to produce their product free from the threat of counterfeiting and to 
assume fair market access (Kampf 2003) both now and in the future (European 
Commission 2003). It also puts their livelihoods, businesses, jobs, and the local 
economy at risk (Personal interview, February 27, 2013). Additionally, consumers 
everywhere are declared to be purposely deceived and confused when they cannot be 
assured of the origin and quality of the products they buy (PRC 2004a). The name, 
the PDO, is intimately linked to the quality of the product and when it is misused it 
compromises the security and safety of consumers. These reasons are presented as a 
means of legitimating the request for a disproportionality of use rights favoring 
Italian producers. 
Another important indication of gastro-panic is the appearance of hostility 
towards those considered to be responsible for the threatening behavior. Concern 
enhances the division between the normal ‘us’ and deviant ‘them’ as claims-makers 
portray so-called illegitimate producers responsible for counterfeiting in a negative 
light. Known as the ‘folk devils’, they emerge within the gastro-panic discourse as 
the manufacturers and producers of imitation or generic Parmesan who are targeted 
as “food pirates” (Owen 2007a; Owen 2007b), “abusers” (Echikson 1998; PRC 
2007), “pretenders” (Olmsted 2012) and “counterfeiters” (PRC 2008) who take 
advantage of, exploit, and free-ride on names and deliberately mislead and cheat 
consumers (PRC 2006; Monti 2014; Bodoni 2008). This negative imagery 
contributes to a process of sensitization where producers who have utilized Parmesan 
outside of the region of origin unnoticed for years are suddenly targeted as 
counterfeiters and rule-breakers who justifiably deserve to have their rights revoked 
due to the inauthentic character of their products, while Italian producers of genuine, 
139 
 
quality Parmesan deserve full rights to the use of the name. In essence, European 
claims-makers create deviance by constructing the rules surrounding the usage of 
certain terms, the violation of which is considered to be deviant, and assigns them to 
generic producers who are marked as “outsiders” (Becker 1963: 9). Through this 
process the identification of deviance is generated through social delineation that 
may be used to facilitate punishment in the form of revoked rights for generic 
producers. 
4.3.2. Serious consequences 
Within the gastro-panic the seriousness of the actions of folk devil imitators 
is also magnified through statements indicating the widespread nature of the problem 
and prophecies of doom, which are predictions indicating the likelihood of the 
phenomenon becoming worse as well as an emphasis on the negative consequences 
that could ensue if it is not controlled. This has the effect of further enhancing the 
political salience of the threat by emphasizing the urgency of the issue in order to 
persuade policy-makers and negotiators to act.  
To begin, for many in Italy the case of Parmesan represents a problem 
perceived to be part of a widespread global trend plaguing contemporary society 
otherwise known as the ‘Made in Italy’ (Ross 2004; Di Maria and Finotto 2008; 
Bertoli and Resciniti 2012) phenomenon. This is where illegitimate producers and 
manufacturers around the world evoke the intangible attributes of Italianness, which 
is generally associated with high quality, in order to capitalize on the attached 
premiums by luring unsuspecting consumers to buy inauthentic products that were 
not actually produced in Italy. Claims-makers have asserted that such actions have 
resulted in the forced closure of tens of thousands of shops and businesses, the loss 
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of thousands of jobs, and missed opportunities by Italian businesses on billions in 
trade revenue at home and around the world due to unfair competition from lower-
quality ‘Italian’ products of non-Italian origin (Ministry for Economic Development 
2012: 3; Owen 2007; Monti 2014; Parliamentary Questions 2013). And Nicoletti, 
Platania and Privitera (2007: 1) state that the fabrication and copying of traditional 
food products is “a growing and increasingly dangerous phenomenon” eliciting 
severe economic and social consequences that warrant immediate governmental 
attention. 
Some also point out that an increasing number of counterfeit products are 
being seized at the border (McMahon 2005; FareAmbiente 2013; Parliamentary 
Questions 2012c), which calls attention to the fact that the problem is getting worse 
through the increased free movement of goods. Consumers both in Italy and abroad 
are declared to be the ultimate “victims” of counterfeiting activities (Olmsted 2012) 
and a recent report (Coldiretti/Eurispes 2013) stated that, “Nearly one Italian in five 
(18 percent) was the victim of food fraud in 2013…” leaving consumers “more 
worried than ever before…” Mara Bizzotto demonstrates concern over this issue in 
correspondence addressed to the European Commission: 
“‘Italian sounding’ products, i.e. products which are marketed and named in such a 
way as to sound Italian, having some features of the original brand, but not 
originating in Italy, are causing considerable economic damage to Italian-made 
products and Italian registered designation of origin (RDO) and protected 
designation of origin (PDO) products. They are also harming Italy’s image, 
especially in relation to the culinary excellence of our regions” (Parliamentary 
Questions 2012b). 
Her statement draws attention to both the negative material and immaterial 
consequences of such actions, in the form of economic damage and harm to the very 
image of Italy’s quality products as a whole, to such an extent that concern is being 
raised at the European level. Furthermore, the perceived and immense scale of the 
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problem can be demonstrated through a response to an American Parmesan winning 
the best US cheese award in 2009:  
“The American Parmesan…is just the tip of the iceberg of a widespread 
phenomenon throughout the world…The countries where the imitations are more 
successful are the U.S., Australia and New Zealand but what worries the most is 
the trend in emerging countries like China where the ‘Made in Italy' imitations 
arrived prior to the original and are likely to affect growth. The foreign market 
penetration of low quality imitations as well as directly affect the Italian 
entrepreneurs, severely damages the image of ‘Made in Italy', both on 
traditional and on emerging markets. Worldwide - concludes Coldiretti - the fight 
against the food pirates that falsify the territorial identity of products should be 
carried out under the WTO, with the aim of extending the protection of 
geographical indications...” (Italian Food Net 2009, original emphasis). 
The gastro-panic discourse in this passage is evident. First, it suggests that these 
actors are highly concerned and perceive this to be a pervasive and seriously harmful 
problem, which is indicated through phrases such as ‘tip of the iceberg’, ‘widespread 
phenomenon’, and referring to ‘worries’ that ‘severe damage’ could occur in both 
established and emerging markets. Hostility is also invoked as they draw attention to 
the need to ‘fight’ the folk devils, here denoted as ‘food pirates’, and the inevitability 
of the phenomenon becoming worse if action is not taken at the global level. The 
imitation of products is securitized as threatening Italian entrepreneurs and damaging 
the image of Italian products, which is then used to justify the extension of GI 
protection as a means of dealing with the problem.  
For Italian actors, widespread imitation has not been the only problem but 
attempts by illegitimate folk devils to verify the genericity of Parmesan at the 
European level and institutionalize an international standard in the CAC are also 
indicative of worse things to come. These attempts were perceived as constituting a 
direct threat to the European status quo that has been built around the protection of 
food product names through GI schemes. The PRC expressed concern that if 
Germany were to be successful in securing a declaration of genericness for Parmesan 
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in the European court that “the whole European system of geographical indications 
would be put in jeopardy” and it “would mean dismantling the entire system of 
Geographical Indications established in Europe…with huge repercussions on 
producers and consumers, who would be without any protection against deceptive 
designations and publicity" (PRC 2007b).  
In addition, regarding the attempt within the CAC the PRC (2005) securitized 
the proposal as an “attack against geographical indications” where Parmesan was 
only the beginning. They declared that its success would set a dangerous precedent 
and lead to the genericization of countless other protected terms around the world, 
putting an important referent object in the form of the entire international system of 
GIs at risk. This is a similar expression of foreboding that followed German attempts 
to declare the genericity of Parmesan within the EU, though taken at a global rather 
than an EU level. The PRC (2005) went on to state that: 
“The objective is for the Codex Alimentarius Commission to finally dismiss the 
"Parmesan" proposal and resume the existing "Hard Grated Cheese" norm, which 
would assure the respect of the rights of all producers and consumers, and the 
principle of protection of territorial products and people's food cultures. The Codex 
meeting attracts the interest of numerous associations that highlight the risk of losing 
national sovereignty on food related issues: a key matter that requires fully shared 
norms.” 
This passage indicates that the PRC perceived the security of a number of elements 
within the food system including producers, consumers, the legitimacy of GI system, 
and even national food sovereignty, to be endangered by the proposal. The 
elaboration of a prophecy of doom whereby the declaration of Parmesan as generic 
would delegitimize the entire system of GIs indicates that they viewed this event as a 
threat to the security of the system as a whole. Such prophecies are used to 
emphasize the seriousness of the behavior in order to legitimize action taken against 
it. 
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Next, claims-makers have stressed that there is more at stake than political-
economic damage but that gastronomic heritage, traditions, and culture are in danger 
(McMahon 2005; Brown 2008; Personal interview, May 24, 2013b; Personal 
interview, February 27, 2013) if certain products are lost: 
“We won’t just lose market share…We lose a culture, because the typical product is 
not just a quality product. It’s a product coming from a region, from a culture, from a 
human experience…For sure, if you lose this kind of product you will lost a little 
part of Italian, Spanish, French, Greek culture” (Holley 2002). 
Italians take the diversity of their cuisines and products very seriously and citizens in 
each area of the country take immense pride in their respective gastronomic 
traditions (Parasecoli 2003, 2004). Traditional products have continued to disappear 
in part due to the spread of European and global standardization and “as regional 
products gradually disappear, they are replaced by foreign foods, foreign tastes; the 
universal and rationalized is now imported into the European periphery as the 
exotic” (Seremetakis 1994: 3). Deepening concerns in Italy over the imitation of 
Parmesan are linked to these wider structural processes and contribute to feelings of 
insecurity where “a fear of cultural homogenization has manifested itself in a politics 
of taste, based around the protection of ‘endangered foods’” (Leitch 2010: 458) such 
as Parmigiano-Reggiano. 
4.3.3. Real versus Fake 
Another important element within the gastro-panic is the appearance of 
divisions between the normal ‘real’ and deviant ‘fake’ Parmesans, which becomes 
more pronounced as claims-makers glorify the characteristics and production of the 
authentic ‘folk angel’ product while the inauthentic product and the folk devils 
responsible for its production are portrayed in a negative light. The presence of such 
a binary opposition is an indication in Barthesian terms that a myth is present and 
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must be deconstructed. It is also demonstrative of discursive boundary-creation and 
maintenance mechanisms used by claims-makers to define and demarcate divisions 
between the authentic and inauthentic products in order to legitimize their normative 
and material interests in attaining protection. 
I first encountered this division in a discussion (Personal interview, February 
22, 2013) with an Italian government official in Rome who exclaimed, “How lucky 
you are to be here, you are able to try the real thing. Now you can go back to the US 
and tell everyone you know that what they are eating is not the real Parmesan, it is 
fake!” The opposition of real versus fake is further evidenced in news articles where 
one US writer contended, “It’s the sad truth that much of what is passed off…as the 
King of Cheeses is not the real thing” (Olmsted 2012b) and, “Those who know the 
real Parmigiano Reggiano don’t like fakes” (D’Addono 2012). Warnings have also 
been issued to consumers: 
“The next time you grate Parmesan cheese over spaghetti, check the label to see if it 
is the real thing. According to the Italian farming association CIA, increasing 
amounts of fake Parmesan are being sold in Britain. The problem is not only 
confined to the UK - inferior versions of Italy's famously crumbly cheese are also 
being sold in Germany, South America and Japan. In Brazil the pirated version is 
called 'Parmesão' while Argentina calls it 'Reggianito'. In the UK, one version is 
called 'Parmeggiano' - the real Parmesan cheese should have 'parmigiano reggiano' 
on the label” (McMahon 2005, emphasis added). 
The marketing and sale of fake Parmesans is viewed as a problem that the consumer 
must be made aware of, and there is evidently an assumption that fake Parmesans are 
by nature inferior. To continue within the dichotomy of real versus fake, a notion of 
correctness and proper use also surfaces. Upon a visit to Canada the President of the 
PRC (2010, original emphasis) stated that: 
"unfortunately we saw examples of cheese called with the term “Parmesan”, a 
denomination that in Europe is protected and restricted to Parmigiano-Reggiano but 
which in extra European markets is considered a generic term and is therefore used 
in an improper manner without anyone being able to prevent it…Checking this 
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phenomenon, which so far is still not opposed by legislation and by agreements to be 
worked out within the WTO…is going to be a long and difficult journey, one 
primarily linked to the education of the consumer, the promotion in these markets of 
a correct food culture, at least in its fundamental elements, starting with the ability 
to recognize these products.” 
The President’s comments blur lines of territoriality by referring to generic use as de 
facto improper use despite Parmesan being considered a generic term in many third 
country markets. He justifies the assertion by appealing to legitimating values 
including enforceable rules for Parmesan within the EU. His particular perspective is 
guided by normative assumptions of what is ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ as related to 
food cultures and he considers an active strategy of re-localization to be required in 
order to instill the ‘correct’ knowledge of Parmesan as a cheese linked to a region of 
Italy in the minds of non-EU consumers.  
In general, the ‘real’ Parmesan is mythologized as that which is produced by 
the folk angel within the region of origin using specifications set by the Consortium 
of producers. It is simple, produced with only three basic natural ingredients using a 
traditional and highly-regulated artisanal production process that assures its quality, 
and is highly nutritious (Olmsted 2012a; Piggot 2012) with a distinguishing taste 
derived from “the soil, the air, the grass the cows eat, the water…” (D’Addono 
2012). On the contrary, through the use of symbolization stereotypes are associated 
with the fake product, which is assumed to be inferior and “is often of lower quality, 
contains additives and is industrially produced” (WIPO 2011). These oppositional 
characteristics are illustrated in Table 4.3 on the following page. 
The continued intensification of capitalist cheese production through the use 
of industrial technologies, additives, and minimized processing standards does raise 
fundamental questions about what is, in fact, the ‘real’ Parmesan. For example, the 
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largest producer of Parmesan in the US Kraft foods manufactures a highly-processed 
grated Parmesan product made with additives such as cellulose powder and 
potassium sorbate. And after petitioning the US government to lower its minimum 
aging standard, the company now matures the cheese for 6 rather than the usual 10 
months (Brodsy 2006). While some may argue that this is a clear case of lower 
quality ‘fake’ Parmesan that typifies the negative features of the folk devil product, it 
is important to deconstruct the myth by calling attention to cases where the ‘fake’ 
Parmesan defies these binary assumptions. For one, the American Sartori company’s 
‘SarVecchio’ Parmesan is additive-free, produced using basic ingredients similar to 
Parmigiano-Reggiano, and aged for a minimum of 20 months. This particular 
Parmesan has won numerous awards at cheese competitions including ‘U.S. Grand 
Champion’ at the US Championship Cheese Contest in 2009 and ‘Best Foreign 
Cheese’ and overall ‘Best Parmesan’ at the Global Cheese Awards in Frome, UK in 
2011, a year before the Parmesan category was eliminated. The same cheese also 
received recognition for its beneficial nutritional qualities, being awarded ‘Best 
Healthy Cheese in the World’ at the Global Cheese Awards in 2013.  
Table 4.3: Characteristics of Real versus Fake Parmesan 
Characteristics Real (Folk Angel) Fake (Folk Devil) 
Ingredients Simple and pure  Complex with additives 
Quality High  Low  
Taste Better, more character Worse, bland 
Nutrition Healthy Unhealthy 
Production  Traditional Industrial 
Producers Legitimate Illegitimate 
Use of name Proper - Inside region of 
origin according to strict 
specifications 
Improper – Generic use 
outside region of origin  
The status of ‘real’ Parmesan as purely Italian is a socially constructed reality 
which is passed off as ‘natural’ and takes form as myth, thereby discounting the 
existence of anything that might contradict it. For example, rather than recognizing 
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the high quality of other types of Parmesan the Italian farmer’s union Coldiretti 
referred to the award winning ‘SarVecchio’ Parmesan as a “blatant Parmigiano 
Reggiano imitation” that “underlines the scandalous faking of the original cheese” 
(Italian Food Net 2009). Furthermore, when asked what the difference is between 
Parmigiano-Reggiano and generic Parmesan, Italian representatives I spoke with 
dismissed the question as nonsensical. To them there is no difference because the 
original Parmigiano-Reggiano is Parmesan and was declared by the ECJ to be so 
(Personal interviews, February 22 and 27, 2013). One interviewee exclaimed that, 
“People, they can continue making cheese that you put on pasta, but they can call it 
cheese, that’s the generic term” (Personal interview, April 12, 2013). Additionally, 
an informational booklet I was given during a factory tour advertises Parmigiano-
Reggiano as “The Only Parmesan” (PRC 2011, emphasis added). By denying the 
potential for a generic version of the cheese, even one of potential high-quality, 
actors negate its very existence as an independent term and naturalize the meaning as 
connoting a cheese from Italy. Any attempts to challenge this universalization are 
dismissed for lacking sense and therefore excluded from serious consideration. The 
real contestation and power relations between proponents and opponents within the 
dispute over the name are obscured, reference to exceptions glossed over, and their 
competitive potential defused.  
4.3.4. Consensus 
The demarcation of ‘real’ Parmesan as endangered and the securitization of 
generic Parmesan production as a threat projected to have serious consequences can 
be seen as an attempt to invigorate a sense of urgency, thereby generating a social 
and political consensus that something must be done to “counter the illegal and 
imitation actions found at international levels and eased by the globalisation of 
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markets” (PRC 2004b). Consensus in the gastro-panic is established by analyzing the 
appearance of organized groups and campaigns on the part of certain members of 
society, such as government officials, farmer’s unions, and the PRC, in order to do 
something about and call attention to the threat of counterfeiting as well as protect 
certain referent objects, such as the name Parmesan and the social relations of 
production in the region. This is furthered through the introduction of new rules and 
regulations or the criminalization of the behavior and the individuals supposedly 
responsible. It is also evidenced through public discussion indicated within the 
media. As has been demonstrated previously in this course, claims-makers have 
attempted to institutionalize the criminalization of the generic use of GI terms in new 
international agreements. This particular issue has also generated a great deal of 
media and social attention that is discussed further in this section. 
To remedy the situation and secure institutionalized punishment for the 
illegal imitation of product names, Italian government ministers have made pledges 
to continue pursuing better protection for Parmesan at national and international 
levels (McMahon 2005; The Economic Times 2003) where the EU is already active 
in pushing for tougher rules and enterprising the usefulness of GIs as a means of 
building international support. As well, the PRC (2008b) issued a call to consumers 
and businesses to “report any anomalous situations found in Italy and abroad because 
this is the only way to protect consumers more effectively and, at the same time, to 
eliminate situations causing unfair competition” while the Italian government has 
launched a “No to Fake” campaign to educate consumers and raise awareness about 
the dangers of counterfeiting in the food sector (Ministry for Economic Development 
2012).  
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Numerous supporters have also mobilized to draw more attention to these 
issues. In 2008, the same year as the ruling against the German production of 
Parmesan, the International Day of Italian Cuisines (IDIC) was established “as a 
reaction against the systematic forgery of Italian cuisine and products” (IDIC 
2014, original emphasis). Additionally, in 2010 the Italian Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Forestry Policies created the ‘Italianissimi’ project in the US where one 
study reported that sales of inauthentic products reportedly outnumber authentic 
products by ten to one (The Economic Times 2003).
23
 The purpose was to “protect 
Italian food from imitation” by enlightening consumers, specifically in the US, to the 
“manipulative” practices of producers and manufacturers and to make them aware 
that they are being duped into buying non-genuine Italian products – meaning those 
not produced in Italy (Reddy 2010). And in December 2013 the Italian agricultural 
association Coldiretti organized an anti-food piracy protest near the border with 
Austria to confiscate phony products entering the country (Italy Magazine 2013), 
marched pigs outside the Italian parliament, and launched a “Battle for Christmas: 
Choose Italy” movement to inspire consumers to purchase genuine Italian-produced 
goods (Newton Media 2013; The Weekly Times 2013). This movement in particular 
is indicative of what DeSoucey (2010) terms ‘gastronationalism’ whereby nationalist 
sentiments are employed to entice consumers to purchase locally-produced products. 
The involvement of Italian government officials along with the various campaigns 
mentioned points to a consensus by certain actors that something must be done to 
deal with the serious problem of counterfeiting and generic use. 
                                                          
23
 According to the Italian Ministry for Economic Development (2012: 3), “the United States along 
with Latin American and Australia ‘falsify’ most frequently.” 
150 
 
4.3.5. Gastro-panic 
When re-considering the various criteria illustrated in Table 4.4 below it 
becomes evident that a gastro-panic is manifested in the discourse surrounding the 
generic use of Parmesan around the world. By way of this mythical discursive 
strategy of demarcation and legitimation, the cultural, economic, and political 
boundaries surrounding the production and consumption of Parmesan are 
(re)constructed and restricted to Italian producers. Additionally, a new and 
unquestioned social reality is created in which the actions of imitators are demonized 
through the use of negative imagery and securitized as posing a serious threat to the 
original cheese, its producers, and consumers while the original cheese is celebrated. 
Within the gastro-panic actors appeal to a security discourse that constructs the threat 
and the threatened in order to legitimate the exceptional measure of revoking use of 
the term in other countries. The final criterion, that of volatility, will be further 
discussed in the next section. 
Table 4.4: Gastro-panic Criteria and Parmesan 
Gastro-panic 
Indicators 
Description 
Concern Heightened in relation to the generic use and imitation of 
Parmesan abroad and its supposed consequences for producers 
and consumers. 
Hostility Toward illegitimate ‘counterfeiters.’  
Consensus Agreement by Italian actors and the EU that the threat is real, 
serious, and caused by the behavior of counterfeiters and 
imitators, thereby requiring the extension of international GI 
protection to control it. 
Disproportionality Calls for asymmetric rights to be conferred to legitimate 
Parmigiano-Reggiano (Parmesan) producers relative to their 
revocation from generic producers around the world. 
Volatility Contemporary movement to institutionalize the exclusive rights 
to the use of Parmesan in global legislation that gained 
momentum following the registration of Parmigiano-Reggiano 
as a PDO in the EU and in response to the insecurity caused by 
socio-economic difficulties and the increasing production and 
globalization of cheese industries.  
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The pervasiveness of the gastro-panic myth in political discourse surrounding 
the Parmesan issue is powerful because it is not only prevalent as a discursive 
strategy in the language of actors but also structures their practice. The issue is not 
only talked about in terms of the threatening effects of generic producers but 
partially structures much of the actions performed by actors both within the EU and 
in international negotiations where the right to use the term Parmesan still has the 
potential to be won or lost. Since Italian and EU actors consider all generic 
producers to be ‘illegitimate’, as the ‘legitimate’ producers they justify the conferral 
of asymmetric rights, formulate new rules through legitimating values, and mobilize 
supporters through enterprise to influence policy and government action. The 
discourse pervading the gastro-panic thus serves a political-economic purpose where 
the deployment of security language is used to persuade policy-makers that actions 
must be taken to stop the threat of generic use. It also acts to legitimize an exception 
within an open market economy that awards exclusive rights to some producers over 
others. In the EU this has had noticeable effects and led to the restriction of 
Parmesan categories and the confiscation of cheeses at international events and trade 
shows (CCFN 2013b; PRC 2012b; PRC 2013a). For example, the Global Cheese 
Awards in Frome, UK, was pressured to eliminate the Parmesan category after 
receiving a “threatening letter” from Parmigiano-Reggiano representatives a year 
following the 2011 win of the American ‘SarVecchio’ Parmesan (Personal interview, 
September 14, 2013). There are now separate ‘Italian-Style Hard Cheese’ and ‘Best 
Parmigiano-Reggiano’ categories. 
As discussed in the second course, European agricultural and food policy is a 
highly-differentiated multi-actor and multi-levelled terrain. The policy and practice 
of individual Member States is influenced by interests at the sub-national level, 
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which has a profound impact on European policy and decision-making. According to 
one interviewee “the economic weight of producers matters. Some are more 
aggressive in protecting their interests and governments are ready to support them. 
Lobby groups as well…” (Personal interview, February 19, 2013). A GI like 
Parmesan is an economically and culturally-important resource and the PRC is a 
well-organized group that polices its use vigorously and is backed by the Italian 
government (Personal interview, February 22, 2013) who is active in ensuring that 
their interests are represented through the negotiating weight of the EU in 
international negotiations. Threats to the security of Parmigiano-Reggiano, whether 
real or perceived, infuse the debate with a sense of urgency and purpose that 
enhances the political salience of the issue by defining generic use as a problem that 
justifies a legal and policy response.  
The gastro-panic represents a boundary-maintaining and creating mechanism 
used by Italian and EU claims-makers to legitimize their normative and material 
interests in attaining the protection of Parmesan. It is also a form of myth that 
simultaneously allows a focus on certain aspects of the situation, such as the 
conceptualization of generic use as counterfeiting, while shrouding others, such as 
the territoriality of genericism. By ensuring that the situation is perceived in one way 
rather than another, the gastro-panic prevents us from paying attention to other 
aspects of the situation that might be inconsistent with it, such as the high quality 
nature of some foreign-produced Parmesan cheeses. The overall effect of the gastro-
panic is to problematize generic use as a threat in order to enhance its political 
salience and secure its placement on the policy agenda, with the ultimate aim to 
secure exclusive global protection of the name for Italian producers. 
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4.4. Demythologizing the Gastro-panic 
When considering the history of attempted protection for Parmigiano-
Reggiano it is evident that any use of the name and in some cases its translation 
outside the region of origin has long been considered objectionable behavior. 
However, Parmigiano-Reggiano and Parmesan have co-existed in use for some time. 
The gastro-panic language that presents a terroirist conception of Parmesan as only 
connoting a region of Italy and generic producers as illegal counterfeiting folk devils 
has only recently become normalized and currently serves as a conceptual map of 
meaning by which claims-makers interpret the issue.  
But Barthes argues that these significations also conceal the operation of 
further orders and ideologies that permeate a culture. As such, it is crucial to 
deconstruct the myth by interrogating the volatility of the gastro-panic to further 
understand why this issue has arisen in recent years, what motivations underlie it, 
and what ideological alignments are being served. Gastro-panic is a rational process 
that does not just occur naturally in society. Rather, its materialization and influence 
is dependent upon actors driven by specific motives, interests, and agendas. It is also 
contextual and often arises during difficult times of social, economic, and political 
change.  
In this section I argue that Italian and European actors are competing over the 
status of Parmesan not only to secure an economic advantage but in an attempt to 
restore an existential sense of security during a time of perceived insecurity brought 
about by socio-economic difficulties at the domestic level and the increased 
industrialization and globalization of Parmesan production. In this context the GI is 
seen as a tool to accomplish various socio-economic, political, and commercial 
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objectives. The issue reflects underlying concerns and preferences of different actors 
and institutions in Italy and the EU that sustain and legitimate current power 
relationships in the international food and agricultural sector and promotes the values 
and interests of well-organized producer groups. It is also linked to larger, 
politically-charged debates surrounding the appropriate assistance for farmers and 
rural communities, the degree to which food cultures should be protected, the need 
for extended GI protection around the world, and the role of governments and the 
market.  
4.4.1. Socio-Economic Woes 
To understand contemporary pressures for expanded protection of Parmesan 
within the EU and abroad also requires consideration of the structure of Italian 
Parmigiano-Reggiano production and the socio-economic difficulties that have 
caused insecurity within the sector over recent years. Parmigiano-Reggiano 
production is exceptional in that it is performed not solely by large-scale industrial 
dairies but according to a collective artisanal system encompassing 384 dairies of 
varying sizes (Parmigiano Reggiano Consortium n.d.), some of which are so small 
that they only produce a couple of wheels of cheese per day. According to de Roest 
(2000: 4), in Parmigiano-Reggiano production: 
“the labour to capital ratio is higher than in other dairy systems. The heavily co-
operative structure of the cheese dairies also contributes significantly to maintaining 
employment…This is in contrast to neighbouring areas with similar physical and 
natural conditions. In this way the Parmigiano-Reggiano system acts as a barrier to 
the marginalisation of agriculture, a process that has caused serious depopulation in 
other parts of the Italian Apennines.” 
The ability to craft the cheese requires the cheese-maker to undergo an extensive 
apprenticeship for many years and the process itself is long and highly labor-
intensive, involving the transformation of milk into cheese on a daily basis. One 
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master cheese maker’s wife I spoke to commented on how she had not had a holiday 
in 36 years and how they, despite being retired, still work 7 days a week from 4am to 
8pm. Parmigiano-Reggiano is a cheese that requires a great deal of passion to make 
and despite having no relation to the cheese-making process in his family, her 
husband “started making it because he fell in love with it” (Personal interview, 
February 28, 2013a). Regardless of the hard work that is required to produce 
Parmigiano-Reggiano, those who are committed to upholding the traditional 
methods of production have helped maintain a differentiated regional culture in a 
potentially unexceptional geographic area. 
Few cheeses embody as much passion, dedication, and consistency of 
tradition in their production and consumption as Parmigiano-Reggiano, having been 
produced in the same region for centuries using largely unchanged and minimally 
modernized processes. One cheese magazine expresses that Parmigiano-Reggiano is, 
“Considered by some to be the greatest cheese on earth…” (Anonymous 2012) and 
to those who know it well it is more than just cheese, it “is art, life – an almost 
sacred symbol of the culture of the land” (Bonilauri 1998: 9) and its consumption 
“borders on privilege” (Rossetto Kasper: 1). Asserted to be truly a product of its 
terroir, discussions surrounding the cheese emphasize the intimate interaction 
between its natural and human environment (Delmonte 1998: 6; Pinto 1998: 7) that 
contribute to its “qualitative superiority” (Bonilauri 1998b: 28) over imitations. 
Parmigiano-Reggiano is described as, “An unmistakable and unique product for its 
aroma and taste, the craft of its production, its extraordinary journey through a 
landscape of rivers, plains and hills, and its unparalleled balance of knowledge, 
man’s passion and nature’s bounty” (Parmigiano-Reggiano Consortium n.d.).  
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But despite its worldwide fame and role as a culinary cultural icon of Italy, 
Parmigiano production has fallen on hard times in recent years with resultant 
economic and social costs, and calls for its global protection coincide with this 
difficult reality. Many dairies have already been forced to close over the years and, 
“Numbers in the region have been dwindling since the end of World War Two, when 
there were more than 2,000 groups huddled on the small pocket of northern Italy 
manufacturing the cheese” (Merrett 2007) while today there are under 400. And as 
quoted in 2008 by the former director of the PRC Leo Bertozzi, “Parmesan is 
undoubtedly the most famous Italian food product in the world and although it is 
worth a billion euros a year it is being hit by the economic crisis” (Pisa 2008). Rising 
production costs, coupled with high retail prices and falling demand have contributed 
to economic hardship in the region. Producers operate in a climate of insecurity and 
are finding it difficult to make ends meet and many have been left on the brink of 
bankruptcy. Animal feed and milk are becoming ever pricier and the stringent 
production code to which producers must commit leaves little room for flexibility in 
cutting costs (Brown 2008; Pisa 2008).  
In fact, also in 2008 the situation was deemed to be so critical that the Italian 
government purchased 100,000 wheels of the cheese at a cost of 50 million euros in 
an attempt to ward off the bankruptcy facing a third of producers. The media referred 
to this move as a “bail out” (Popham 2008; Owen 2008; Pisa 2008; Brown 2008) and 
it was criticized for “using state resources to help those that are inefficient” but 
justified as necessary by the Italian government (Berretta 2008). This is because 
Parmigiano-Reggiano is considered “the most important typical product in Italian 
agriculture” (de Roest and Menghi 2000: 439). It is a cherished referent object within 
the Italian economy where it comprises 30% of all cheeses with protected 
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designations (Mora 1998: 122) and utilizes 15% of the milk produced in Italy. 
According to de Roest (2000: 3), “In production terms Parmigiano-Reggiano is the 
most valuable cheese in the country. It is sold all over Italy and five percent of total 
production is exported.” However, Parmesan is not only an important commercial 
resource but also a signifier that expresses a sense of Italianness, which resonates 
strongly in an increasingly globalized world. 
Other indications of the economic struggle lie in the increasing number of 
cheeses held on loans, where wheels of the cheese are accepted by some banks as 
collateral while they age in huge vaults (Storing cheese 2013; Associated Press 
2009). This practice offers a lifeline for many producers who would otherwise be 
forced to close, and one cheese-maker was reported in 2009 to say that over 100 
already had in the previous five years (Kennedy 2009). And to compound the 
problems, it has been reported that mafia gangs have been stealing the valuable 
cheese from trucks during distribution (Mercer 2006) and in 2012 the region where 
Parmigiano is produced was struck by a series of earthquakes that damaged around 
5% of yearly production (Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano 2012).  
To top it off, the social fabric of Parmigiano production has changed. An 
article in the Taipei Times referred to Parmigiano-Reggiano as “an industry under 
threat of extinction” (Logre 2011) that is being rescued by foreign immigrant 
workers at a time when the young Italian generation is disinterested in taking on the 
labor-intensive work (Duttagupta 2012). This point was reiterated in an interview I 
conducted with a Parmigiano cheese-maker who agreed that the danger of the 
tradition disappearing is very real. Two out of three factories formerly in his area had 
shut down and he stated that, “The young are not interested in farming. There are 
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Indians now raising the cows…Indians and immigrants are making Parmigiano now” 
(Personal interview, February 28, 2013b). 
Producers are not the only ones stressed by the difficult economic climate 
and many cash-strapped Italian consumers have turned to lower-priced grated cheese 
substitutes (Mercer 2006) manufactured in Italy and abroad, such as Grana Padano 
and Gran Moravia,
24
 making it increasingly difficult for Parmigiano cheese-makers 
to remain competitive within the country. In fact, “The main threat facing the 
Parmigiano Reggiano production system is the risk that its characteristics become 
indistinguishable from those of its main market competitors” (de Roest and Menghi 
2000: 450). With consumption of the cheese in Italy slumping, many Parmigiano-
makers have set their sights on bolstering exports to markets where the cheese 
fetches gourmet, rather than staple, prices (Berretta 2008). But this alternative is in 
jeopardy as global competition increases. To illustrate, Parmesan production has 
reportedly “tripled in the US over the last 20 years, while exports of Parmigiano-
Reggiano to non-EU countries had fallen” (Mercer 2005) and, “Exports have 
recently risen by 7 percent to Europe, but a significant drop in exports to the U.S. 
was reported as production of “false” parmesan has increased there. According to an 
Italian farmers’ association, Chinese production of false Italian fontina, mozzarella, 
                                                          
24
 Production of Gran Moravia, for example, was started by an Italian family in the Czech Republic 
where it is produced and sent to Italy to mature. A small amount of the cheese is sold in the country 
itself, three-fourths is exported to Italy, and the rest all over the world (Lopatka 2012). What is 
interesting about this cheese is that the producers have branded a very competitive product without 
using the term Parmesan. One producer states that, “The word parmesan is not right. In the Czech 
Republic, it’s commonly used for hard cheese but it Italy, we don’t use it. Instead we say formaggio 
grana to indicate the special structure of the cheese. Gran Moravia belongs to the family of hard 
cheeses manufactured according to old Italian traditions” (Richter 2012). However, websites 
marketing the cheese internationally still refer to it as “Parmesan Cheese” (Weiku 2014) and “Italian 
parmesan cheese” that is “similar in flavor to hard parmesan cheese. This delicious range is imported 
from Italy where it is now made using a traditional recipe. Try using this cheese as an economical 
substitute for more expensive parmesan cheeses as the flavor of the Gran Moravia is still quite lovely” 
(Fields China 2014). On a Czech trade site it is listed as a “cheese of Parmesan type – grana” (Czech 
Trade International 2014) and on an American one as “a hard grating cheese in the style of culinary 
Italian masterpieces like Parmigiano Reggiano or Grana Padano” (igourmet.com 2014). 
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and parmesan cheeses has already claimed a 52.6 billion euro market” (The 
Florentine 2005). And not only are these countries producing generic versions of the 
cheese to meet domestic demand but they too are taking advantage of the growing 
export potential around the world. 
4.4.2. Protecting Whom? 
Italian and European actors appear to segue interchangeably between treating 
GI protection for Parmesan as a security measure for consumers and for producers, 
the former being consistently used to justify its necessity as a means of reducing 
confusion. For example, in the 2008 court case pitting the European Commission 
against Germany, the Commission stated that the point of GI regulations “is not to 
protect private economic interests but those of consumers, whose expectations as to 
the quality and geographic origin of that product should not be disappointed” 
(Commission v Germany 2008: 6, para 60). Many consumers do indeed seek 
comfort in knowing the source of their foodstuffs and consider EGI labels to be 
indicators of quality. In Italy for example, quality “has been the main symbolic 
resource enabling people to deal with food scandals such as the one caused by BSE” 
(Halkier et. al. 2007: 390). But Raustiala and Munzer (2007: 361-62) challenge the 
need for extended GI protection for agricultural products under the consumer 
confusion argument by drawing attention to the inconsistency of quality within many 
appellations that results from intra-regional diversity and loosely-defined production 
practices. They argue that the disappearance of competing products could actually 
have the opposite effect in leaving consumers even more bewildered when they are 
unable to locate familiar products. They also state that simple labelling is sufficient 
to mitigate any consumer confusion, as no one would be misled to the place of origin 
when encountering a product such as ‘Parmesan made in Canada.’  
160 
 
The consumer-confusion argument is also questionable when re-considering 
that Italian claims-makers have expressed that consumers in some markets need to be 
‘educated’ to re-establish the ‘correct’ link between the region of origin in Italy and 
the name Parmesan, suggesting that the link has indeed been lost and de-legitimizing 
the need for exclusive GI protection. It could therefore plausibly be argued that if 
consumers prefer the fake versions of Parmesan that their consumption rights are 
being infringed if particular products are removed from the market. This would be 
exacerbated by the purported inability of Italian Parmigiano-Reggiano producers to 
keep up with international demand for the cheese and as such “the losers…would be 
consumers accustomed to buying an affordable, locally or regionally produced 
Parmesan” (Anonymous 2004b). Some consumers might knowingly choose a ‘fake’ 
commodity version or perhaps cannot afford to spend a larger proportion of their 
constrained income on the ‘real’ specialty product. 
With that said, the main motivating factor in the case of Parmesan appears 
more so to be an attempt to offer extra-market assistance to Parmigiano-Reggiano 
producers where the GI acts as a tool “to keep producers producing, improve 
income, and preserve agriculture” (Personal interview, February 19, 2013). This 
assertion was further supported in interviews I conducted where informants admitted 
that GI schemes originated as producer, rather than consumer, protection 
mechanisms: 
“the Commission were driven not from a consumer perspective. They were driven 
from a production and a desire to safeguard and protect rural communities where 
these traditional food products have been made for a long long time. And that in 
itself is a very noble objective, I’m not decrying it, but I think that has to say up front 
it was all about protecting the production rather than anything after the consumer. It 
was almost an afterthought” (Personal interview, September 25, 2013). 
161 
 
Furthermore, when asked if the main beneficiaries of GI protection were producers 
or consumers, one Parmigiano-Reggiano representative stated:  
“First, there is a necessity of protecting producers in the beginning because the first 
interest is shown by producers themselves who need to protect their own cheese and 
then ask for government help. It also protects the local economy. Then, the 
traded/marketed and guarantees to consumers follows. Consumers need sufficient 
security to know that this cheese is produced in Parma. So first it is producers, then 
immediately follows the guarantee to consumers” (Personal interview, February 27, 
2013). 
The consumer confusion rationale thus emerges as myth, which acts as a guise for 
employing protectionist means in a world that increasingly condemns such practices. 
Global institutions such as the WTO are based on an economic model which holds 
that consumers benefit from the liberalization of trade through lower prices and 
greater choice and are penalized by any form of protectionism and the 
implementation of trade barriers (Gaisford and Kerr 2001). But here an inversion of 
that logic is evident through the assertion that consumers stand to gain directly from 
the protection of producers even if they are required to pay a premium for the ‘real’ 
product as they can be assured that what they are buying is not counterfeit.  
It is also interesting to consider that the folk devil in operation seems to be 
unilaterally the producers and manufacturers of imitation products rather than those 
who choose to consume them. The political legitimation for the disproportionality, or 
the exclusive protection of Parmesan, revolves around targeting the improper 
behavior of producers rather than consumers in the same way that GI policy was 
designed to first and foremost protect producers and not consumers. A distinction 
arises between them where producers are targeted as deliberate counterfeiters and 
consumers as innocent victims who are being knowingly duped to purchase ‘fake’ 
products.  
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This is perhaps not surprising within the Italian and European context where 
the food and agricultural sector has long been distinguished as ‘exceptional’ in 
relation to other economic sectors and is “dominated by a restricted policy 
community in which producer interests are given precedence over those of 
consumers…” (Grant 1995: 156). While this discourse is being eroded in favor of 
more market liberal models, the protection of farmers and producers continues to be 
politically, economically, and socially important particularly as the EU is 
increasingly pressured to reform its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
liberalize its market while at the same time appeasing vested interests and ensuring 
international competitiveness for European producers (Potter and Tilzey 2005; 
Tilzey and Potter 2007). In order to balance these conflicting imperatives, EU policy 
has been guided by an “‘Embedded’ neo-liberalism” that has made the CAP 
increasingly more market-oriented (Tilzey 2006: 16) while also developing a number 
of policy instruments designed to increase competitiveness, strengthen rural 
communities, and encourage the shift from commodities to value-added products 
(Clemens 2004).  
EGIs are one among a variety of food quality initiatives that each Member 
State can choose from to suit their specific needs and as a result have been unevenly 
embraced by different countries (Becker 2009). Italy is part of a group of mainly 
Mediterranean countries with agricultural sectors consisting of many labor-intensive 
small-scale family farms and companies. Their approach to agricultural policy is 
characterized by a terroirism that emphasizes “territorial, social, and cultural 
embeddedness” (Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch 2002: 256). These countries have 
taken up origin labelling as a means of increasing producer incomes and base a large 
part of their agricultural strategies around them. Dickie (2007: 333) states that EGIs 
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“are particularly well suited to Italy’s diverse and specialised agriculture” and the 
country is currently leading in the number of registered food products [see Appendix 
C]. The GI for Parmesan thus serves as a powerful security tool designed to maintain 
marginal producers on the land and give small-scale producers the upper-hand in a 
more competitive market environment where they might not otherwise be able to 
compete. With regard to the former, they help: 
“maintain the lifestyle and livelihood of communities and avoid people having no 
chance but to go somewhere else. Those who remain are not lost in empty space. 
They have something to do and offer something to the urban communities. They are 
stewards of cultural history and the traditional way of life” (Personal interview, 
February 25, 2013). 
Origin-protection schemes have become central to rural development strategies both 
within Italy and the EU and are actively promoted abroad.  
4.4.3. (Re)affirming Security 
Although the protection of Parmesan has a long history, it can be argued that 
the gastro-panic surrounding its use has arisen within the international debate in 
recent years as producers seek to restore a sense of security amidst socio-economic 
struggles and increased global competition through securing exclusive rights to the 
name. Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese is not being ‘re-invented’ or ‘re-valorized’ to 
meet market demands as has been the case with many other traditional cheeses 
(Bromberger 2006; West and Domingos 2012). It is considered a “mature system” 
with an established reputation that is appreciated by consumers (de Roest and 
Menghi 2000: 440) and a highly regulated production process that does not allow for 
much internal differentiation. Thus, in Barthesian terms this mythical discourse has 
occurred because the meaning of Parmesan as generic has become inadequate to 
serve the needs of the established Italian producer community.  
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A possible explanation for this could come from a conversation I had with an 
Italian professor (Personal interview, February 25, 2013) who explained that a 
certain amount of ‘counterfeiting’ through unrestricted production can be beneficial 
to the original product in order to increase its popularity as imitations are part of the 
brand-building process. However, over time as a market becomes more developed 
this becomes unnecessary and can actually begin to have negative effects, thereby 
prompting the original producers to take action to stop it. This appears to be the case 
with Parmesan in saturated European and NW markets where the product is widely 
produced and consumed and the myth of terroirism, which uncritically defines the 
authenticity of products and rights to the use of their names as linked to production 
within the region of origin, has been employed in an attempt to discontinue use of 
the name outside the region of origin. But interestingly, he also stated that imitations 
continue to play this role in less-developed markets. Yet, Parmigiano-Reggiano 
producers are seeking exclusive protection all over the world even in emerging 
markets where Parmesan is not widely known. This begs the question if such actions 
could actually be counterproductive to enhancing consumer recognition of the 
cheese. 
But the idea surrounding the move towards global protection is that if 
consumers throughout the world always purchased the ‘real’ Parmesan it would 
reaffirm a sense of security for producers through a boost in sales and increased 
revenue (D’Emilio 2008) and would also mitigate future abuse as the product 
becomes more famous (Personal interview, February 19, 2013). According to 
Raustiala and Munzer (2007: 352), “actors tend to demand new property rights” such 
as GIs “when underlying costs and benefits shift in fundamental ways” and the 
defense of so-called ‘genuine’ products both at home and abroad is supported in Italy 
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as a possible “way out of the crisis” (Newton Media 2013) and a means of meeting 
the “challenge of globalization” (PRC 2006) that has placed immense pressure on the 
livelihoods of producers. For Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese-makers, imports and 
exports are a major threat that forces them to compete directly with companies and 
products from all over the world. This has created a climate of insecurity that is 
evident when considering references to producers being at ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerable’ as 
well as appeals to their ‘safety’ in offering assurances that their names are protected.  
Furthermore, the referent objects illustrated in Table 4.5 are indicative of this 
insecurity because they represent particular economic, political, social, and cultural 
elements of the food system perceived to be endangered by international imitation 
and counterfeiting and have prompted producers to fight the generic use of Parmesan 
at the global level in order to preserve its exclusive use. This would potentially 
extend the market premium worldwide where strong protection for GI rights and the 
legal power to restrict the use of the word to certain products and producers would 
confer a sense of security through an economic advantage over competitors. 
Table 4.5: Referent Objects Perceived to be Endangered by Counterfeiting 
Sector Referent Object (s) 
Economic Traditional production system, producer livelihoods, 
consumer assurance, businesses, jobs, profits, trade, market 
share, resources (Parmesan) 
Societal Gastronomic heritage, traditions, culture 
Political Principles and legitimacy of GI norms, rules, and 
institutions, food sovereignty 
Terroirist attempts to redefine and relocalize the meaning of the translation 
Parmesan may thus be understood paradoxically as both a reaction against the 
perceived threats of globalization and accommodation to it through its perceived 
advantages. While claims-makers might legitimately fear the homogenizing advance 
of global competition and consider it to be exacerbating the production and trade of 
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generic products, they at the same time seek security and profit from it through 
strengthening the international protection of GIs and increasing exports. Decreased 
trade barriers and rising wealth continue to create global market opportunities where 
none existed previously and the proportion of cheeses traded internationally is rising, 
aided in part by the increasing liberalization of dairy industries negotiated through 
trade agreements. The PRC celebrates improvements in its exports and makes 
explicit its goal to increase them (PRC 2013b, 2013c). The global has now become a 
battleground upon which to fight in order to preserve the local and actors are able to 
mask what are essentially local business interests as global concerns through gastro-
panic discourse, forcing issues to the top of governmental policy agendas to 
legitimate the installation of exceptional measures through GI protection. 
Economic incentives are not the only motive driving defenders of Italian 
foods such as Parmesan. The effort to secure its exclusive protection around the 
world is also related to issues of heritage, history, and culture. To assert the necessity 
of protection for Parmesan is partly to assert the importance of preserving cultural 
systems of production in the face of ever-encroaching globalization. One 
Parmigiano-Reggiano representative emphasized that the issue is not whether a name 
is ‘generic or not’ or that production will be able to satisfy demand but that the 
importance reaches beyond the product’s economic value (Personal interview, 
February 27, 2013). To lose the Parmigiano-Reggiano production tradition would 
essentially be to lose “something unique in the world” and also “a way of life” 
(Personal interview, February 28, 2013). 
The protection of Parmesan therefore gains legitimacy for the multifunctional 
character of Parmigiano-Reggiano production, which does more than produce a 
cheese for consumption and has many functions and positive externalities that 
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potentially contribute to the public good. Focusing on the non-economic externalities 
associated with Parmigiano-Reggiano production as referent objects to be protected 
allows producers to justify the controversial conferral of exclusive rights to 
Parmesan under its banner and serves as a means of defense when these actions 
come under attack. The gastro-panic myth surrounding Parmesan therefore seeks to 
ground political and historical situations, and ideological alignments, in the realm of 
the natural. It is composed of beliefs and representations that sustain and legitimate 
current European agri-food policy and power relationships and promotes the values 
and interests of dominant food producing groups in society. 
The Parmesan issue represents an attempt to claim specificity for European 
producers that differentiates it from a form of mass-production executed by its 
competitors, for example by emphasizing the recognized natural and cultural 
qualities which characterize the cheese, the benefits afforded to consumers and 
culture, and the threatening effects of generic use. It is guided by the myth of 
terroirism that acts as a legitimating strategy and a political tool to ensure the 
conferral of exclusive property rights to some producers over others. Terroirism 
obscures this ideological purpose and legitimates government action in formulating 
and extending economic patriotic agricultural policies that seek to privilege certain 
groups based on their production within a particular region of origin. 
For some critics, however, this is little more than a thinly disguised 
protectionism and an attempt to justify aid to inefficient production sectors on the 
grounds of legitimate rights. According to Chen (1996: 36), “a transformation of the 
farmer as an economically weak supplier into a captain of agribusiness requires 
governments to suspend the ordinary rules of free enterprise.” The GI acts as a 
security tool to protect both marginal areas and the market advantages derived from 
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it but carries with it negative consequences for producers and manufacturers in other 
countries, which has contributed to Parmesan becoming a majorly contested topic of 
international discussion. While Italian and EU advocacy to restrict the usage rights 
of Parmesan can be interpreted as an attempt at producer assistance to one of Italy’s 
most important sources of economic, cultural, and gastronomic output, there is little 
evidence that GIs have been effective in halting cultural change (Broude 2005). Such 
protectionist measures also create tensions in a global climate increasingly framed by 
a discourse of neoliberalism and have in turn becomes a threat to the dominant 
paradigm, which will be further discussed in the sixth course. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this course I used Parmesan as a lens to demonstrate how something as 
taken-for-granted as a cheese name represents an internationally negotiated and 
contested domain. Parmigiano-Reggiano (Parmesan) is a product that is not only 
important for its quality, taste, and other consumer attributes but for its role as an 
iconic cultural symbol and, on a socio-economic level, a culture of production that is 
able to maintain the employment and livelihoods of hundreds of small producers in 
the region. As a result, numerous attempts have been made throughout history to 
restrict its use to producers within the designated geographical region as a means of 
maintaining a sense of security for producers and consumers. But it is clear that 
attempts to revoke rights to the use of translations and generic terms such as 
Parmesan are highly controversial.  
In examining cases at European and global levels it became evident that 
actors have participated in parallel processes of meaning construction – that of 
genericism and terroirism – in order to demarcate and fix particular meanings to 
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secure exclusive protection for or open use of Parmesan. Attempts to institutionalize 
the term’s genericity are considered by claims-makers to have serious consequences 
and the concern surrounding such actions has been manifested through the language 
of gastro-panic. Here, a perceived political-economic problem – that of the 
uncontrollable generic use of Parmesan around the world – is portrayed as a serious 
threat that nurtures a view of folk angel (‘real’ authentic producers) versus folk devil 
(‘fake’ generic producers) and has serious implications. As myth, the gastro-panic 
provides an interpretative framework through which Italian and EU actors convey 
their own perspectives and evaluations of the current situation and also seek to 
ground a political situation and particular ideological alignment in the realm of the 
natural.  This reflects and at the same time reinforces a particular way of 
understanding the actions and policies restricting the use of Parmesan in terms of 
legitimate rights. It also acts to infuse the debate with a sense of urgency through an 
invocation of security whereby exceptional measures such as the conferral of 
asymmetric rights taken to deter the threat appear as reasonable. 
At a time of rapid change and competition where cheeses are increasingly 
standardized and traded around the globe, the GI helps Parmigiano-Reggiano 
producers define, protect, and profit from authenticity by distinguishing ‘real’ 
Parmesan from its competitors. But while the enhanced protection for Parmesan 
would safeguard it against homogenization and industrial production, the 
transnational nature of globalization has simultaneously led to increased demand and 
market opportunities. Advocacy for the protection of Parmesan can thus be 
understood as a way to capture the exclusive right to market a cheese in an 
increasingly global economy and a desire to protect struggling European producer, 
rather than consumer, interests and dominance in the global cheese market at a time 
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of increasing threats from non-EU producers. In the next chapter I investigate the 
uncontested case of Cheddar, a name that is widely considered to be generic. 
Cheddar offers an interesting contrast to Parmesan as no gastro-panic has arisen 
surrounding its use and it enables a closer look at the social construction of 
genericism within GI politics.  
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Fifth Course 
5. Not Much Ado about Cheddar? Demythologizing Genericism 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Cheddar is one of the, if not the most consumed and produced cheeses in the 
world (British Cheese Board 2012a; Personal interview, September 25, 2014). It is 
the most popular cheese-type in the UK and Australia, where it makes up half of the 
latter’s cheese exports (Dairy Australia 2014), and the second most consumed (IDFA 
2014) and produced in the US (USDA 2012). At the same time, it is one of the 
world’s least-contested cheese names. While the use of many European-derived 
names such as Parmesan have been the subject of lengthy legal and political 
disputes, Cheddar has for the most part been uncritically accepted as the generic 
name for a type of cheese manufactured all over the world – its meaning dislocated 
from the original area of origin in the UK.  
Because of the ubiquity and heavy commoditization of Cheddar-type cheeses, 
the name has been saddled with a poor reputation as a perversion of industrial 
production whereby bland orangey plastic-like blocks are aged for less than 3 
months and sold in mass quantities, often used to designate the flavor of any number 
of processed products from crackers to squeeze cheese. But despite its apparent lack 
of differentiation, when it comes to Cheddars one size does not fit all. The 
production of traditional handmade Cheddars is experiencing a renaissance and 
revival of appreciation in the UK and there is currently more being done to celebrate 
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the cheese’s history. After all, it can plausibly argued that Cheddar’s origins are 
every bit as English as Parmigiano-Reggiano’s are Italian.  
The distinction between generic and non-generic terms has emerged as a key 
issue in international negotiations and the growing political and economic salience of 
GGIs makes it especially important to interrogate the meanings and assumptions that 
underlie notions of genericism. Genericism is important in the GI context and differs 
in important ways from how it is approached in the field of trademarks (Phone 
interview, April 20, 2013), which was discussed in the third course. However, 
although generics constitute an important exception within the GI regulatory 
framework, there is no systematic discussion within the literature of terms that are 
considered to be generic and why. Thus, the focus on a ‘generic’ term like Cheddar 
enables me to further address the second and third research questions by generating a 
better understanding of the meaning and practice of genericism within the context of 
GIs. In many ways, focusing on an uncontested case is every bit as important as 
focusing on a contested one because the lack of contestation may point to the 
mythologization of assumptions that need to be questioned. In addition, the 
methodological importance of juxtaposing an uncontested case with a contested one 
lies in exploring the relationship between two unlike conditions or things, such as 
protected Parmesan versus generic Cheddar, to understand the connections between 
them and discern critical differentiating features that might otherwise be overlooked. 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically deconstruct the uncontested 
genericity of the name as a form of myth and to consider why there has been an 
international struggle to protect Parmesan but not Cheddar. I argue that the taken-
for-granted nature of the name stems from the mythologization of its genericity as 
indisputable fact or common sense, a socially constructed reality which is passed off 
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as ‘natural.’ I make this assertion partly on the basis that my attempts to question the 
naturalization and universalization of Cheddar as generic were dismissed for lacking 
sense and therefore excluded from serious consideration by two UK interviewees 
who simply stated that the reason Cheddar is not protected is “because it is generic” 
(Personal interviews, May 25 and September 25, 2013). But as I will demonstrate, 
pinpointing solid evidence to verify the genericity of the term is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. The definition of genericism, how it is measured, 
where, and in what context are still a matter of debate both within the EU and at the 
multilateral level. Genericism is therefore a dynamic and socially-constructed 
concept rather than a static condition that is determined with a confident degree of 
finality, and this means that Cheddar’s generic status could conceivably transform in 
the future. What is more, I contend that there are 3 key differences in the approach to 
Cheddar that help explain the absence of gastro-panic surrounding its protection: (1) 
lack of historical attempts to protect the name, (2) differing ideological perspectives 
and level of UK government involvement, and (3) fragmented organization, 
cohesion, and approach of producer consortiums to GI protection.  
I begin by providing evidence pointing to the widespread agreement that 
Cheddar has succumbed to genericide, followed by an exploration of further cases of 
contested cheese names that exemplify its uncontested status. Then, by drawing 
attention to various ambiguities and inconsistencies within the EU and 
internationally I focus on deconstructing Cheddar’s genericity as a mythical social 
construction in order to expose the dynamic and complicated nature of genericism. 
Finally, I interrogate the relative absence of gastro-panic by comparing Cheddar to 
Parmesan and expanding on the abovementioned differences in the approach to the 
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two names. This enables me to explain the variation in their protection and better 
understand potential factors that lead to some names being protected over others.  
5.2. The Unquestionable Genericity of Cheddar 
Unlike Parmesan, there is considerable agreement that Cheddar is widely 
understood both in the UK and abroad to be a generic term (Eagles 2003; Smale 
2006; Bromberger 2006: 96; Correa and Yusuf 2008; Linford 2008: 114; Rajan 
2009; Fernandez 2009; Mount 2011; Gangjee 2012: 10; Barnard 2013: 187; British 
Cheese Board 2014a; The British Cheese Centre of Switzerland n.d.). A GGI is a 
sign used on goods that once served an indicative function – for example to specify 
the geographical origin and production of a cheese – and was gradually subject to a 
process of de-localization through which its meaning became generalized, losing its 
distinguishing function and instead designating a type or category of cheese. 
Through the process of genericization or “genericity drift” (Hughes 2006-2007: 353) 
the geographical distinctiveness is lost and as a result use of the name is not 
restricted to production activities located within the region of origin. This is assumed 
to have affected other cheese names that were originally associated with regions in 
particular European countries such as Brie (France), Camembert (France), Edam 
(Netherlands), Gouda (Netherlands), Mozzarella (Italy), and Emmental 
(Switzerland). 
To further demonstrate the general perception of Cheddar’s genericity, even 
the ‘West Country Farmhouse Cheddar’ (WCFC) cheese-makers that submitted an 
application for a PDO within the cheese’s territory of origin described Cheddar as a 
“variety” of cheese that today “is made throughout the world and…now describes 
the method of manufacture and the unique process of stacking and turning the curds 
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designed to speed up the draining of the whey” (FCL 1996). Cheddar is thus a noun 
– a cheese type – and a verb that specifies a stage in the production process. In 
addition, when asked if UK consumers connect Cheddar to its area of origin, one UK 
cheese association representative expressed: 
“I think it’s been lost in the mists of time simply because, as far as UK legislation is 
concerned, cheddar is a recipe…and it is regarded by Government and by ourselves 
and by the EU as a generic name. So there is no dispute about that…because it is 
made all over the world it can be made all over the country, the association with its 
place of origin has been lost.” 
He continued: 
“we lost the plot when the recipe went over with the Pilgrim fathers to America. I 
mean, that’s it, it’s become a worldwide recipe and it is recognized as a generic. End 
of story, and there’s no desire in this country to try and protect the name Cheddar. 
That doesn’t mean to say that people won’t want to go out and do Scottish Cheddar 
or Irish Cheddar or Welsh Cheddar or any other prefix for that. And that is permitted 
under the regulations. And that is simply saying to people, this product comes from 
this area, this region, this country, whatever. There’s no way that we will be able to 
get one for the UK as a whole or for England because the geographical area is too 
large” (Personal interview, September 25, 2013). 
By virtue of being ‘lost’ this representative is suggesting that the Cheddar name is 
something that was once possessed but that was unable to be retained and, having 
succumbed to genericide, cannot be recovered. He also refers to the generic status of 
Cheddar as indisputable common sense, thereby enforcing its incontestability and 
mythical position. His statements convey a sense of inevitability and powerlessness 
– that there was essentially no way to stop the evolution of Cheddar’s meaning as it 
travelled with immigrants to new lands, which over time severed its link to the 
original area of origin. But he also mentions that there is no ambition in the UK to 
try and protect Cheddar, which suggests that a strategic mobilization of political 
action to do so, through such discursive strategies as gastro-panic, is required to 
overturn a declaration of genericity. He also remarks that it would be impossible to 
acquire protection even if there was, as it was already mentioned that generic names 
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are prohibited from being registered as GIs. ‘Cheddar’ itself is in fact not protected 
under any European legislation but has thus far only been granted a GI when 
accompanied by geographical qualifiers to form compound terms such as ‘WEST 
COUNTRY FARMHOUSE Cheddar’ or ‘ORKNEY SCOTTISH ISLAND 
Cheddar.’ And one cheese award show representative exclaimed, “Let’s be honest, 
no one can re-claim Cheddar” (Personal discussion, November 28, 2013).  
Next, there is further evidence that Cheddar epitomizes genericness under GI 
legislation around the world. In an interview with an Italian professor (Personal 
interview, February 25, 2013), Cheddar was casually referred to as an example of a 
homogeneous good – a good produced in bulk, large quantities as a commodity as 
opposed to a heterogeneous good, such as a GI product, that is differentiated. This 
has the effect of stripping the name of any uniqueness to emphasize its uniformity of 
composition and character. Finally, Cheddar is the only example provided on the 
WTO TRIPS website of a name that has become generic and falls under the 
exception in Article 24, referring to a type of cheese rather than one produced in a 
particular area of the UK (WTO 2008) and giving the impression that Cheddar is a 
global generic term. 
Once geographical names become genericized they eventually “form part of 
the general cultural and gastronomic stock and may, in principle, be used by any 
producer” (Canadane v Hellenic Republic 1997: para 28). This is important because 
it means that cheese-makers all over the world are entitled to use the term Cheddar 
despite the fact that production techniques vary. Many countries including Canada, 
the US, Australia, and New Zealand have adopted national legislation mandating 
conditions of production under the generic name Cheddar and standards differ from 
one place to another. In the US for example there is surprisingly no requirement that 
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‘cheddaring’ – a practice where the curd is cut, stacked, and turned to drain the whey 
and is assumed to distinguish Cheddar from other cheeses – be an integral part of the 
production process or that the cheese be aged for any specific amount of time. In 
many cases it is produced using a faster method called “curd stirring” (Thorpe 2009) 
and any cheese may be called Cheddar so long as it meets basic compositional 
criteria – specifically a milkfat content of 50% and a moisture content of 39% (FDA 
2013).  
A lack of concern and hostility towards those producing Cheddar around the 
world is evident in the abovementioned comments, and these are two crucial criteria 
for identifying a gastro-panic. Thus, their absence implies that no panic has arisen 
but rather that the meaning generated by the name, which indicates a generic type of 
cheese rather than a particularistic one exclusively produced in a designated area of 
the UK, has been naturalized to appear as indisputable fact or common sense. 
Consequently, in Barthesian terms the genericity of Cheddar has become myth and 
the name serves as a form that carries the concept of genericness, which deprives it 
of its history and transforms it into a mere categorical type. The myth does not hide 
the cheese’s origins but rather distorts them and makes them disappear (Barthes 
2009: 145). By banishing its historical linkages the name on its own is subjected to a 
life of commodification. The signification of genericism prevents the registration of 
the name as a GI while bolstering the interests of global dairy industries by 
representing a widely recognizable kind of cheese. And because its generic 
connotation has become accepted as ‘normal’ it acts as a conceptual map of meaning 
through which to make sense of the name as well as legitimate the clause in EU and 
WTO legislation that ensures the un-protectability of generic terms. Hence, when a 
consumer enters the cheese section of a supermarket multiple Cheddars compete for 
178 
 
their attention and give an impression of similarity that must be differentiated with a 
further layer of meaning such as ‘West Country Farmhouse.’  
5.4. Demythologizing Genericism 
However clear it may seem, aside from relying on general agreement as to 
the status of Cheddar, in reality proving that a name has become generic is no easy 
task. A main problem in defining genericness lies in where the measurement would 
apply; for example, is the name considered generic at the national, EU, or global 
level? This becomes ever more important as dairy industries increase trade across 
borders. Barthes argues that it is crucial to deconstruct myth because it can be used 
to serve particular ideological positions and interests. In the following sections I 
critically demythologize the supposed genericity of Cheddar to further reveal that the 
generic status of a name, even one as taken-for-granted as Cheddar, is a constant site 
of discursive construction. From this analysis genericism emerges as an ambiguous, 
complex, and unstable concept. 
5.4.1. Uncontested in a world of contestation 
I have asserted that Cheddar is, for the most part, one of the world’s least 
contested cheese names. This is an assertion I base on the apparent naturalization of 
its genericity and the fact that producers in the UK have never attempted to secure 
exclusive use of ‘Cheddar’ as a singular term. I have also provided evidence pointing 
to widespread agreement that the name is definitively generic. And because the 
security of the term and those who produce it is not deemed threatened, no gastro-
panic has manifested surrounding its use and generic production has not been 
securitized.  
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However, I must briefly explain my inclusion of the qualifier ‘for the most 
part.’ Some NW cheese producers have recently expressed concern over the security 
of the Cheddar term and its open use. Such discourse has the makings of a security 
issue where the use of Cheddar, as an endangered referent object that needs to be 
protected, is perceived to be at risk from the existential threat of European GI 
protection. An objection was raised by three non-EU organizations to the registration 
of ‘Orkney Scottish Island Cheddar’ based on concern over the protection of the 
component term ‘Cheddar.’ Similar concerns have emanated from the ambiguous 
protection of compound terms in bilateral agreements that will be discussed in the 
sixth course, such as the agreement with China where ‘West Country Farmhouse 
Cheddar’ is protected, and has left some actors fearing for the continued use of the 
single term ‘Cheddar’ in the Chinese market (Morris 2011: 2). Finally, a US 
magazine blog suggests that there exists “growing pressure within the U.K. to 
expand the legal protection of cheddar” (McDonough 2013) and American author of 
Cheese and Culture Paul Kindstedt (2012: 216) expresses worry that the European 
reinterpretation of certain names including Cheddar could someday require 
“Vermont Cheddar” to be renamed despite its “long and proud history.”  
Regardless of these concerns, I still maintain that Cheddar may be currently 
viewed as an uncontested term that is not the subject of international negotiation and 
contestation or competing gastro-panics. This may be evidenced through the Scottish 
government response to the aforementioned objection. The objectors were assured 
that protection was only sought for the whole name and not Cheddar on its own 
(Email interview, September 26, 2013). Additionally, a clause in the response 
document states that the name ‘Cheddar’ may still be used within the EU 
(Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1186/2013). The European 
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Commission also issued a statement following perceived misunderstandings of the 
Consortium for Common Food Names (CCFN), a lobby group based in the US that 
has made active attempts to preserve the right to use GGIs in global commerce. The 
Commission stated that, “The suggestion made by the Consortium, that names that 
have long been generic such as “mozzarella”, “brie”, “gouda”, “edam” or “cheddar” 
could be used anymore is incorrect. Those names are not protected as geographical 
indications in the European Union” (European Commission 2012). And although 
there is a contemporary movement to re-connect the quality of certain Cheddars to 
their origin in the region of Somerset and its surroundings, this is occurring more as 
a mode of product differentiation in a competitive market context than an attempt to 
secure legal protection for the name through terroirism. Whether or not this changes 
in the future is another matter and something that will be addressed in the final 
section of this course.  
At any rate, as an uncontested name Cheddar is unique in the world of cheese 
because it has not been subject to lengthy and complicated legal and political 
disputes that have plagued the use of many others. I demonstrated Parmesan to be 
one of the most prominent examples of a contested cheese name in the previous 
course. But there have been other cases where producers have sought to register 
names that other countries around the world consider to be generic. The purpose of 
this section is to discuss additional cases of contested cheeses in order to exemplify 
and question the uncontestedness of Cheddar and further expose the unstable and 
socially constructed nature of the myth of genericism.  
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1. Feta and intra-EU contestation 
To begin, the controversial case of Feta was the first instance under European 
regulations to confront the issue of genericism and illustrates the dynamic and 
fluctuating nature of generic status. Problems at the European level initially began in 
1994 when Greece requested that Feta be protected as a PDO within the EU. This 
was accepted in 1996 to the dismay of Feta-makers in Denmark, Germany, and 
France. In order to secure a degree of protection for their producers, these countries 
challenged the decision on the basis that Feta was produced in large quantities 
outside of the country and had become the generic indicator for a type of white 
cheese in brine, and that this was the case even within Greece where cheese was 
imported under the name. A lengthy court battle that ensued whereby the PDO was 
revoked and then reinstated, culminating in the final 2005 decision to award 
exclusive rights to producers within the territory of Greece. A summary of events is 
illustrated in Table 5.1 (Canadane v Hellenic Republic 1997; Federal Republic of 
Germany v Commission 2005a).  
Like Parmesan, this case pitted claims-makers employing competing 
discursive strategies against one another. The Greeks used terroirism to demarcate 
Feta as a uniquely Greek product in order to secure exclusive rights to the use of the 
name while their opponents were guided by an oppositional position of genericism in 
order to maintain their use of it. The final decision resulted in a disproportionality 
whereby it became legitimate to withdraw rights from producers and manufacturers 
in other EU countries and to assign extra rights exclusively to Greek cheese-makers. 
This strategy of social division was built upon the Greeks’ ability to successfully 
define what counted as the ‘proper’ production of ‘authentic’ Feta and ‘improper’ 
production of its ‘inauthentic’ counterpart. 
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Regardless of the final ruling, the decision over Feta has not been easily 
digested both within and outside the EU and its legitimacy is still in question (Stærk 
Ekstrand 2006; Gangjee 2007). Critics have drawn attention to the fact that Feta 
itself is not a geographic area of Greece but an Italian-derived name that means 
‘slice’, ‘slab’ or ‘chunk’ that is used widely throughout the Balkan region. 
Additionally, they pointed out the absurdity of the entire country of Greece being the 
designated area of production. One informant called the case “an absolute disgrace” 
and “a political stitch-up,” baffled that the European court could have ruled in favor 
of its protection despite so much evidence pointing to its genericity and the fact that 
it had long been produced in other countries throughout the EU (Personal interview, 
September 25, 2013).  
Table 5.1: Timeline of the Feta Case 
Year Event 
1987 Greece begins to enact legislation to protect the name ‘Feta’ as 
a geographical name 
1988 Development of production and marketing regulations for Feta 
in Greece begins 
1991 Feta from Denmark seized at Greek border 
1994 Greece applies for Feta PDO 
1996 Feta is registered as PDO 
1999 (March) Feta registration annulled following objections 
1999 (October) Member States given questionnaire to determine connotations 
of Feta in minds of consumers 
2001 Scientific Committee declares Feta not to be generic based on 
consumer associations with Greece and use of Greek symbols in 
marketing 
2002 (October) Feta is re-registered as PDO 
2002 (December) Germany, Denmark, and France apply for annulment of 
decision 
2005 Request dismissed, Feta remains registered PDO 
The UK cheese association representative I quoted in section 2 stated that it 
would be impossible to secure a GI for Cheddar designating the whole of the country 
as the geographical production area because it was too large. However, this did not 
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prevent Feta from being registered as a PDO and is allowed under the regulations in 
exceptional circumstances. A case like this makes it seem less inconceivable that a 
name like Cheddar, which is actually derived from a town in an area of the UK 
where the cheese was historically produced, might become protected if its meaning 
is actively re-constructed. This possibility was reiterated following the Feta ruling by 
the head of the Danish Dairy Federation in Brussels who was quoted as stating, “The 
door is now open for other cheeses such as cheddar or camembert to apply for PDO 
status” (Jones 2005). And in actuality, one European lawyer I spoke with commented 
on how, “It is much easier to overcome a problem based on genericness in the EU 
than to overcome a problem based on genericness for trademarks…Feta as a 
trademark would have never been approved. The standard of is distinctiveness was 
not sufficient” (Phone interview, April 20, 2013). Nevertheless, it is possible to 
imagine the outcry that would ensue if producers of Cheddar were to seek protection. 
2. Emmental and bilateral contestation 
Feta is one instance where a cheese name has been the subject of much legal 
and political wrangling but another case is that of Emmental. Emmental highlights 
the negotiated position of generic names when dealing with bilateral relations when a 
non-EU country attempts to protect a name that those in the EU consider to be 
generic. In 2004 cheese-makers in Germany, Denmark, France, Austria, and within 
Switzerland contested a Swiss decision to award protected status to Emmentaler 
cheese. A food system security issue arose as the EU and Switzerland were 
undergoing discussions to formulate a FTA, which non-Swiss producers feared could 
threaten their use of the name. Emmental is unprotected in the EU and like Cheddar 
is incorporated into protected compound designations including Allgäuer 
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Emmentaler (PDO) in Germany and Emmental de Savoie and Emmental français 
est-central (PGIs) in France. Opponents argued that the majority of cheese by the 
name Emmental is produced in non-Swiss countries. In fact, France is the largest 
producer of the cheese (Bulman 2004) and it is also one of the most popular cheeses 
in Germany, having been produced there since the early 1800’s. But as was indicated 
in the case of Parmesan, greater production levels outside the region of origin are 
sometimes not enough to solidify the genericity of a term.  
Table 5.2: Status of Emmental in Bilateral Agreements 
Bilateral Treaty Year Name Status 
Swiss Confederation – 
Federal Republic of 
Germany  
1967 Use allowed indicating country of manufacture 
Swiss Confederation – 
Socialist Republic of 
Czechoslovakia  
1973 Protected, use restricted 
Swiss Confederation – 
Republic of France 
1974 Use allowed indicating country of manufacture 
Swiss Confederation – 
Spain 
1974 Use allowed indicating country of manufacture 
Swiss Confederation – 
Republic of Portugal 
1977 Protected, use restricted 
Swiss Confederation – 
People’s Republic of 
Hungary 
1979 Protected, use allowed indicating country of 
manufacture for limited period 
Swiss Confederation – 
Russian Confederation 
1994 Protected, use restricted 
Swiss Confederation – 
European Union  
2011 Unprotected 
Opponents to the registration of Emmental also contended that the name was 
the victim of genericide on the basis that it had been standardized in an agreement 
between Switzerland and Germany and within the CAC (Dairy Industries 
International 2004). But as is shown in Table 5.2 above (Swiss Federal Institute of 
Intellectual Property 2014), the genericity of Emmental varies depending on the 
bilateral agreement and its status was most probably the result of trade negotiations 
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rather than objective empirical assessment in each national context. Interestingly, 
protection for Emmental is absent in the text of the recent EU-Switzerland agreement 
on GIs (Council Decision 2011/738/EU). This implies that no decision was reached 
honoring Switzerland’s protection of the name and is unsurprising considering the 
European Commission has previously claimed that Emmental had become a “generic 
expression” (Swissinfo 2004). Still, similarly to the case of Cheddar no court cases 
have substantiated such a claim. Thus, in many instances the status of terms appears 
to be decided through political negotiations rather than validated through the courts.  
3. Gruyère and global contestation 
Lastly, disagreement surrounding the registration of Gruyère as a protected 
GI illustrates the controversial nature of attempts to protect a name that those in non-
EU countries consider to be generic. According to Dalby (2009: 26-7), Gruyère 
originated in Switzerland but has been imitated in France since the late 17
th
 century. 
The composition of the cheeses differs and the body of the French Gruyère is 
indented by lots of small holes that do not appear in the Swiss variety. Both 
countries have sought protection for the name, which led to conflicts in the past. 
Gruyère from Switzerland was originally granted protection in the EU through a 
bilateral agreement that granted EU producers a 5-year transition period to phase out 
use of the name (Council Decision 2011/738/EU). As a result, French producers 
were denied their request for protection (RFI 2010). But in 2012 this decision was 
overturned and Gruyère from France was granted a PGI under one condition: that the 
name Gruyère is clearly accompanied by the country of production (France) so as 
not to mislead consumers. The avoidance of consumer confusion by simply 
indicating the country of origin on a product’s packaging calls into question EU 
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arguments that a higher level of protection is required for agri-food product names 
around the world.  
Table 5.3: Contested Cheese Terms 
Proposed Name 
Registration 
Registering 
Country 
Contested 
Component 
Objectors 
Feta Greece Feta Denmark, Germany, France 
Gruyère Switzerland Gruyère France 
Gruyère France Gruyère Australia, New Zealand, NMPF, 
USDEC 
Gouda Holland Netherlands Gouda Germany, Czech Republic, 
France, Austria, governments of 
Australia, New Zealand, and the 
US, Dairy Australia,  
Dairy Companies Association of 
New Zealand,  
NMPF, USDEC 
Edam Holland Netherlands Edam Czech Republic, Germany, 
Finland, Austria, Slovakia, 
governments of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the US, Dairy 
Australia,  
Dairy Companies Association of 
New Zealand,  
NMPF, USDEC 
Emmental Switzerland Emmental Germany, Denmark, France, 
Austria, producers in 
Switzerland (received total of 64 
objections) 
Orkney Scottish 
Island Cheddar 
UK Cheddar Dairy Australia, Dairy 
Companies Association of New 
Zealand, CCFN 
An interesting aspect of this case is also that a number of groups from the 
US, Australia, and New Zealand contested the registration on the basis that Gruyère 
is not the name of a region in France and also provided evidence to demonstrate its 
genericity  (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 110/2013). The 
objections of non-EU groups to the registration of cheese terms have become more 
numerous in recent years and third country governments and industry organizations 
have sent objections to the registration of ‘Edam Holland,’ ‘Gouda Holland,’ and 
‘Orkney Scottish Island Cheddar,’ which along with the previously discussed 
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cheeses are displayed in Table 5.3 (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1829/2002; 
Bulman 2004; Swissinfo 2004; Commission Regulation (EU) No 1121/2010; 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1122/2010; Commission Implementing Regulation  
(EU) No 110/2013; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1186/2013). 
This is because they view their security in the use of these terms to be threatened by 
GI protection. 
Based on the aforementioned cases it becomes clearer that GGIs, as a 
security object, are a continuous site of negotiation and contestation within an 
international context and their meaning is the outcome of politics and plays of 
power. Barthes states that the meanings of concepts are rarely stable or 
unproblematic in practice because their meaning fluctuates. Therefore the sign, or in 
these cases the food names, are at the center of the struggle over their ownership. 
The signification attached to each name changes as social actors compete to fix their 
own meanings in international settings. It is also worth pointing out that in each case 
a disproportionality, or an imbalance in the conferral of rights to some producers 
over others, led to feelings of insecurity on the part of producers and governments 
who considered themselves to be ‘losing out.’ These cases point to genericism as a 
state of being that is not addressed unless faced with a challenge in the form of 
attempts made by producers or governments to register a term and ultimately offers 
one of the main tools and lines of defense against proposed GI registrations for 
cheese names. The generic nature of Cheddar has yet to be confronted as such.  
5.4.2. Ambiguity in the EU 
Under EU legislation, GGIs are not eligible to be registered as PDOs or PGIs 
and are specifically defined as: 
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“the names of products which, although relating to the place, region or country 
where the product was originally produced or marketed, have become the common 
name of a product in the Union” (Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012). 
The clause is basically intended to prevent a widely-used term from becoming 
monopolized by a small number of producers. This means that even if they wanted 
to, under current perceptions of its genericity Cheddar producers in the UK would 
have a difficult time claiming exclusivity over the name. Its apparently fixed 
meaning has the concrete effect of preventing anyone from seeking to acquire 
protection. But one must then ask – has Cheddar in fact assumed common name 
status throughout the EU and if so, how do we know this and how was it 
determined?  
In spite of the perceived clarity, since EGI regimes were first institutionalized 
in 1992 there exists no official definition of genericity or lists that might confirm the 
genericness of Cheddar. This is because defining the meaning of ‘generic’ or 
drawing up a list of agreed-upon names was described as “impossible” (Personal 
interviews, February 22 and 27, 2013) and extremely “difficult” by European 
informants (Personal interview, May 24, 2013b). Any decision to tackle the issue has 
been delayed in the EU mainly as a result of it being a very “sensitive” issue 
(Personal discussion, July 3, 2013; Personal interview, April 20, 2013). Consider, for 
example, that the original 1992 regulations stated that the European Commission 
would draft and publish an indicative list of generic names for agricultural products 
and foodstuffs in the Official Journal of the European Communities before the 
regulations came into force (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92). An attempt 
was made to compile names the same year during which time the Commission gave 
each Member State the opportunity to establish their own lists. As the submissions it 
received were “varied and lacking in detail” the Commission used its own procedure 
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to adopt a potential list, which considered among other factors whether the name had 
been suggested by at least 8 Member States (European Court of Justice 1998: para 
24). A non-exhaustive list was formulated in 1996 and included a mere 6 names – 
Cheddar, Brie, Camembert, Edam, Emmentaler, and Gouda – and lacked many 
others that individual Member States considered to be generic (Europolitics 1996). 
This aim has since disappeared from subsequent regulations because according to 
one EU official, although the Member States agreed on an initial list, there were too 
many further suggested names for which majority agreement was never reached. 
Thus, there was no further obligation to make the list and no names have ever been 
published (Personal interview, May 24, 2013a).  
In addition, the genericity of Cheddar appears more as a taken-for-granted 
mythical assumption rather than an objective fact when considering the criteria for 
establishing the genericness of a name in the EU. There was a general agreement by 
the European representatives I interviewed that under all circumstances genericness 
is only legitimate when objectively determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis 
and substantiated by a large degree of concrete evidence (Personal interviews, 
February 22, 2013; March 13, 2013; April 9, 2013a; May 24, 2013b; Personal 
discussion, July 3, 2013). The results of these cases vary and there is no guarantee as 
to why something is generic or not considering there is no set methodology for 
determining the genericness of a name. This is surprising considering that genericity 
is one of the only exceptions where a name may not be registered as a GI and means 
the difference between the security and insecurity of producers being able to utilize 
it. Within the EU, certain criteria are considered when identifying genericity that 
include “(a) the existing situation in areas of consumption; (b) the relevant national 
or Union legal acts and any other actions deemed necessary” (Regulation (EU) No 
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1151/2012: Art. 41, para 2). Additionally, following the Feta case it was determined 
that a GI can be considered as having become generic “only when there is in the 
relevant territory no significant part of the public concerned that still considers the 
indication as a geographical indication…” (Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1829/2002: para 23). This could be measured through opinion polls or surveys, 
levels of production and consumption, labelling and advertising, and dictionary use. 
Therefore, if generic terms are defined by consumer perceptions then the test for 
Cheddar should be empirical. However, the name has never been subject to court 
proceedings or empirical analyses gauging consumer perceptions either within the 
UK or in the EU as a whole. 
Since it is deemed to be a matter for the courts there are also no instruments 
within the European Commission to distinguish genericity. This is surprising 
considering that in the Parmesan case the ECJ declared, “It is for the Commission to 
determine whether a name is generic or not under the Regulation…” (European 
Court of Justice v Bigi 2002: 6, para 39). In addition, the way in which the system 
works in the EU has been cause for concern (Personal interview, May 23, 2013). The 
first step in which the issue of genericity may be raised is at the Member State level 
where the application for a name is first received. If the genericity of a name is 
questioned it must initially be proven there. If no objections are raised the 
application is forwarded to the Commission for review. The Commission does 
consider the generic nature of a name in its initial review but once an application is 
deemed complete and acceptable it is subject to a contestation period of 3 months 
during which time other Member States and third countries are able to contest its 
registration based on assertions of genericness. This pits the country of origin – 
where a name is declared to be specific – against other countries who view it as 
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generic and unprotectable. According to one European representative, “Within the 
contestation period there is no ‘pressure’ to find an agreement and often times the 
registration is still pushed through. But then the probability is that it ends up in front 
of a court” (Personal interview, May 23, 2013). Genericism is then used as a 
defensive tool in order to block the registration of a proposed name. 
Instead, names are declared to be “not protected” or “not protectable” 
because, “The moment you say something is generic, this is making a charge that 
needs to be substantiated” and the costs and time spent on extensive litigation are 
best left avoided (Personal interview, May 24, 2013a). For instance, there are a 
number of names listed in the initial 1996 registrations that include footnotes 
expressly specifying that applicants did not seek certain constituent parts of 
compound terms for protection. Here, ‘Cheddar’ was cited as a component of ‘West 
Country Farmhouse Cheddar’ that producers were not seeking protection for 
(Commission Regulation (EC) No 1107/96).
25
 This has the effect of suggesting the 
genericity of the term. But unless there has been a court case to substantiate such a 
claim it still does not mean that the name is definitively generic. As well, the practice 
of indicating through a footnote the unprotected parts of compound GIs, which was 
the case in the West Country designation, ceased after 1998 when the ECJ ruled that 
compound terms would only be protected in their entirety and not as individual units 
even if they incorporated a generic term (Criminal proceedings 1998: para 34-9). 
The lack of such a footnote was a main factor in contributing to the insecurity of 
cheese-makers around the world and motivating the previously-mentioned objection 
to the registration of ‘Orkney Scottish Island Cheddar’ because it was unclear 
                                                          
25
 Other components of compound cheese terms that were recorded as not being sought for protection 
included: Graviera, Chabichou, Crottin, Picodon, Sainte Maure, Tomme, Camembert, Emmental, 
Brie, Canestrato, Pecorino, Provolone, Caciotta, Mozzarella, Edammer, and Gouda (Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/96). 
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whether or not protection was being sought for the term ‘Cheddar’ on its own. Cases 
like Parmesan, a translation of the compound term Parmigiano-Reggiano, have also 
contributed to increasing complexity in this area. And for example, the term ‘Grana’ 
in ‘Grana Padano’ is protected as a single term in a bilateral agreement between the 
EU and South Korea. 
The terminology in the EU refers to terms with multiple components as 
‘compound GIs’ whereas in other countries such as the US these might be classified 
as ‘semi-generics’ and are used to distinguish wine terms such as ‘California 
Champagne.’ According to Pager (2006: 6, original emphasis), such rules have been 
offered as a compromise to balance competing interests over the use of particular 
terms in the GI debate because they “recognize that many GIs have a dual meaning, 
describing both the specific geographic origin of a good as well as serving as a more 
general descriptor for a type of product, independent of its origin.” But referring to 
compounds as ‘semi-generics’ is highly controversial, which was indicated by one 
EU lawyer who stated that, “If you talk about semi-generics some people in the EU 
will kill you. Because that’s an expression, as you know, pretty much used in the 
US” (Phone interview, April 20, 2013). And according to a European agricultural 
official, the idea itself is contradictory because “either something is generic or it’s 
not” (Personal interview, May 24, 2013) 
Next, genericism was declared to be something that cannot simply be 
assumed based on the use of a name outside the territory of origin. One Italian 
representative raised the issue of Asiago; a cheese name protected in the EU but 
considered to be generic in the US. He pointed out that the status of the name was 
not ruled by any judge and was therefore delegitimized as an “assumption” (Personal 
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interview, February 22, 2013). Though, presumptions as to the generic nature of 
certain names are also evident within the EU. One Member State official I spoke 
with who manages PDO and PGI registrations commented that “there are some 
things where you just think, oh of course that’s generic…” (Personal interview, 
March 13, 2013) and there is a clear absence of any official lists or court cases 
involving Cheddar. When asked why Cheddar was not protected one UK 
government official admitted that they did not know but offered a possible 
explanation that it was “because ‘cheddaring’ is a straightforward process compared 
to producing Parmesan. You don’t need to look after it like Parmesan and there are 
differences in the production process” (Personal interview, March 13, 2013). Yet, 
this runs contrary to the production of artisanal handmade Cheddars produced in the 
original region of origin that will be discussed in the final section. These cheeses 
require every bit as much care and attention as famous cheeses such as Parmigiano-
Reggiano. Their production is considerably labor-intensive and vintage Cheddars are 
aged for over 2 years with some now being aged for 3 (Personal interview, 
September 25, 2013). Finally, because Cheddar is so widely produced this 
sometimes implies that the high levels of production outside the region of origin are 
enough to justify its genericity. One cheese-maker offered the suggestion that 
Cheddar might not be protected because the government considers that it “stops 
innovation to some extent” and that it “would be difficult to stop them making it 
everywhere else” (Phone interview, March 18, 2013). But as was demonstrated in 
the case of Parmesan, high production levels are not necessarily proof of 
genericness. 
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5.4.3. Conflicting nature of international Codex standards 
As I mentioned in the first section of this course, the use of Cheddar as an 
example of a generic term within the WTO makes it appear as though it has global 
generic status. It might also be tempting to verify this by pointing to its 
standardization under the CAC, which Echols (2008: 182) states confirms a name’s 
genericity and open use in international trade. However, when referring to the 
multilateral level it was regularly reiterated by both EU and non-EU interviewees 
that genericism is a territorial concept (Personal interviews, May 24, 2013a; April 
11, 2013; April 9, 2013a). One informant stated that genericness “is not a static 
thing, it’s not [something] that you can sort of define once and for all, and for 
everyone, in an extraterritorial manner…” (Personal interview, April 9, 2013). This 
is also supported within Article 24 of the TRIPS agreement which states that, 
“Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect of 
a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to goods or services for 
which the relevant indication is identical with the term customary in common 
language as the common name for such goods or services in the territory of that 
Member” (WTO n.d., emphasis added). This clause stipulates that it is up to each 
national jurisdiction in individual countries to objectively assess whether a name is 
generic or not within their borders. If it is deemed to be the case then they are 
exempted from the obligation to grant GI protection to the term but has no bearing 
on its use in other Member countries. That being said, there have been attempts to 
overcome the territoriality of name protection through, for example, the 
institutionalization of clauses in trade agreements that ensure protected terms cannot 
be deemed to have become generic and cannot fall victim to genericide so long as 
they are protected as GIs in the country of origin (WIPO 2002). 
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Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the role of Codex and the 
implications of its international standards are understood in different ways. In two 
interviews that I conducted with European officials, Codex standards were described 
merely as optional guidelines, references, or voluntary standards deemed feasible at 
the global level rather than specifying the genericity of terms, the general belief 
being that a Codex term is not necessarily a generic term (Personal interviews, May 
23, 2013 and May 24, 2013b). According to one EU trade official, “Third countries 
lay standards and make lists, then it is supposed to be generic, but we think it 
[Codex] is just a standard” (Personal interview, May 24, 2013b). This assertion 
contradicts the position taken with regard to the creation of a Parmesan standard in 
the previous course, which was perceived by actors as institutionalizing the 
genericity of the term. Codex has also been used strategically by EU actors to 
support genericity claims to other names such as Emmental: 
“While it would appear appropriate to protect a designation such as ‘Emmentaler 
Switzerland’ as a registered designation of origin, it is unacceptable that ‘Emmental’ 
should become a protected designation of origin, as its generic character is 
recognised in Codex standard C-9” (Parliamentary Questions 2007). 
Codex standards are not immune from being protected even within the EU itself 
where applications to grant GI protection to two standardized names – Danbo and 
Havarti – are being processed, resulting in a heated reaction from dairy industries in 
many non-EU countries who view Codex names as having “become generic because 
they list a specific type” of cheese (Personal interview, April 11, 2013). This 
oppositional viewpoint will be discussed in more detail in the sixth course but it is 
worth drawing attention to the contradictory position and use of Codex as both a 
means of verifying and resisting genericity. It also makes apparent the impossibility 
of referring to Cheddar as a definitively global generic term. 
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5.5. Gastro-silence 
Cheddar continues to be important in its country of origin and many 
consumers connect the name to the UK. The question thus remains as to why no 
gastro-panic has arisen surrounding its use and why there has been a complete 
absence of political will on the part of UK actors to galvanize the protection of 
Cheddar? The contested cheese cases I have discussed thus far indicate that 
genericide is not necessarily set in stone if there is deliberate political action, such as 
through a discourse of gastro-panic, designed to prevent or reverse it. There is some 
concern and hostility evident surrounding the use of Cheddar. However, without a 
wide enough consensus on the part of claims-makers that its outside use constitutes a 
threat, it cannot be said that a gastro-panic is afoot. Therefore, in the following 
sections I compare Cheddar to Parmesan in order to better understand why no 
discursive struggle has emerged surrounding the protection of Cheddar. I argue that 
there are 3 key differences in the approach to the two names that help explain the 
variations in their protection: (1) historical attempts or lack thereof to protect the 
name, (2) differing ideological perspectives and level of government involvement, 
and (3) characteristics of producer consortiums including organization, cohesion, and 
approaches to GI protection. 
5.5.1. Cheddar: A cherished referent object in the UK? 
Cheddar has always been and continues to be an important cheese in the UK 
for both economic and cultural reasons. In a study performed by Sainsbury’s 
supermarket based on data representing its 12 million customers, Cheddar holds the 
top spot as the country’s most popular cheese (J Sainsbury plc 2011). And out of the 
over 700 cheese varieties produced in Britain, it comprises over half of all cheese 
purchased (British Cheese Board 2014b). In recent years more has been done in 
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Britain to celebrate the cheese’s origins and place in British food history. In one 
news article Cheddar was referred to by Nigel White of the British Cheese Board as 
a “national treasure” (BBC News 2012a). His organization recently held a 
competition challenging the musically-inclined to write the best “National Anthem 
of Cheddar” in order to draw attention to its importance as a cultural icon (British 
Cheese Board 2012). Such events are intended to reinvigorate Cheddar’s taken-for-
granted status in the minds of the consuming public by raising awareness of the 
heritage and quality of Cheddars today. As one UK cheese association representative 
put it “there’s no doubt in our mind, the best Cheddar is still made in this country, 
despite the fact that there are huge quantities made in the USA, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and various countries across the world” (Personal interview, 
September 25, 2013).  
There are also some who lament the lost connection of Cheddar to its home 
in the UK. Patrick Rance (1982: 6), author of The Great British Cheese Book, 
expresses this regret eloquently by exclaiming that, “There is a sad aspect…to 
England’s casual way with names. The honourable name of Cheddar has been given 
away to all the world, and is now equated in its home country with mouse-trap 
fodder by those who only know it through eating cheese that should never have been 
borne its name.” And though it is probably not widespread enough to constitute a 
consensus, discussions surrounding the cheese in online blog postings, comments, 
and news articles indicate that some have questioned the taken-for-granted status of 
Cheddar and view the outside use of the name with hostility as a misuse of the real 
thing. In one instance a blogger reacted angrily to the proposed registration of 
‘Orkney Scottish Island Cheddar’ and its shameful misuse of the ‘Cheddar’ name. 
He exclaimed, “Rather than going for name protection, the makers of Orkney Island 
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Cheddar should be prosecuted under EU legislation for misappropriating the 
Cheddar name” (Chairman Bill 2011). Others have suggested that mass-produced 
Cheddar should be labelled as “Cheddar-style” since it is a distinctly different cheese 
from artisanal varieties (Anonymous n.d.; Gerrie 2012). Another blog post asked, “Is 
it really fair that Cheddar can be made anywhere?” (Pascal 2011). The author 
asserted that the deemed genericness of the name should not prevent its protection 
and points out that many around the world also viewed the protected name 
Champagne as generic and French producers were able to get it protected. They went 
on to state that, “It’s nonsense that Wales, Ireland and Canada can produce Cheddar. 
Can you imagine the uproar if Cheddar was in France?” In a poll at the bottom of the 
posting asking whether people thought that Cheddar should be given its own 
protected designation, out of 40 people 80% chose “Yes we should fight to protect 
our proud heritage, only Cheddar coming from the West Country should be allowed 
to be called Cheddar” while 20% selected “There are too many Cheddars now, it’s 
too late to legislate” (Pascal 2011).  
From a consumer perspective, also consider that the importation from abroad 
of a large amount of the Cheddar purchased in Britain is unbeknownst to many. But 
there has been a backlash against foreign Cheddars parading around as if they wholly 
originated within the country, which is reflected in an increasing number of articles 
devoted to educating British consumers about how to choose a quality and locally-
produced Cheddar amidst a sea of mass-produced foreign imports and at the same 
time enhancing consumer awareness of the difficulties facing domestic dairy 
producers (Fernandez 2009; Jackson 2011; Gerrie 2012; Gray 2012). Consumers are 
exhibiting shifting preferences to foods produced locally, which are often assumed to 
be of a “better” quality and perhaps even “safer” than “imported food” (Nygard and 
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Storstad 1998: 48). Notions of high quality are also being tied to local 
distinctiveness, traditionality, and artisanship. In addition, tastes for Cheddar in 
Britain have changed. Not too long ago the majority of Cheddars were aged for less 
time and characterized by a milder flavor. Shorter maturing periods fit the industrial 
model well because it meant that the cheese could be marketed sooner, thereby 
reducing aging costs. But today the most popular Cheddars fall into the mature, 
extra-mature, and vintage categories, assuring that the cheese was aged for a 
minimum 9 months (Personal interview, September 25, 2013). 
The current treatment of Cheddar in the UK indicates that there is some 
concern over the image of Cheddar, hostility towards the open use of its name, and 
insecurity as to the source of its production. Yet, it cannot be said that Cheddar is a 
referent object because there is minimal discourse indicating that it is somehow 
endangered and in need of protection.  
5.5.2. Tracing the de-localization of Cheddar 
As myth, Cheddar’s perceived genericide is a product of history and did not 
simply evolve from the nature of things. In order to further deconstruct the myth it is 
important to take account of the history of the cheese to better understand how the 
meaning of Cheddar has evolved. The name itself claims a history as long as 
Parmigiano-Reggiano and was derived from the town of Cheddar around 800 years 
ago (British Cheese Board 2014a). In the past Cheddar cheeses were very much 
linked to their area of origin and though production was not restricted to the town 
itself, its use was only permitted to designate cheeses made within 30 miles of Wells 
Cathedral in the county of Somerset (The Cheddar Gorge Cheese Company 2013). It 
was here that the unique stage of the cheese-making process known as ‘cheddaring’ 
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was developed and the cheese was stored and matured in nearby caves. Early 
Cheddars from this region were extremely popular in the courts of Kings and in 
many cases demand outstripped supply, resulting in the cheeses being “sold before 
they were made” (Dalby 2009: 23). Cheese produced in Cheddar garnered an 
impressive reputation and in the early 18
th
 century Daniel Defoe (1962: 278) 
proclaimed that “without all dispute, it is the best cheese that England affords, if not, 
that the whole world affords.” 
The disconnection of Cheddar’s meaning from its place of origin could be 
attributed to the actions of imitators, scientific advances, the increased 
industrialization of dairy production, and the emigration of cheese-makers abroad. 
What happened to Cheddar is a familiar story in food production and is similar to 
what occurred in the history of Parmigiano-Reggiano – the reputation and 
historically high price commanded by the product spurred a significant number of 
copies outside the region of origin by imitators who sought to take advantage of the 
reputation and premium attached to the cheese, which before long began to cast a 
shadow over the original (Dalby 2009: 24). This use is not always the result of 
producers maliciously free-riding on the name to maximize their own financial gain 
but can also be done by immigrants who desired or were forced to continue their 
culinary traditions in other territories. For example, food was vital in shaping the 
identities of poor Italian immigrants to the US who re-created their traditional foods 
using locally-sourced ingredients due to the high cost of imports from Italy (Dickie 
2007: 235-47). But the difference between the history of Cheddar and Parmigiano is 
that no one considered the outside use of the name to be compromising their security 
and took active steps to prevent it. 
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Furthermore, the production of Cheddar was affected over time by the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain and abroad. This period had a profound impact on 
dairy and traditional cheese-making practices, which were progressively mechanized 
in an attempt to maximize and profit from large-scale production (Linford 2008: 10). 
Amidst these broader societal changes, influential and experimental cheese-makers 
pursued scientific experimentation in order to improve the efficiency of cheese 
manufacturing. The most infamous personality as far as Cheddar history is 
concerned was Joseph Harding, otherwise known as the “Father” of modern Cheddar 
(Heeley and Vidal 1996: 15). In the 19
th
 century he developed a number of new 
techniques and inventions that systematized the practices of Cheddar-making to 
enable more efficient production, thereby resulting in its standardization. He 
published widely and openly and was pivotal to the spread of Cheddar-making 
knowledge and methods around the world, having being consulted by cheese-makers 
in Scotland, Denmark, America, and elsewhere. His sons were also instrumental in 
establishing the system in Australia and New Zealand (Heeley and Vidal 1996). 
What is particularly interesting is that rather than attempting to prevent the open use 
of Cheddar as was the case with Parmigiano-Reggiano, “The process of imitation 
was actively encouraged by leading figures in English cheese-making” (Blundel and 
Lockett 2011: 373) and spread by British emigrants around the world. Rather than 
being securitized as a threat to the security of the cheese’s production methods, 
generic production was instead viewed as a source of pride and shared innovation. 
Throughout the 20
th
 century a combination of external factors continued to 
have a major impact on Cheddar’s territorial links. What happened to the cheese 
throughout the industrial phase of history fits into what Marsden and Sonnino (2005: 
50-2) refer to as the “agro-industrial paradigm,” which was characterized by the 
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globalized manufacture of uniform, undifferentiated goods. It is within this paradigm 
that the relations of production within the food system were de-localized, becoming 
characterized by mass-production, placelessness, and standardization. In the UK the 
establishment of the heavily-regulated Milk Marketing Board monopolized the 
buying and selling of dairy products (Blundel 2002). Changes in the regulatory 
environment of Britain after the Second World War further centralized cheese-
making systems and new compositional standards led to increasingly homogenized 
products. This was exacerbated by the rising power of supermarkets, which fostered 
a demand for low-cost, efficiently-produced, packed, and standardized cheeses 
(Linford 2008: 12). During this time the number of dairies producing Cheddar in the 
UK and particularly in the region of origin was seriously diminished and smaller 
producers were subsumed by their industrial counterparts. Slow Food UK (2014) 
states that today, “Barely 5% of the 400 producers who made Cheddar in the cheese's 
home territory—the county of Somerset in southwest England—a half-century ago 
remain in business.” There is currently only one cheese-maker within the town of 
Cheddar itself – the Cheddar Gorge Cheese Company – that not long ago resumed 
cheese-making operations.  
The use of a name by producers outside a region of origin, which has 
evidently been the case with Cheddar, can eventually lead to genericide and the de-
localization of its meaning (Federal Republic of Germany v Commission 2005: para 
135) and is something that GI systems of protection were designed to prevent in 
various European countries; however such a system was not formerly in place in the 
UK. The lack of previous regulations along with consumer indifference and the 
inaction of officials in confronting misuse can intensify the genericization process 
(Federal Republic 2005: para 135), which proceeds over time and, “As the 
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geographical link weakens, producers continue in good faith, believing that the name 
in question refers only to a type of product having certain characteristics. The 
transformation is complete when the name refers to a category and is used freely” 
(Federal Republic 2005: para 134). The widespread use of Cheddar through the 
openness in spreading its production techniques, the emigration of cheese-makers to 
other countries, and the lack of political action to restrict use of the name may be 
considered as having contributed to its de-localization over time and the 
naturalization of its genericness. 
5.5.3. Ideological divides and the state 
Cheddar is not the only cheese name to have experienced a historical de-
localization. Many famous names, which Dalby (2009:15) calls “escaped cheese 
names,” have spread around the world through waves of immigration and 
widespread use (Kindstedt 2012) and some like Parmesan have acquired or are being 
sought for protection in the EU and Switzerland that others around the world view to 
be generic. Genericization is thus not an inevitable process that leads to a definitive 
and irreversible endpoint and is less straightforward than it may seem. The meaning 
attached to cheese names is not a static condition but rather something extremely 
malleable.  
Cheddar is unique in that its accepted genericness has seemed to remain 
much more stable than others and has to do in part with the situation within the 
country of origin. No security issue has arisen surrounding its use as the name and 
those who produce it were never considered to be referent objects in need of 
protection. The UK is exceptional in its disregard to the protection of Cheddar even 
among countries such as the Netherlands who have similar “market-driven” cheese-
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making histories (Kindstedt 2012: 180). At one point Holland was “arguably the 
most industrialized, technology-intensive, specialized, and successful (as measured 
in market penetration) cheese-producing country on the planet” (Kindstedt 2012: 
184). Yet, even they at one point requested to have ‘Gouda’ protected as a GI within 
the EU. Their application was denied “due to the accepted pre-existing generic 
nature of the name” (Eucolait 2013) and “Gouda Holland” was protected instead. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an absence of political will on the part of the UK 
Government to motivate the protection of Cheddar. This was evidenced in my 
abovementioned conversations with UK officials who admitted that they had no idea 
why no attempts had ever been made to protect Cheddar. 
A reason for this could have to do with the fact that GI regimes and norms 
have powerful constitutive effects in some European countries but not others and 
historical, geographical, and ideological divides characterize European Member 
State approaches to their food cultures and agricultural systems, resulting in very 
different institutional arrangements and concerns. When compared to its Italian 
counterpart, the UK appears to be less concerned overall in preserving the identity of 
their food through the GI system. Although the number of registered products in the 
country has risen over the years to 57 and interest in the benefits of the schemes is 
growing (Personal interview, March 13, 2013), it pales in comparison to Italy where 
264 products are registered. The protection schemes remain relatively unknown in 
the UK both to producers and consumers and because of lack of recognition by the 
latter, producers who opt for protection do so to protect their business interests and 
to stop others from using their terms as opposed to boosting advertising and profits. 
Producers also espouse differing conceptions of quality as linked to traditional skills, 
methods, and hygiene rather than territory (Ilbery and Kneafsey 2000b), and origin is 
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considered to be less important overall in the quality of products in the UK (Becker 
2009). 
The historical context could also help explain these differences. In the UK, 
food and agricultural production were profoundly affected by centralization, 
industrialization, and standardization and the country’s food culture transformed 
significantly from pre to post-industrial eras (Tregear 2003). Rather than being 
something that should be preserved, “The continuation of producing traditional 
products was perceived as outmoded and a residue of a tradition that was exercising 
a disruptive influence on the modernization process” (Bertozzi 1995: 144) and was 
progressively phased out. The production and consumption of food was also affected 
by increased agricultural trade. Since the UK’s “comparative advantage was in 
industry and not agriculture,” in the past they exported manufactured products and 
imported more of their food than most other European countries (Simpson 2004: 85). 
This contributed to majorly severing territorial links between products and their 
places of origin, resulting in a food culture that is characterized by a ‘placeless 
foodscape’ (Ilbery and Kneafsey 2000b: 319). 
To continue, according to Barthes the combination of the denotative word 
Cheddar and its connotative function as an indicator of a generic type of cheese is 
what produces ideology. This “third order of signification” (Fiske and Hartley 1978: 
30) involves claims-makers’ interpretation of reality and conceals the operation of 
socio-economic structures and modes of ownership. Within Europe ideological 
positions compete to define how community agricultural policies should be 
constituted, pitting agricultural exceptionalists against normalists. Italy and many 
other ‘southern’ countries tend towards the former, which is a main driving factor in 
their persistence and legitimation for protecting Parmesan. The link between 
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products and places tends to be more embedded there and GIs like Parmesan have 
been historically upheld by governments as important tools for protecting regional 
traditions and keeping marginal and less-competitive producers on the land. 
Conversely, along with other ‘northern’ European countries, UK food and 
agricultural policy is underpinned by a more agricultural normalist and “market-
oriented” (Grant 2012: 421) approach where increased liberalization is promoted and 
interventionism condemned. And because the UK has historically lacked any type of 
GI protection system and the “revalorisation” of regional foodstuffs is a very recent 
phenomenon (Tregear 2003: 97), their view of the GI system has “often rested on an 
assumption that they are an unjustified market intervention, distorting trade and 
competition within the Community food market” (Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch 
2002: 248).  
The state has traditionally played an important role in the protection of GIs. 
Although this has declined over time in favor of more producer-driven models in 
some countries such as France where designations of origin have long been 
institutionalized, the state remains quite active in promoting and even coordinating 
applications in many countries and particularly where the system is relatively new 
(Marie-Vivien 2009). Bowen (2010: 209) has indicated that a certain level of “state 
involvement, in order to level the playing ﬁeld and empower small farmers, is a 
necessary, although not sufﬁcient, precondition for successful and sustainable GIs.” 
Therefore, when comparing Cheddar with Parmesan and other cheese names the 
differentiated response to genericide could be understood in terms of the differential 
alignment of interests and state involvement, which are more noticeably inclined 
against genericism in countries such as Italy, Switzerland, and even the Netherlands 
where both governments and producers have acted against the genericide of 
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important terms. Officials within the British Government appear to be indifferent to 
it and have not made any attempts to forge Cheddar producers into a potentially 
powerful interest group. This could be the result of the aforementioned historical 
context and because government officials are guided by a normalist perspective of 
agricultural policy that does not view the outside use of terms to be a threat but 
rather a normal part of market functioning. 
5.5.4. Re-localization within a market context 
Despite the apparent de-localization of its meaning and production, what was 
once ‘lost’ is now being ‘found’ and there appears to be a contemporary movement 
to revitalize the meaning of Cheddar from a placeless generic industrial commodity 
to a cheese of highly-variable, original, and distinctive characteristics. In many ways 
this is resulting in a re-localization of the cheese’s quality and reputation to 
production within the UK. However, it does not currently constitute a terroirist 
attempt to secure disproportionate legal protection for the name and instead 
represents a process of differentiation within a competitive context where, “While 
more localistic or ecological conventions are present…they are embedded within an 
industrial and market context and gain their value within that context, not outside it” 
(Parrott, Wilson, and Murdoch 2002: 256, original emphasis). There have been 
several attempts to redefine the boundaries of Cheddar in the UK. 
1. Proper versus improper Cheddar 
In an article in The Independent, the chairman of the West Country 
Farmhouse Cheesemakers Association was quoted as saying that, "Most people don't 
understand what has happened with cheddar…You have this modern style of 
cheddar which is extremely popular and the traditionally made cheddars – two totally 
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different styles and flavours. Even experienced judges are saying you can't judge 
them both as cheddar” (Gerrie 2012). The first attempt to redefine the boundaries of 
Cheddar involved the registration of ‘West Country Farmhouse Cheddar’ as a PDO 
in 1996 and restricts use of the name to cheeses produced in the traditional area of 
origin. There are currently 12 dairies licensed to use the name within the 4 counties 
of Devon, Cornwall, Dorset, and Somerset. This appellation is a good example of a 
GI that is based more on the traditional skills and methods that give the cheeses their 
unique character rather than the qualities derived from the geographical area, which 
is composed of different types of climate and soil. One interviewee admitted that “to 
say…the terroir of the southwest of England gives the cheese its character is a bit 
far-fetched” (Personal interview, September 25, 2013). Instead, what unites them is 
the use of a similar recipe that leaves room for individualizing each dairy’s cheese 
according to a variety of factors such as the choice of starter cultures, rennet, and 
animal feed. This is noticeably different from Parmigiano-Reggiano where all 
aspects of the production process, including ingredients and animal feed, are 
relatively uniform and highly regulated. 
The second attempt was built on a belief that the rules set for West Country 
Farmhouse Cheddar do not go far enough and defines the boundaries of Cheddar 
even further. A Slow Food UK (2014) ‘Artisan Somerset Cheddar’ presidium has 
been set up by three dairies, which are also licensed within the West Country 
designation, to protect the traditional cheese-making process. The difference 
between cheese produced by these dairies and the West Country designation is that 
the majority of the process is performed by hand with the use of raw, unpasteurized 
milk rather than mechanically using pasteurized milk. The production of handmade 
Cheddar is a highly labor-intensive process that involves the daily transformation of 
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milk into cheese. The three dairies use their own fresh milk derived from cows kept 
and fed on grass within their own pastures, therefore allowing them to monitor the 
quality of the cheese from start to finish. The curd is cheddared by hand while being 
adjusted to the daily condition of the milk. The cheeses are then aged for a minimum 
of 11 months and up to 2 years or more in large aging rooms where they are 
regularly turned by hand to ensure consistency. Some hold a view that these 
traditionally-produced Somerset cheeses are the only “proper” or “real” Cheddars 
(The Bath Chronicle 2011; BBC News 2012b; Farmers Weekly 2003; Fletcher 2006; 
Mason 2008; Good Food Channel 2014).  
Discussion surrounding the cheese distinguishes between ‘proper’ versus 
‘improper’ Cheddar, the characteristics of which are illustrated in Table 5.4 (FCL 
2006; Fletcher 2006; Gerrie 2012; West Country Farmhouse Cheese-makers 2014; 
Slow Food UK 2014). The features of ‘properness’ listed here bear remarkably close 
resemblance to the binary of ‘real’ versus ‘fake’ that Parmesan producers use to 
justify the protected status of the name. In particular, the production of ‘proper’ 
Cheddars is also restricted to a particular area and they are produced without 
additives using traditional methods and are aged for a minimum amount of time. On 
the other side, ‘improper’ Cheddars are akin to ‘fake’ Parmesans that are mass-
produced using industrial technologies and additives. But they differ in that rather 
than presenting a straightforward binary divide, debates surrounding Cheddar 
implicate a more complicated view of what constitutes the ‘real’ thing and is 
distinguished between the West Country Farmhouse and Artisan Somerset groups. 
There is no focus on the ‘healthiness’ of the cheese or presumptions of ‘high’ versus 
‘low’ quality, which is left for the consumer to infer from individual marketing. 
There is also a clear lack of securitization of the generic ‘misuse’ of the Cheddar 
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name by folk devils outside the region of origin or a focus on the legitimacy of 
certain producer groups to be able to use it. Though one cheese-maker stated that 
they would “like to say that Cheddar can only be made in Somerset” he recognized 
that the name is un-protectable and that there is debate as to whether or not the 
cheese was even ever made in Cheddar (Phone interview, March 18, 2013). 
Table 5.4: Characteristics of Proper versus Improper Cheddar 
Characteristics Proper Cheddar Improper 
Cheddar 
Type West Country 
Farmhouse PDO 
Artisan Somerset 
Cheddar 
Mass-produced 
Production 
Area 
Devon, Cornwall, 
Dorset, Somerset  
Somerset Any 
Production 
Methods 
Traditional/artisanal/ 
industrial – some 
mechanized and 
some handmade 
Traditional/artisanal 
– handmade 
 
Industrial – 
mechanized 
Milk treatment Pasteurized and 
unpasteurized 
Unpasteurized Pasteurized 
Milk origin Sourced within 
designated regions, 
or from other areas 
of England to meet 
seasonal shortfalls  
Sourced on farm Any source 
Additives No No Yes 
Form Block, rounded and 
rinded 
Rounded and 
rinded 
Block, no rind  
Maturation 
Methods 
Plastic-wrapped or 
cloth-bound 
Cloth-bound Plastic-wrapped 
Maturation 
period 
Minimum 9 months Minimum 11 
months 
No minimum 
2. Local versus global Cheddar 
The third attempt directs a focus on distinguishing between locally versus 
globally-produced Cheddar. The “locality” (Winter 2003) of foodstuffs has assumed 
increasing prominence in developed economies as the sustainability of industrial 
models of food production are called into question, industries come under threat 
from an inflow of cheap imported products spawned by a globalized food system, 
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and consumer concerns over food quality and safety grows. From a producer 
perspective, as dairy industries are further liberalized around the world UK-made 
Cheddars are forced to compete against rising imports. Many non-UK producers and 
supermarkets have exploited a legal ambiguity that allows the cheese to be produced 
outside of Britain and brought into the country to be packaged and labelled with 
‘British’ and ‘UK’ and sold for lower prices. Industry and producer organizations 
argue that this misleads consumers into believing the cheese wholly originated in 
Britain and exacerbates the problems already facing the UK dairy industry that have 
contributed to the demise in the number of dairy farmers in the country (Rajan 2009; 
Craig 2010). These factors have led to a feeling of insecurity similar to the ‘abuse’ of 
the term Parmesan and the socio-economic difficulties facing producers. 
In order to counter such trends, instead of campaigning for the restricted use 
of the name by other producers the Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers 
(RABDF) launched an ‘Honest Dairy Labels’ campaign in 2012 as a means of 
mitigating consumer confusion over the source of dairy products such as Cheddar 
through clearer country-of-origin labelling (RABDF 2012). This suggests that 
producers hope to capitalize on consumer preferences for Cheddar produced within 
its home country, thereby increasing the market share of British-made cheeses. 
Scholars have referred to this as the “country-of-origin effect” whereby consumer 
purchasing considerations are influenced by perceptions – positive or negative – 
associated with the country from which a product originates (Elliott and Cameron 
1994; Al-Sulaiti and Baker 1998; Hingley and Lindgreen 2009).  
The above discussion indicates that the increasing divisions between 
Cheddar-types serves a purpose of differentiation within a market liberal and 
competitive context rather than a terroirist attempt to delegitimize the use of the 
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Cheddar name by non-origin producers, which has been the case with Parmesan. At 
the same time, the lack of gastro-panic discourse is apparent as there has not been an 
outbreak of concern over the use of Cheddar by actors such as cheese-makers in the 
region of origin, hostility towards those who produce it, a consensus that something 
must be done about it, or an attempt to legitimate disproportionate ownership rights. 
Both the West Country and Slow Food groups link the production of their 
Cheddars to a particular territory as well as the historic conditions of production that 
have evolved over time in the region. But whereas Parmigiano-Reggiano is 
characterized by a relatively standardized production process and a well-organized 
and unified producer grouping that strictly defines and defends use of the translated 
name around the world, this is not the case with Cheddar. In fact, there is tension 
within the PDO itself and some from the Artisan group have become disillusioned 
with the West Country PDO, which is said to have “only benefited the largest 
producers in the group, who profited from their cheeses’ association with the 
smaller, more traditional producers protected under the same legislation” 
(Bromberger 2006: 96). This was echoed in an interview I conducted with a cheese-
maker who stated that he is “quite skeptical” of the scheme and has considered 
leaving it because it is “not specific enough. The regulations are drawn too widely 
and encompass everything. This includes pasteurized and block cheddars, modern 
and industrial as well” (Phone interview, March 18, 2013). When I asked him why 
the PDO is defined broadly and how the consortium was formed in the first place he 
remarked: 
“Because if everyone didn’t agree with a specification you’d have companies 
complaining that they couldn’t do it how they wanted and it wouldn’t come together. 
It depends on how specific you want to be and what style you want. It’s [the PDO] 
drawn widely and not useful to small producers who want to be more specific in 
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what they produce. It’s not actually an aid to us because it includes things like 
industrial Cheddar.” 
He continues: 
“It’s not like when you have something like Parmesan and everyone is producing 
one type of cheese in the same way. Unless you want to market together, there is no 
use for it. It [the consortium] started as a co-op who were marketing jointly through a 
government marketing board. But the government closed it because it was 
uncompetitive. Many left the group because it didn’t give them the freedom they 
wanted. Our marketing is much more diverse and varied and we all market under our 
own brand names. We each market separately. It’s not as efficient, but we’re all very 
proud of our own style” (Phone interview, March 18, 2013). 
The cheese-maker’s remarks illustrate a view that the PDO, in a sense, is perceived 
as actually stifling the innovation and ability of individual producers to market their 
cheeses freely according to their own specific practices. This also resulted in many 
producers actually leaving the group and points to the relative lack of collectivity 
within the consortium.   
The overall re-emphasis on the cultural heritage and UK production of 
Cheddar could be considered a conscious response to the standardizing, 
industrializing, and de-localizing effects of globalization. These initiatives seek to 
counteract the homogenization and historic loss of Cheddar’s diversity within global 
cheese systems by protecting traditional skills, production processes, and domestic 
producer interests. The values and meanings attached to ‘proper’ Cheddar are linked 
to particular practices in the form of skills, raw ingredients, and techniques that help 
differentiate them from ‘improper’ mass-produced ones and are an integral part of 
the identity of the traditional cheese. Through the promotion and protection of 
methods and know-how, traditional cheese-makers recapture and add value to 
something perceived to be lost – the unique quality of original Cheddar – and at the 
same time, help to “create, innovate, and accept change” (Bessière 1998: 29) within 
the broader generic Cheddar market. However, while the West Country Farmhouse 
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producers have utilized legal protection mechanisms to distinguish the quality of 
their products through protection of the name, the Slow Food group and other UK 
producers take this one step further outside of this institutionalization. 
5.5.5. Worlds of Cheddar 
 The current differentiation of Cheddar-types within the market context could 
be seen as creating different ‘Worlds of Cheddar’ and is usefully demonstrated using 
Storper’s (1997) “Worlds of Production” model. This model sets out ideal types that 
govern production and consumption structures and are defined by two sets of 
opposing “dimensions” that include whether a product is “standardized or 
specialized” or whether it is “generic or dedicated” (Storper 1997: 109). In the first 
dimension, a standardized product “is made with a known, widely diffused 
production technology in which quality is so widely attainable that competition 
comes to be inevitably centered on price” (Storper 1997: 109). One example could 
be the mass production of Cheddars cited under the ‘improper’ heading in Figure 
5.5. In contrast, specialized products are the result of “technology and know-how 
that are restricted to a community of specialists” that depend on “quality” as their 
main differentiating factor (Storper 1997: 109). It is here that ‘proper’ Cheddars, or 
those produced by the West Country consortium and Slow Food presidium, would 
fall. The higher cost for such cheeses is the result of a highly labor-intensive and 
time-consuming production process that depends on the knowledge of specialists 
versed in the art of traditional Cheddar-making, which fosters the character and 
unique qualities of the cheese. 
With regard to the second dimension, generic products are targeted towards 
“undifferentiated markets” and characterized by “well known” or uniform qualities, 
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offering a sense of predictability that will “appeal to a large number of potential 
buyers at any given moment…” (Storper 1997: 109). This could refer to the 
standardized composition of mass-produced Cheddar that is manufactured using 
pasteurized blended milk from a variety of different sources thereby minimizing 
complex flavors, as well as the use of the name itself which conveys the qualities 
assumed to be inherent to that particular type of cheese. On the contrary, a dedicated 
product may be unpredictable and will have qualities that are adapted to meet a 
specific “demand” from consumers who seek “precision and personality” in their 
products (Storper 1997: 109). Here again it would be possible to place the West 
Country and Slow Food cheeses whose production and maturation processes results 
in more complex and variable flavors. They are characterized by a certain degree of 
unpredictability in that even the cheese-maker cannot be completely sure of the taste 
of the final product as the composition changes seasonally according to 
environmental conditions, the grass the cows ate, and the particular bacteria and 
enzymes present in each batch of milk. One artisan Cheddar producer was quoted in 
an article expressing that, “Cheeses are cunning beasts. They are a living 
environment so there’s always an element of chance” (BBC Countryfile 2010). 
These particular cheeses cater to a consumer niche that values uniqueness and 
dynamic flavors over price. It might also be possible to include here the UK-made 
Cheddars that focus on the positive connotations associated with country-of-origin 
labelling. Simply by being produced in the UK these cheeses might appeal to a 
specific consumer demand for locally-made products, which could be assumed to be 
of better and safer quality than those produced in other countries. 
These dimensions enable me to map out the differentiating trends occurring 
within the broader generic Cheddar market, which are illustrated in Figure 5.1 
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(Model developed by Murdoch, Marsden, and Banks 2000: 120, based on Storper 
1997).Though it is possible to locate a variety of Cheddars within this matrix, it must 
be remembered that these dimensions are ideal-types that serve as references rather 
than rigid divisions. For example, the production of ‘Orkney Scottish Island 
Cheddar’, which received PDO protection in 2013, is not clearly placed. The 
protected name differentiates the cheese by alluding to quality and specificity that is 
legitimized through the EGI system. However, the method of production cited in the 
original PDO application reveals that: 
“The cheese milk is pasteurized and at this stage is also standardized by removing 
cream to maintain a given butterfat to protein ratio with a centrifugal separator. The 
process of standardizing the milk will maintain a consistency in the firmness of the 
body of the cheese, which would otherwise vary over the course of the year” 
(Orkney Cheese Company Limited 2012).  
 
It is evident that Orkney cheese-makers are attempting to reduce the unpredictability 
of composition and flavor, which on the one hand appeals to consumers in search of 
quality assurance, traceability, and the perceived traditional properties embodied 
through the EGI certification and on the other hand offers a predictably uniform taste 
and consistency. 
 
Figure 5.1: Worlds of Cheddar 
With all the attempts to re-localize the image of Cheddar along with the 
inconsistencies in its genericity, the question remains as to whether someday the 
Mass-produced  
industrial Cheddar 
Artisan Somerset Cheddar 
West Country Farmhouse Cheddar 
Orkney Scottish 
Island Cheddar  
UK-made Cheddar 
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name could be recaptured and protected. One EU trade official reiterated to me that 
simply because a name is in use somewhere and not protected does not necessarily 
mean it is generic. He stated that “some people see it in a very sort of simple binary 
way. Either something is a GI or it is generic” (Personal interview, April 9, 2013a). 
And as I have already demonstrated, the picture is more complicated than this 
because genericity is considered to be a separate state-of-being that requires a name 
to be subjected to concrete definition. If a name is not a GI it is more likely that it is 
simply not protected. Consequently, an unprotected name today can become a 
protected GI at any point in the future and “it is not a static thing that you can define 
once and for all” (Personal interview, April 9, 2013a). In the EU it is also easier to 
overcome charges of genericness for GIs than for trademarks in other countries 
around the world (Evans 2010: 17) and “generics don’t always remain generic” 
(Personal interview, April 9, 2013b). The socially constructed nature of genericism 
could therefore leave space for a shift of meaning in the future. Under this logic 
Cheddar could one day become a protected name if producers in the UK successfully 
demonized generic producers outside of the region of origin or were able to educate 
consumers as to the essential link between place of origin and quality. The latter is 
something that has already begun and would mirror what I discussed in the fourth 
course about how some Italian actors are attempting to re-educate consumers in non-
EU countries about the true origin of Parmesan and other GIs, thereby legitimating 
its exclusive protection. It is therefore not inconceivable that such a thing could 
happen to Cheddar.  
However, for the time being it is noticeable that no discursive struggle or 
gastro-panic has arisen surrounding the use of Cheddar. There has been a degree of 
demarcation within the market that sets PDO cheeses, such as West Country 
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Farmhouse Cheddar, apart from their generic counterparts through reconstructing the 
cultural, economic, and political boundaries surrounding their production by 
acquiring GI protection. But this has not been used to persuade an audience that the 
term Cheddar must be protected from the existential threat of generic use. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this course my primary objectives were to demythologize the uncontested 
genericity of Cheddar and question why no gastro-panic has arisen surrounding its 
use. I provided evidence pointing to the widespread agreement that Cheddar has 
succumbed to genericide, its status naturalized as indisputable fact or common sense. 
I also contrasted further cases of contested cheese names that exemplify its 
uncontested status. Then, I called attention to various ambiguities and 
inconsistencies within the EU and internationally through deconstructing Cheddar’s 
genericity as a mythical social construction in order to address the third research 
question that seeks to better understand genericism in the context of GI politics. 
Genericism is highly complicated and its definition, how it is measured, where, and 
in what context is still a matter of debate both within the EU and at the multilateral 
level. It therefore emerges as a dynamic and socially-constructed concept that is a 
constant site of negotiation and contestation rather than a static condition that is 
determined with a confident degree of objective evidence and finality.  
Finally, I addressed the second research question that aims to interrogate why 
a discursive struggle is manifested in the case of Parmesan but not of Cheddar. The 
case of Cheddar differs from that of Parmesan because there is a lack of concern 
over its widespread use and an absence of political mobilization on the part of 
producers and government officials to control it. By expanding on differences in the 
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approach to the two names I was able to isolate 3 key differences in the approach to 
Cheddar that help explain the absence of gastro-panic surrounding its protection: (1) 
a progressive de-localization over time that stemmed in part from the lack of 
historical attempts to protect the name, (2) a differing ideological perspective of 
agricultural normalism that minimizes UK government involvement in protecting 
producer interests, and (3) the producer consortium’s fragmented organization, 
cohesion, and individualistic approaches to the production of the cheese and GI 
protection. In the next course I turn to examining the countering gastro-panic 
processes at play in the international competition over cheese names. 
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Sixth Course 
6. The Folk Devil Strikes Back: Countering Gastro-panic and ‘New 
World’ Defense of Generic Cheese Names 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In recent years, the EU has made attempts to reclaim the use of many widely-
used cheese names through GIs that would prohibit cheese-makers around the world 
from using certain terms that originated in Europe. This situation constitutes a puzzle 
because many of the names they are looking to protect are considered generic, or 
open to public use, in other countries. Parmesan is just one important example, 
which among others includes Feta, Asiago, and Havarti. And according to the Global 
Dairy Alliance (GDA 2003) European-derived names are applied to approximately 
three-fourths of all cheeses produced in the EU, US, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Argentina, and Switzerland. Cheese names are a valuable commercial 
resource for communicating product information, which is part of the reason the 
generic issue has become so important in trade negotiations. Major cheese-producing 
regions particularly from NW countries outside the EU and Switzerland are reluctant 
to give up names they consider to be generic and claims-makers including domestic 
and international dairy associations, lobby groups, cheese-makers, producers, 
manufacturers, governments, and trade officials have launched a global campaign to 
preserve their continued use.  
 In the fourth course I demonstrated how a gastro-panic manifested in the 
discourse of actors from the EU and Italy frames generic producers of Parmesan as 
counterfeiting folk devils who deserve to have their name-use rights revoked due to 
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the deleterious consequences it has for producers and consumers of the original 
cheese. But gastro-panics are not simply one-sided affairs and the current 
coordinated response to European actions indicates that folk devils are fighting back 
(McRobbie 1994). Numerous groups representing the oppositional viewpoint of 
genericism have emerged to defend their right to use generic cheese names in 
commerce, thereby challenging the EU folk devilling process likening their 
production activities to illegal counterfeiting. Countering gastro-panic politics 
inform national and international debates on the future of generic terms and are 
interwoven with demands for agricultural liberalization, market access, and open 
competition in a proposed global free trade regime. 
The purpose of this course is to use cheese as a lens to understand the 
countering processes at play within the contested politics of food name protection. 
More specifically, the issue is presented in depth from the perspective of genericism 
and demonstrates how claims-makers from certain NW countries compete with the 
EU through a countering discursive process of gastro-panic as a strategy to secure 
the open use of terms. I argue that these actors appeal to a food system security 
discourse that counter-securitizes the EU’s actions in order to block the conferral of 
exclusive rights to the use of cheese terms and attempts to institutionalize generic 
exceptions. A global defense of these terms has been mobilized in an attempt to 
restore an existential sense of security during a time of perceived insecurity brought 
about by the European pursuit of claw-back, which occurs within the context of the 
increased industrialization and globalization of cheese production. 
I begin by introducing a brief overview of recent European actions at various 
scales of governance aimed at extending GI protection to certain cheeses. This 
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behavior has been interpreted as a threat to NW dairy interests and sparked a 
countering gastro-panic in defense of generic cheese names that is illustrated in the 
following section, which is characterized by heightened concern over the attempted 
GI protection of these terms, hostility towards the European aggressor, and a 
consensus that something must be done to combat the behavior. I illustrate how 
claims-makers from various NW countries have securitized these efforts as a threat 
projected to have serious consequences for global dairy industries as a means of 
providing a foundation for political action. I then demythologize the gastro-panic 
through discussing the motivations behind this response and addressing the various 
interests at play. 
6.2. Pairing Cheese With Wine 
As was discussed in the second course, issues related to the use of generic 
names first arose in 1994 during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. At this 
time the EU’s attempts to enshrine GI protection at the global level met with 
opposition. The resultant TRIPS agreement reflects a political compromise in the 
negotiating context in which a number of provisions institutionalized disparate levels 
of protection for wines and spirits and other agricultural products. According to one 
NW trade official, the higher protection for wines and spirits was a “compensation” 
(Personal interview, April 9, 2013b) to appease the EU and ensure a balance of 
benefits in other areas of agricultural negotiations. These were agreed upon because 
the TRIPS agreement also included certain exceptions, such as for the continued use 
of generic terms (Dudas 2003). This meant that producers and manufacturers around 
the world could continue to market and sell varieties of GI wines and other products 
that they considered generic within their territory, such as Champagne, Port, and 
Sherry.  
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Since the TRIPS agreement was signed the EU has successfully used bilateral 
trade agreements to recall the use of numerous wine terms previously used 
generically around the world. These terms are now forbidden for use outside the 
European regions of origin. In some cases these agreements were made as a 
compromise to ensure more access to the EU market (Personal interviews, April 9, 
2013b and April 11, 2013). But although it may seem like a straightforward process, 
negotiating the revocation of these terms was highly controversial and viewed with 
disdain (Zahn 2012; Personal interview, May 30, 2013). This is reflected in a 
comment made by the CCFN (n.d., emphasis added) on their website where they 
state, “We have watched as the EC has imposed geographical indication protections 
on one trading partner after another to prevent those countries from using terms such 
as Champagne, which has long been in common usage around the world.” While the 
original agreements did not have an impact on food products such as cheese, over the 
years the EU has taken steps to better protect its agricultural GIs. 
This is problematic from the NW standpoint because the issue of name use is 
approached from the perspective of genericism whereby the meaning of certain 
terms have been fixed as connoting types rather than specific products derived from 
certain areas of Europe. This is the case with both wines and cheeses and in this 
mythological context the meaning is not the result of the sign, or the name itself, but 
by how it has been naturalized by NW actors as taken-for-granted fact. As was 
evident in the case of Parmesan, cheese names have varied meanings in the 
international market that are at the root of the struggle over the ownership of the 
terms themselves. The EU’s actions are seen as an attempt to fix their own ideas 
inherent to the use of cheese names around the world and are therefore interpreted as 
an affront to the NW status quo. In the next sections I discuss the EU’s efforts at 
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three scales of governance – the multilateral, bilateral, and EU levels – that have 
caused considerable insecurity in the global cheese industry. 
6.2.1. Multilateral Level  
First, the EU has consistently requested an extension of greater protection for 
agricultural products in tandem with wines and spirits in the WTO. This would 
constitute a literal pairing of wine and cheese protection that could have a significant 
effect on global cheese industries. Under current protection, non-EU companies are 
able to market cheese products domestically and abroad so long as consumers are not 
being misled as to their place of origin. Under extension WTO Members could only 
continue to market cheeses under EU-protected GI labels within their own markets if 
they fell under the exception for generic terms. But export markets are another story. 
Under current rules, the burden of proof rests on GI-holders in the country of origin 
to challenge the use of their protected names in non-EU markets and prove that 
consumers are being misled as to the true origin of the product. Under extension it 
would no longer be necessary to prove consumer confusion and the burden of proof 
would shift, thereby requiring each state to police its market regardless of whether or 
not consumers are being misled. As well, there would be no assurance that the 
generic exception would be available for exporters in other countries and market 
access could be diminished. The main worry is that “if PDO status receives global 
recognition under the WTO, Europe will control the exclusive rights to the names of 
almost all of the economically important cheeses of the world” (Kindstedt 2012: 
216). 
Furthermore, as mentioned previously the EU made the provocative ‘claw-
back’ request at the multilateral level in 2003 to recapture the use of 13 widely-used 
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cheese names. In this context claw-back is a term with a negative connotation that 
refers to the “re-appropriation” (ADIC et. al. 2010) of names solely for the exclusive 
use of European producers that were previously used generically or incorporated into 
protected trademarks. Many of the terms on the EU’s list have been used outside the 
EU since the 19
th
 century with some varieties being produced in much greater 
quantities. Such an action has therefore been viewed as conferring EU producers 
“monopoly rights over markets built by others” (GDA/NMPF/USDEC 2006) and 
also generated “a great deal of fear and resentment” (Monten 2006: 347).  
6.2.2. Bilateral Level 
Second, as no substantive progress has been made to extend protection at the 
multilateral level the EU has taken to institutionalizing extra protection for 
agricultural products within various bilateral and ‘Stand Alone’ agreements 
(Personal interviews, February 22, 2013, April 11, and April 20, 2013, and April 9, 
2013a). For example, they concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South 
Korea (EUKOR) that went into force in 2011 and was the first bilateral of its kind to 
protect cheese and other agricultural GIs. They have also procured protection for 
cheeses in agreements with Colombia, Peru, Moldova, Singapore, China, and 
Canada [See appendix D for a list of protected names] and are in the process of 
negotiations with other countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, and the US. The 
difficulty with incorporating GIs for food products into these agreements is that it 
has the potential to substantially affect the market access of third parties, calling into 
question whether non-EU dairy companies can continue to market many types of 
cheese in each country.
26
 This approach is also viewed as “circumvent[ing] the 
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 Regarding market access in South Korea, dairy industries in the US expressed concern over the 
continued use of Asiago, Brie, Camembert, Emmental, Feta, Fontina, Gorgonzola, Grana, Mozzarella, 
Parmesan, Provolone, Romano, and Taleggio (Umhoefer 2010; USDEC/NMPF/IDFA 2011). 
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normal processes of IP protection” thereby preventing countries who are not party to 
the agreement from disputing or contesting proposed name registrations (Personal 
interview, April 9, 2013b). 
Additionally, the EU’s bilateral agreements obscure the status of three types 
of cheese names: single terms, compounds, and translations. Single terms include 
names such as Feta, Munster, and Fontina. But many of the names that have been 
protected through trade agreements form compounds such as Provolone Valpadana, 
Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, and West Country Farmhouse Cheddar that contain 
what others view to be generic components; in these cases ‘Provolone’, 
‘Mozzarella’, and ‘Cheddar’ are considered to be generic. As discussed in the fifth 
course, in 2012 the EU issued a statement alluding to the generic nature of certain 
terms (European Commission 2012) but no list of generic names exists in the Union 
itself. Moreover, the EU generally holds that a compound term is protected only in 
its entirety (Personal interview, May 24, 2013a). However, this declaration has been 
complicated by global attempts to protect translations such as Parmesan, which 
forms one part of the compound term Parmigiano-Reggiano. Following this decision, 
in 2010 a number of NW dairy associations (ADIC et. al.) expressed feelings of 
insecurity that “although at this time the EU does not appear to be seeking to lay sole 
claim to the generic names Brie, Camembert, Cheddar, Edam, Gouda and 
Mozzarella, the relatively recent EU court ruling on the extent of protection for 
‘Parmigiano Reggiano’ calls the safety of even these terms into doubt.”  
The establishment of bilateral agreements has contributed to increasing 
complexity in the global arena where the genericity of terms must be established on a 
country-by-country basis. The South Korean Minister for Trade forwarded a letter to 
US trade representatives clarifying that the use of various generic cheese terms 
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would continue to be allowed in South Korea and that compound terms would only 
be protected in their entirety and original languages and would not pose any threat to 
existing trademarks that incorporate such terms (Kim 2011).
27
 Nevertheless, dairy 
industries are unhappy about restrictions placed on the use of single terms such as 
Asiago, Feta, Fontina, and Gorgonzola and many companies have been required to 
“unwillingly” rebrand products long sold in the South Korean market (Email 
interview, May 31, 2013).  
To illustrate the complexity of generic terms further, in the recent 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and 
Canada, Canada agreed to make certain changes to its protection of GIs. For one, it 
granted limited GI rights to single terms including Asiago, Feta, Fontina, 
Gorgonzola, and Munster. Canadian producers will still be able to use these terms, 
however they will here forth be required to be accompanied with a qualifier such as 
“kind”, “type”, “style”, or “imitation,” which will require non-EU imports to be re-
labelled. The translation Parmesan, a term commonly employed in Canada, will have 
no restrictions placed on it. Similarly to South Korea, they also reserved the right to 
continue using components of composite terms such as ‘Gouda’ in “Gouda Holland” 
and ‘Brie’ in “Brie de Meaux” (Government of Canada 2013: 20).  
6.2.3. EU Level 
Third, events within the EU itself have further complicated the status of 
particular terms. In 2005 exclusive rights were granted to Greek producers of Feta 
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 Some compound terms to be protected in EUKOR included Brie de Meaux, Emmental de Savoie, 
Grana Padano, Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, Parmigiano Reggiano, Pecorino Romano, Provolone 
Valpadana but the individual units themselves such as Brie, Emmental, Grana, Mozzarella, 
Parmigiano, Romano, and Provolone would not be. Kim (2011) confirmed that the Korean 
government understood terms such as Camembert, Mozzarella, Brie, and Cheddar to be generic 
cheese types (non-exhaustive) and therefore not subject to protection under the agreement. 
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and in 2008 to Italian producers of Parmesan despite intra-EU contestation and 
assertions of generic status. The EU is also processing applications for two Codex 
names, Danbo and Havarti, which are widely manufactured by non-EU countries. 
The CCFN (2012a, 2012b) states that the former has been internationally 
standardized for 50 years and the latter for 30. Unlike in the fourth course where I 
demonstrated that Codex standards were perceived by the EU to be voluntary and 
non-determinate, non-EU actors consider them to be indicative of generic status 
(Dairy Australia 2013; CCFN n.d.). As a result, such a move is perceived as having 
greater implications in that it “calls into potential question the safety of all other 
international standardized cheeses, which include names as common place as 
mozzarella and cheddar” (CCFN n.d.). The protection of these terms at the EU-level 
is also of particular concern because it enables their protection to be sought in 
international agreements. 
Ultimately, a main issue with the EU system is viewed to be its arbitrariness 
and ambiguity (NMPF 2012; Personal interview, April 9, 2013b). One dairy industry 
representative referred to this as “the ‘plastic’ nature of European claw-back policies, 
that is, the EU does not claim some name today, but it may well do it in a few years’ 
time, nobody knows for sure” (Email interview, July 30, 2013). This is evident in the 
EU’s various trade and association agreements where certain GIs have been 
protected over others, a result of the complicated interplay that characterizes 
European decision-making and involves trade negotiators, the Commission, Member 
States, and producers. Individual EU Member States choose particular terms they 
deem especially important for protection in specific markets so that the European 
Commission may avoid intimidating potential trading partners with a list of 
thousands of terms (O’Connor and Richardson 2012; Saez 2013). But at the same 
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time the EU has not made it immediately evident which names it considers as still 
open for general use (Suber 2013: 6). Dairy Australia (2013: 2) has asserted that, “It 
is becoming increasingly problematic for exporters to be certain that they will have 
continued use of generic or common dairy names” and CCFN Director Jaime 
Castaneda states that, “Unless the system designates a term as generic, we have to 
assume the scope of protection is extremely broad” (CCFN 2012a).  
Table 6.1: CCFN List of Endangered Cheese Names 
Use restricted Use could be restricted 
in future 
Use not currently 
restricted 
asiago brie american 
danbo camembert cacciocavallo/caccio 
feta/fetta canestrato  chevre 
fontina cheddar colby 
gorgonzola edam colonia 
gruyere/gruyerito emmental/emmenthal coulommiers 
mozzarella gouda criollo 
munster/muenster grana fynbo  
parmesan/parmesano/ 
parmesão 
havarti goya 
romano pecorino limburger/limburgo 
 provolone  mascarpone 
 ricotta monterey/monterey jack 
 tilster/tilsit neufchatel 
  saint-paulin 
  samsoe  
  swiss 
  tybo 
The CCFN (CCFN n.d.) has published a non-exhaustive list of widely-used 
generic names displayed in Table 6.1, the continued use of which it considers to be 
endangered both now and in the future by the EU’s efforts. The restriction of use 
categories apply to different markets around the world.
28
 The vagueness and 
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 I include the CCFN’s list because it is the most comprehensive. However, other dairy groups have 
specified concern for certain terms over others and most lists are non-exhaustive. For example, the 
ADIC (et. al. 2010) declared the international use of Asiago, Emmental, Feta, Fontina, Gorgonzola, 
Grana, Gruyere, Manchego, Munster, Neufchatel, Parmesan, Provolone, Ricotta, and Romano to be at 
risk. As well, the Australian dairy industry expressed its particular concern over the use of Feta, 
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uncertainty surrounding the status of terms has fostered a climate of insecurity within 
the international cheese market and resulted in the EU’s behavior at the 
abovementioned three levels being currently securitized as a threat to the continued 
use of generic cheese names around the world, thereby sparking a countering gastro-
panic designed to fix the meaning of these terms as generic in order to secure their 
open use in the global marketplace.   
6.3. The European Aggressors Must Be Stopped  
In recent years, a countering gastro-panic discourse has arisen surrounding 
European efforts to globally reclaim the exclusive use of particular cheese names 
through GIs that others around the world consider to be generic. This may be 
evidenced through heightened concern emanating from various claims-makers 
including domestic and international dairy associations, lobbyists, cheese-makers, 
producers, manufacturers, governments, trade officials, and the media (Dudas 2003; 
Ridder 2003; Tundel 2003; House Committee on Agriculture 2004, 2004; Embassy 
Wellington 2005; The New Zealand Herald 2005; Wilson 2008; Beary 2012; Suber 
2013: 6; CCFN n.d.) over EU efforts to limit the use of common cheese terms like 
Parmesan. For many NW producers and companies, countless widely-used cheese 
terms have become normalized as generic and thus their use outside the original 
region of origin is legitimate. Consequently, European attempts to recapture their 
exclusive use solely for producers within the region of origin are considered to be 
monopolization, claw-back, and trade protectionism. NW claims-makers counter-
securitize the EU’s actions as a threat projected to have serious political, economic, 
and social consequences and profess to represent and promote the needs, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Camembert, Brie, Emmental, Provolone, Mozzarella, Grana, Pecorino, Romano, and Parmesan in 
Singapore (Dairy Australia 2013: 3). 
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preferences, and/or interests of producers and consumers in an attempt to influence 
global policy through the institutionalization of generic exceptions around the world. 
6.3.1. Concern 
The appearance of a countering gastro-panic is indicated by concern 
exhibited through the securitization of behavior, in this case European efforts to claw 
back generic terms, deemed to be threatening or violating the status quo. A security 
issue has arisen as the use of cheese terms, which is a referent object perceived to be 
endangered and in need of protection, is demonstrated to be at risk from the 
existential threat of protectionism. According to one US official, in 1995 when the 
TRIPS agreement was signed dairy industries were not troubled about GIs because 
the regulations only affected wines and spirits (Personal interview, April 10, 2013). 
But as European protection attempts have “increased in the last 15 years” (Email 
interview, July 30, 2013) dairy industries around the world have become 
increasingly concerned that restrictions already enforced on wine in TRIPS and 
various bilateral trade agreements would be extended to other foods such as cheese. 
There was worry that if the EU were to be successful in achieving its aims that others 
around the world would be forced to abandon the use of generic cheese names long 
employed in export markets and even domestically (Houston 2003; Wilson 2008; 
Email interview, July 30, 2013), which would effectively “throw the dairy industry 
into turmoil” (Prairie Farmer 2005). One US company’s alarm over the EU’s actions 
is reflected in language surrounding the 2003 ‘claw-back’ proposal: 
“Kraft is very concerned that it would be prohibited from using terms that are 
integral to the identity of brands we have been building for decades…We regard the 
threat to our businesses, and to those of other U.S. and other non-EU food processors 
and producers, as real, substantial, and immediate” (House Committee on 
Agriculture 2003). 
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Kraft, it should be noted, produces a significant amount of grated Parmesan cheese 
along with other products. This statement brings the perceived threat into objective 
existence by indicating its ‘realness’ while also stressing its seriousness, scale, and 
urgency.  
Gastro-panic involves the perceived and expressed anxiety over a wide range 
of elements within the contemporary food system, how this concern is manifested in 
political and public discourse, and the concrete effects it has. In this case, the main 
referent objects – the cheese names – are perceived to be under threat of exclusive 
GI protection where they are restricted to producers within the designated region of 
origin. The actions of the EU compromise the safety of these terms and seriously 
threaten the continued right and ability to market cheeses using generic terms in 
domestic and international markets. But threats to cheese names are also seen as 
having important economic, social, and political implications for those who produce 
and consume them and these generic terms act as an umbrella encompassing a 
number of secondary objects within the food system feared to be threatened by 
European efforts. In prohibiting their use, the EU’s actions purportedly present a 
danger to milk producers and processors, manufacturers, retailers, restaurateurs, 
trademark owners, and consumers in both developed and developing countries 
(House Committee on Agriculture 2003; Dudas 2003; Australian National University 
2004; GDA , 2003, 2005; Embassy Wellington 2005; Carper 2013). They also 
threaten cheese exports, commerce, and market share (Brink 2007: 5; 
USDEC/NMPF/IDFA 2011; Morris 2011: 2; Hagstrom 2012; NMPF 2012; CCFN 
n.d.).  
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In addition, European actions are considered as representing an affront to pre-
established intellectual property institutions, national sovereignty, and territoriality 
(Dudas 2003; GDA 2005). The CCFN (2013a) states: 
“The EU’s actions…are a direct threat to a country’s ability to make its own 
determinations about which terms warrant protection in its market based on a variety 
of factors, including existing local production and prior commitments to other 
trading partners. This has particularly harmful impacts on developing countries.” 
Under the TRIPS agreement the principle of territoriality ensures the respect of 
particularistic national laws and regulations to determine the genericity of a term. 
Thus, it is up to national jurisdictions in individual countries to use evidence in order 
to decide whether a name is generic or not within their borders. But a successful EU 
proposal within the WTO “would supersede national rules” (House Committee on 
Agriculture 2003) and interfere with this right.  
Actors opposed to the EU system have long argued that the TRIPS agreement 
negotiated in 1994 along with domestic trademark systems are more than sufficient 
to protect GIs (GDA/NMPF/USDEC 2006) and that an extension would “only 
impose new obligations on WTO members” (USDEC n.d.). The EU is thus 
perceived to be forcing its system on others merely as a means of providing 
“exclusivity over generic terms” (ADIC et. al. 2010), something that is inconceivable 
under a trademark system where generic terms may never become protected. Fear 
stems from the fact that not only would cheese-makers and companies have to give 
up the use of generic terms “in exchange for nothing” but would be forced to adopt 
the EU’s regulatory approach under a new sui generis regime that would 
“substantially restructure the standards for protecting intellectual property rights” 
through GIs (Dudas 2003). These new rules and regulations constitute a “direct 
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threat to trademarks and brands…essential to the future growth of the food industry” 
around the world (House Committee on Agriculture 2004: 322).  
As progress at the multilateral level has stagnated, worries have extended to 
the EU’s bilateral approach. EUKOR was a tipping point, providing the spark that 
most recently ignited global dairy industry concerns and fired them into action. One 
US official informed me that dairy industries initially “woke up” to the danger to its 
interests because of this agreement (Personal interview, April 10, 2013) and the issue 
has since “been elevated in importance” (Email interview, May 31, 2013). EUKOR 
was considered to be the first sign that the EU had changed tactics by enshrining GIs 
into bilateral FTA’s in order to claw back terms for their exclusive commercial use. 
It was perceived as setting a “dangerous precedent” (Umhoefer 2010) that could be 
replicated in future FTA’s with an aim “to erode the use of common cheese names in 
wide-spread usage throughout the world” (ADIC et. al. 2010). Limitations set by this 
agreement were declared to be erecting a new “form of non-tariff barrier” (Suber 
2013: 6) that would “be very damaging to future commerce” (NMPF 2012). 
Members of the US Congressional Dairy Farmers Caucus (2010) expressed their 
consternation surrounding this agreement in a letter: 
“we write to share our concerns with the European Union’s (EU) aggressive 
escalation of its efforts to secure unfair market advantage through the misuse of 
Geographical Indicators (GI). We are particularly concerned with the EU’s current 
efforts with regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) it has negotiated with South 
Korea.” 
They continued: 
“Specifically, we are very concerned that the impending regulations of the EU-South 
Korea FTA will contain GI provisions that will greatly diminish, if not foreclose, the 
market opportunities available to many U.S. cheeses and other agricultural 
products.” 
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The threatening actions of the EU are seen to be intensifying as well as actively 
harming the position of others through the use of deceptive or wrongful practices 
with respect to their ability to compete on equal and fair terms. In this instance, they 
point to a disproportionality or the asymmetric conferral of privileges to some over 
others would arise where an EU gain would result in losses for others within the 
South Korean market. 
If South Korea was seen as setting a precedent, subsequent and ongoing 
bilateral negotiations are considered to be proof that the European “threat is very real 
and obviously escalating” (Castaneda 2014) and has led to an increase in the 
language of heightened concern. Dairy Australia (2013: 1) sent a letter to Singapore 
disputing the inclusion of cheese GIs in their recent trade agreement with the EU, 
afraid that it might “jeopardise and compromise” their “long standing trading 
relationship.” Furthermore, the EU only just entered into bilateral Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks with the US. The EU and US are the 
world’s largest cheese producers and exporters and have long conflicted over the GI 
issue within the WTO. One of Europe’s main goals in talks with the US is centered 
on the enforcement of GIs and has the potential to affect the use of cheese names 
within the country. The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF 2012) has stated 
that “the U.S. cheese sector faces a very real threat if negotiators write any GI 
restrictions into a resulting agreement.”  
6.3.2. Serious Consequences 
Gastro-panic is also indicated through the presence of disaster analogies that 
elicit fatalistic prophecies of doom, which are imaginative allusions as to what might 
ensue as a result of the securitized behavior. This language takes form through 
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predictions indicating the likelihood that the improper behavior will reoccur, become 
worse or spread like a virus through society and has the effect of highlighting its 
urgency and legitimating actions taken to control it. NW claims-makers in the 
generic debate have attempted to call more attention to the seriousness of the EU’s 
actions and legitimate measures to contest them through emphasizing the negative 
consequences, such as exorbitant costs, that could ensue if not controlled. The CCFN 
(2013c, emphasis added) indicates the uncertain and uncontrollable nature of the 
problem, “The EC’s intransigence on the issue of protected names has already 
affected trade in dozens of countries, and there’s no end in sight.” The EU is alleged 
to have a wide and hidden agenda to which trade agreements and proposals such as 
claw-back are only the start of worse to come. Other actors anticipate the extent of 
the EU’s ambitions as, “No one knows how far it will go” (Personal interview, April 
10, 2013). The EU may have listed only a select few names to be protected now but 
the future remains insecure and the possibilities are limitless, leaving all possible 
food terms at risk. Jaime Castaneda (2013a) states that, “Geographical Indication 
(GI) provisions in Europe and within the EU-South Korea FTA are a mere example 
of the intentions and the extent that the EU is prepared to go in the international 
arena” and names restricted by EUKOR “could be just the tip of the iceberg” (CCFN 
n.d.). As well, Shawna Morris (2011: 2), a representative of the US Dairy Export 
Council (USDEC), warns that: 
“The even more dangerous question about the EU’s GI push is where it will end. If 
the EU were willing to take on major manufacturers in its own backyard, such as 
German and Danish parmesan makers, who is to say that 10 years from now it won’t 
go after provolone or mozzarella globally? Or aggressively try to prevent us from 
even using such names in the United States once it establishes a strong precedent in 
many other countries?”  
Words such as ‘dangerous’ suggests the likelihood that the EU’s behavior will cause 
serious harm while ‘aggressively’ points to an interpretation of their behavior as 
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forceful. The dominance of GIs is perceived as having gotten so out of control that 
even Member State countries within the EU cannot stop it, suggesting that the 
system has become a mercilessly destructive and unstoppable “juggernaut” (The 
New Zealand Herald 2002). The security of terms is questioned by Suber (2013: 6) 
who declares that, “Even terms for which there is an internationally recognized 
Codex standard such as cheddar or mozzarella are not safe at this stage…” and a 
letter written by the Congressional Dairy Farmers Caucus (2010) of the US 
proclaims that, “It is not inconceivable that the EU may ultimately decide to also 
seek sole use rights for common cheese descriptors such as cream or cottage cheese.” 
They could even threaten “widely used terms for common production processes or 
descriptive use, such as ‘aged’, ‘vintage’, or ‘washed rind’” (GDA 2005). Thus, 
some are left wondering, “Where does the effort end? Are brie, camembert, edam, 
gouda, provolone and even cheddar and mozzarella next?” (Castaneda 2013a). 
And they also make it clear that the threat is not confined to the category of 
cheese as “the fight over cheese is just the beginning” (Tundel 2003) and “Some 
U.S. officials suspect the EU has an even more sweeping agenda” (Cox 2008). The 
EU’s out-of-control efforts could conceivably lead to a domino effect of restrictions 
in other product categories and affect the use of any former place-based names, for 
example prohibiting the use of ‘pizza’ outside of Italy (Geist 2010) and reserving 
‘hamburgers and frankfurters’ for Germany. According to one article, “Left 
unchecked, the EU’s push could also come to cover an almost infinite array of 
manufactured goods, such as Capri pants, Bermuda shorts, cuckoo clocks or Panama 
hats” (The Editors 2013). Eventually however, the message is clear – that something 
must be done because, “Evidence is mounting that inaction would only cause GI 
restrictions to worsen with time” (Castaneda 2013a).  
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While there is considerable uncertainty and speculation over the possible 
extent of the EU’s actions, there is stated certainty that success on the part of the EU 
would have serious consequences for dairy industries around the world. The Global 
Dairy Alliance (GDA 2003) emphasizes that the EU’s activity “is very likely to 
significantly damage milk producers, milk processors and consumers around the 
world including in developing countries” who would have to devote huge sums to 
relabeling, repackaging, remarketing, and re-educating consumers (Australian 
National University 2004; Cox 2003; Said 2003; Eagles 2003; Brink 2007: 5). In 
doing so, they risk alienating consumers who can no longer find the products they 
are looking for, resulting in even greater financial losses (Tundel 2003). Companies 
both big and small would be affected (Tundel 2003) and some might “go broke 
because of it” (Personal interview, April 10, 2013). The CCFN (n.d.) states: 
“Many of these products are made in significant volumes around the world, so 
between the prospect of re-labeling, plus the loss in sales when consumers don’t 
recognize their favorite foods, the price tag for such changes could easily reach 
billions of dollars worldwide. In the United States alone, the U.S. Dairy Export 
Council has estimated that the top cheeses that could be impacted represent at least 
14% of U.S. cheese production, valued at $4.2 billion a year.” 
Restrictions on the use of cheese names would have serious implications for 
exporters who rely on recognizable names by impairing their competitiveness in 
established and emerging foreign markets, resulting in “potentially huge economic 
losses” (Email interview, July 30, 2013). One New Zealand company warned that 
half of their revenue could be impacted if the EU restricts the use of cheese names 
and that, “Such a move would require re-branding half of New Zealand’s cheese 
exports, and leave it permanently handicapped in export markets” (The New Zealand 
Herald 2005). Costs would also be borne by consumers faced with higher-priced 
European cheeses, increased search costs, and reduced choice (Said 2003; Christian 
Science Monitor 2003; Castaneda 2013a) as popular products vanished from 
239 
 
supermarkets. Finally, regulatory costs would be imposed on governments saddled 
with the extra task of enforcement within their borders (Said 2003; Embassy 
Wellington 2005). 
In the long run, actors declare that not taking action to counter the European 
threat could result in eroded and damaged sales, disadvantaged producers, and 
confused consumers. This would be “disastrous for the U.S. and the global cheese 
industry…U.S. cheese suppliers would see the promise of emerging markets shrink 
considerably and could even face business upheaval here at home” (Castaneda 
2013a) and in Australia not taking action would “bring a short-term political cost. 
But the long-term cost will be borne by a diminished Australian dairy industry” 
(Wilson 2008). As well, the GDA (2005) emphasizes that their members have been 
producing and trading generic cheeses for over 100 years and that many of their 
members are developing countries, so “Restriction of their ability to produce and sell 
those cheeses, through enhanced GI protection for dairy products, carries potentially 
significant cost to their economies” (GDA 2005). 
6.3.3. A War on Claw-Back 
“In the past several years, use of many common food names has come under greater 
attack, particularly by European producers of these products” (Suber 2013: 6). 
In addition to prophecies of doom, a reoccurring rhetorical theme evident in 
the gastro-panic discourse presents the clash over generics through a language of 
war. The international dispute over GIs has been conceptualized by one scholar as a 
“War on Terroir” (Josling 2006). However, current events may more suitably be 
characterized as a “War on Claw-back” because the most recent tension is targeted 
specifically at the issue of generic use rather than GIs as a whole. Some of my 
respondents as well as the CCFN, for example, emphasized that they do not take 
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issue with GI protection as a whole but only when it threatens the use of common 
names (Personal interview, April 9, 2013b; April 10, 2013; Email Interview, May 
31, 2013; CCFN n.d.). The generic issue has an emotive angle that has attracted 
media and public attention and the dispute is often likened to a high-stakes ‘battle’ 
(Chase 2003; Cox 2003; Quaife 2013; NMPF 2012; Barber 2014; 9NEWS 2014; 
CBS NEWS 2014) or international ‘food fight’ (Financial Times 2002; Tundel 2003; 
Said 2003; Cox 2003; Morris 2011: 2; Katz 2014) and the latest media articles 
covering transatlantic negotiations between the EU and US furthers this image with 
articles characterizing the debate as a “cheese war” (Bella 2014; Westcott 2014; 
Kass 2014) or a “War on American Cheese” (Sanburn 2014).  
Clearly lacking the physical attributes of war, this dispute is rather a “war of 
words” (Beary 2012) – a verbal battle revealed in the structure of the discourse that 
has material implications for the use of food names. It contributes to enhancing the 
political salience of the issue through invoking a security language and also leads to 
the appearance of a division between the normal ‘us’ and deviant ‘them’ as claims-
makers portray those allegedly responsible for the behavior, known as the folk 
devils, in a negative light. In a battle, opposing sides fight to win and meet a specific 
aim, which in this case involves the attainment a cherished object in common – the 
secure right to the use of particular cheese names in commerce. But this is a form of 
security that is desired disproportionately by the opposing sides. And as was 
discussed in the third course, security always results in winners and losers. Thus, in 
order to not become the loser NW claims-makers contend that the EU folk devil 
must be stopped.  
In communicating the gastro-panic through a language of war, a perceived 
political-economic problem – that of European efforts to restrict the use of generic 
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cheese names – is securitized as a serious threat that nurtures a view of the attacking 
folk devil versus the defending folk angel and has important implications. The war 
metaphor provides an interpretative framework through which NW actors convey 
their own perspectives and evaluations of the current situation. This reflects and at 
the same time reinforces a particular way of understanding the actions and policies 
related to the protection of food names in terms of a breach of security. Actors 
invoke security by drawing attention to the threatening EU enemy perceived to 
endanger the use of cheese terms in order to raise the issue on the decision-making 
agenda and legitimate new policies that could potentially block unwanted GI 
protection. 
Another crucial indicator of gastro-panic discourse is the manifestation of 
hostility directed towards those responsible for the perceived objectionable behavior. 
From the NW perspective within the generic debate, this is elaborated through the 
war metaphor where unfavorable pictures are painted of the EU and its producers 
who take form as a threatening enemy or folk devil. In the gastro-panic it is not only 
important that actors are concerned with the actions of the EU but with how these 
actions are negatively described through the use of adjectives and other forms of 
description. The most common descriptor refers to European behavior in its attempts 
to restrict the use of generic terms and expand its GI protection system as 
‘aggressive’ (Suber 2012; NMPF 2012; Hough 2013; Congressional Dairy Farmers 
Caucus 2010; CCFN 2012a; Personal interview, April 9, 2013; Email interview, 
May 31, 2013). The EU is seen as using ‘force’ to pressure countries and their 
cheese-makers into abandoning the use of generic names and adopting its regulatory 
approach (Australian National University 2004; Carper 2013; CCFN 2013a; Email 
interview, May 31, 2013). It pursues these aims through the WTO and the insertion 
242 
 
of GI protection and claw-back into various free trade agreements intended to 
increase and impose dominance in the area of food name protection and block others 
from selling these products in important export markets. The behavior of the 
European aggressors is also described as ‘demanding’ (Tundel 2003; 
GDA/NMPF/USDEC 2006), ‘pushy’ (Sutton 2004; GDA 2005), ‘imposing’ (GDA 
2005; The Editors 2013), ‘reckless’ (Castaneda 2013a), ‘fanatic’ (CCFN 2013c), 
‘bullying’ (Carper 2013; CCFN 2013c), ‘abusive’ (Castaneda 2013b: 4), and even 
‘extortionate’ (CCFN 2013a), implying that the EU is illegally using its power and 
negotiating position to coercively obtain the exclusive use of food terms.  
Claims-makers also highlight the EU’s tactfulness by indicating that the war 
on cheese names was premeditated and strategically calculated. Over time, cunning 
European producers purposely allowed names to become popularized throughout the 
world to the point of losing their link to the place of origin in many countries, and 
then conveniently demanded them back (Eagles 2003). As such, it is “no 
coincidence” that they now demand the most valuable and extensively-used cheese 
names (GDA 2005). Additionally, they suggest that the EU became disgruntled and 
jealous of increased and often better quality competition that arose through the 
popularization of these names. Faced with pressures to further liberalize its dairy 
industry, they responded by implementing new protectionist measures through GIs 
(Morris 2011: 1) and continue to pursue this agenda strategically by “mounting an 
offensive” (Quaife 2013) on multiple international “fronts” (Sutton 2004; Quaife 
2013) in order to “enlist the support of other countries” (Cox 2003) to become allies. 
Castaneda (2014) states that, “Each victory appears to embolden the leaders to a 
point where they are steadily expanding their crusade to an ever-wider list of cheese 
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names and ever-broader geography.” Here the Europeans are seen as using 
enterprise to publicize and spread their vigorous campaign indefinitely.  
And within this strategy the EU’s motives are declared to be clear. One 
informant stated that, “Obviously, the EU is pursuing this initiative trying to improve 
the competitiveness of its dairy sector, by restricting the use of common names only 
to EU producers, and thus increasing their incomes in comparison with a situation in 
which those names were open to everybody…” (Email interview, July 30, 2013). It 
is no secret that the EU has made competitiveness in its agricultural industries, 
especially regarding value-added food items, a priority. But there is resentment as 
they are perceived as imposing an undesirable agenda on others purely for their own 
benefit. The GDA (2003) cites the EU’s moves as: 
“an attempt to privilege particular producer groups at the expense of all other 
producers and consumers – and to privilege the EU at the expense of the rest of the 
world. Given the history of the development of the cheese industry, the 
overwhelming majority of cheese names happen to be European. Conferring special 
value on certain of these names through regulation would benefit European 
manufacturers only.” 
The notion of ‘privilege’ emerges as the GDA again draws attention to the 
disproportionality of the EU’s actions whereby an imbalance between rights and 
benefits granted to EU producer groups occurs relative to their revocation from non-
EU groups. This is further underlined by others who see the EU’s efforts as 
disadvantaging non-EU producers (Hagstrom 2012) while affording EU producers 
“an illegal and undeserved advantage” (Castaneda 2014) that shields them from free 
market forces. This aspect sets the countering gastro-panic apart from the initial 
gastro-panic discussed in the fourth course because claims-makers do not necessarily 
seek to gain extra rights. Rather, by highlighting this inequity actors delegitimize the 
EU’s behavior in order to block or reverse the conferral of exclusive rights to 
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European producers and essentially ‘undo’ the disproportionality. Finally, the 
Europeans appear as heartless and uncaring, indifferent to the damaging 
consequences that revocation would have on other producers and consumers around 
the world (Tundel 2003; Cox 2003; CCFN 2013a).  
The war metaphor transforms the European folk angel discussed in the fourth 
course from legitimate right-holders into adversarial aggressive and conniving 
strategists bent on privileging their own producers and consumers at the expense of 
the rest of the world and recasts an abstract threat as a folk devil, thereby rallying the 
opposing side in solidarity. The response of NW actors is also pervaded by warlike 
metaphors that portray their motives not as intended for revenge or gain but in order 
to protect and defend the use of generic cheese names from a European ‘attack’ 
(Suber 2013: 6; Castaneda 2014). Defensive calls to ‘counter-attack’ (Eagles 2003) 
and ‘fight’ (Chase 2003; Eagles 2003; Wilson 2008; NMPF 2012; Astley 2013) the 
European threat is evident. A representative of the CCFN emphasizes their 
disadvantaged position as the underdogs as they are “currently bringing a 
switchblade to a blazing gun fight” but are formulating a plan “to upgrade our 
weapons in this global battle to defend our most important generic cheese names” 
(Morris 2011: 2). US groups have been particularly vocal in mobilizing and 
recruiting allies and rallying in defense of common names as to ‘surrender’ 
(Financial Times 2002) is not an option. Dairy groups advised a collective effort to 
‘combat’ (ADIC et. al. 2010; State of Wisconsin 2014) the EU’s growing ‘offensive’ 
(ADIC et. al. 2010; Hagstrom 2012), which it seeks through aggressive protection of 
its GIs to occupy generic terms and achieve its strategic goal of global domination in 
the area of food name protection. 
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6.3.4. Humanizing the Folk Devil 
While the initial gastro-panic language deployed in European discourse acted 
to demonize the generic-producing folk devil, countering gastro-panic discourse 
indicates attempts by actors to reverse this imagery by rallying in their defense as a 
means of humanizing them. This functions to simultaneously create a clear boundary 
marker between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and draws on deeply rooted cultural representations 
through which actors are able to represent their position and beliefs almost as a 
heroic task. Likewise, they are able to demonize the Europeans as the folk devil and 
depict unfavorable policy pursuits as improper behavior. The folk devil’s actions are 
demonized to such an extent that the prevention of exclusive protection appears 
acceptable and warranted. 
Rather than being malicious counterfeiters, innocent producers and 
manufacturers are transformed into ‘victims’ (CCFN 2013c) and folk angels whose 
legitimate rights are being stifled by the European aggressor. Actors humanize the 
faceless counterfeiting folk devil by highlighting cases of victims whose businesses 
could be jeopardized by EU efforts, such as factory owners and small producers 
whose immigrant families started their businesses years before (Tundel 2003). A 
means of responding to the image of folk devils as large and industrial-scale 
productions is by accentuating the many small and medium-sized farms and firms 
from developed and developing countries that use generic terms for their quality 
products (Schumer and Toomey 2014; CCFN 2013d). Rather than seeking to 
capitalize on or erode the reputation of European cheeses, these innocent cheese-
makers are portrayed as simply trying to do what they have always done in 
contributing fairly to the wide selection of cheeses from around the world (Suber 
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2013: 7). This image is also fostered on the CCFN website where such producers and 
manufacturers are characterized as “Un-common Heroes” (CCFN n.d.).  
Following from this, actors emphasize that these names were legitimately 
acquired through a historical immigrant heritage whereby culinary traditions, 
processes, and names arrived in NW countries and subsequently became generic and 
indicative of product characteristics through years of use “in good faith” (Hough 
2013). The GDA (2005) states: 
“It is a fact of history that virtually all non-EU cheese-producing countries in the 
world were once colonies or part of EU Member States. Colonists carried traditional 
cheese-making methods and names with them to their new homes. In some cases 
(such as cheddar in British Commonwealth countries) use of the EU name was even 
obligatory under local law.” 
They point out that it was these immigrant cheese-makers, not their European 
forebears, that invested significant resources and contributed substantially to the 
domestic and global popularization of many names, a success that could not have 
been achieved by GI right-holders alone (Ridder 2003; Said 2003; House Committee 
on Agriculture 2004: 147-48; NMPF 2012; Suber 2013: 6; Personal interview, April 
10, 2013; Jalonick 2014; CCFN n.d.). 
In addition, actors shatter the binary opposition between high and low 
quality, the latter of which characterized European perspectives of generic-produced 
cheeses. One dairy representative stated that this assertion “is based on the flawed 
belief that the EU product is – by the mere fact that it has a PGI or PDO – superior” 
(Email interview, May 31, 2013). Local and artisanal cheeses have been growing in 
popularity and actors defend the quality of their cheeses, citing for example the 
numerous non-EU cheeses that have won awards in international competitions that 
serve as proof that quality cheeses are produced that meet and even exceed European 
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versions regardless of where their production is based. This success is not the result 
of a place of origin but “the expertise and dedication to quality of the company 
producing the product” (Castaneda 2013b: 4) and the “pride” taken by cheese-
makers in their products (CCFN n.d.). They also evoke the competitive and 
confident spirit, suggesting that the “effort by certain European GI-holders to block 
competition suggests that in fact they lack confidence in the quality of their products. 
In contrast, U.S. companies, as well as others around the world, are willing and eager 
to go toe to toe with European producers” (Castaneda 2013b: 4). 
Since NW actors view their use of generic terms to be legitimate, this issue is 
ultimately one of fairness (Dudas 2003; GDA 2005) and interestingly was also an 
argument made by the EU with regard to its protection of GIs. The CCFN (n.d.) 
states that the preservation of generic names “is not just a question of dollars and 
cents, but of fairness and choice” for producers and consumers. And in an email 
interview with a dairy representative, he stated that it “is a question for dairy 
producers unable to use the same names we brought from Europe more than 100 
years ago…Just think from our perspective. We have been using those names…and 
then, one year, the Europeans who remained in Europe decide we no longer can use 
those names. A little unfair, isn’t it?” (Email interview, July 30, 2013). The language 
of fairness adds a normative angle to the gastro-panic and serves the purpose of 
enhancing the political influence of actors. The binary opposition of fair versus 
unfair is presented as a means of again calling attention to and discrediting the 
disproportionality of the EU’s attempts. Here the revocation of rights for a small 
number of European producers epitomizes unfairness and actors advocate for a fair 
model that respects both GIs and common names. The EU, on the other hand, uses 
the fairness argument to justify its asymmetric conferral of rights to certain 
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producers, stating that the issue is “not about protectionism. It is about fairness” 
(European Commission 2003) to ensure that ‘real’ products are not driven out of 
markets by generic fakes, that legitimate producers are duly compensated, and that 
consumers are not misled. 
The language of fairness is often used in international trade politics and acts 
to influence and shape negotiations and political-economic outcomes (Davidson, 
Matusz, and Nelson 2006; Kapstein 2006). According to the “Moderate Westphalian 
View” of fairness in trade, each state should be able to “determine the social costs of 
production” under the condition that they do “not harm other countries” or infringe 
on any “negative rights” (Risse 2006: 25). But notions of fairness depend on 
competing economic interests and differ within and between states, being further 
complicated by the transnational nature of trade. On the one hand, NW claims-
makers hold a view that producers and manufacturers possess a negative right to 
market cheeses using inherited generic terms in commerce and consumers to be 
offered a wide range of low-priced and easily distinguishable cheeses, whereby the 
EU is required to refrain from restricting the use of generic terms. On the other hand, 
this conflicts with the negative right of EU producers and manufacturers to have 
their private GI rights respected in commerce and consumers to purchase counterfeit-
free products, whereby NW actors would be obliged to withhold from marketing 
imitation cheeses using protected GI terms. Both sides consider the actions of the 
other – EU attempts to limit the use of cheese terms and NW attempts to continue 
marketing illegitimate copies – to be in violation of these rights and perceive 
themselves to be losing out, giving rise to claims of fairness to suspend or restrict the 
others’ rights in trade and for governments to intervene through international 
negotiations.  
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6.3.5. Consensus 
“A global response to a global threat” (Castaneda 2013a). 
Consensus is an integral criterion of gastro-panic in that it indicates an 
agreement by claims-makers that a threat is real, serious, and caused by the behavior 
of a folk devil and that something must be done to control it. Here, the securitization 
of the EU’s actions as a threat projected to have serious consequences invigorates a 
sense of urgency that has generated a social and political consensus that something 
must be done about it. This is revealed through evidence of collective action, 
campaigns, and statements made by various actors that call attention to the 
deleterious consequences of the EU’s behavior and the move to protect generic terms 
and the necessity for a change in international policies to do so. For example, 
American dairy groups (USDEC, NMPF, and IDFA 2011) have expressed their 
commitment to “tackle” the “threat head-on…” and as it has crystallized over the 
years a number of NW governments and dairy interests have spoken out and joined 
forces against bids to extend GI protection to generic names (Chase 2003; Houston 
2003; GDA 2003; House Committee on Agriculture 2003; Sutton 2004; Prairie 
Farmer 2005; Embassy Wellington 2005; Wilson 2008; ADIC et. al. 2010; 
USDEC/NMPF/IDFA 2011; Carper 2013; IDFA 2013; CCFN 2013c; USDEC n.d.). 
The consensus was made even clearer through the establishment of the US-based 
CCFN in 2012. A representative of the CCFN declares: 
“The breadth of the problem and the resources allocated by the 27-member bloc 
demands a comprehensive, coordinated global response. To meet the challenge, U.S. 
Dairy Export Council pulled together an international coalition of concerned 
companies and organizations, including dairy companies and associations from 
Canada, Argentina and Central America, as well as U.S. companies and 
organizations such as National Milk Producers Federation and International Dairy 
Foods Association, to form the Consortium for Common Food Names, an 
independent international group focused on countering the GI threat” (Castaneda 
2013a). 
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Their task is to raise awareness of the “far-ranging negative repercussions on the 
international cheese business unless it is strongly contested” (Castaneda 2013a). 
While the CCFN also focuses on a small number of non-dairy product names, the 
overwhelming dominance of cheese names on its “Names at Risk” list signals the 
vital importance of this issue for the dairy sector.  
Similarly to the EU’s pursuit of support for its GIs in order to counter the 
generic threat, NW actors form alliances and gather support through enterprise to 
encourage interested parties to unite and take action against the EU. Morris (2011: 2) 
declares that, “We face a big and growing challenge – one that will require the entire 
industry to raise its collective voice to defend both our domestic and export market 
shares.” The lobbying effort at the political level in the US has been successful in 
making members of the US government aware of the issue and urging them to take 
action. This is evident in recent letters signed by 55 US Senators (Schumer and 
Toomey 2014) and 117 Congressmen (Congress of the United States 2014) as well 
as a resolution passed by the largest cheese-producing state in the US, Wisconsin 
(State of Wisconsin 2014), that were published urging government officials to take 
action against the EU’s efforts to harm cheese exports and restrict competition 
through protectionist FTA’s.  
Actors involved in the consensus not only seek out allies but also take part in 
“a battle between cultural representations” (Cohen 2002: xxxiii) that characterizes 
the opposing gastro-panics. Competing actors make claims and counter-claims in an 
attempt to establish dominance over the other through a “discursive strategy of 
demarcation” that crystallizes boundaries between what constitutes admissible and 
inadmissible behavior (Watson 2009: 431). Through the use of legitimating values, 
or the enforcement of new rules and guidelines, actors demarcate what constitutes 
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legitimate and illegitimate geographical indicators and propose the development of a 
set of models to determine the generic status of commonly-used terms for open use 
across the globe. The perceived ‘correctness’ of their approach is advocated through 
the use of numerous adjectives specified in Table 6.2 (CCFN n.d.; Castaneda 2013a; 
Dairy Australia 2013: 2; Suber 2013: 7; NMPF 2012).  
Table 6.2: Oppositional Legitimacies and GIs 
Legitimate GIs/system Illegitimate GIs/system 
Proper Improper 
Just Unjust 
Reasonable Unreasonable 
Acceptable Unacceptable 
Appropriate Inappropriate 
Fair Unfair 
Legitimate GIs for cheeses would include “minor” (The New Zealand Herald 
2005) and “well-designed” (Suber 2013: 7) GIs or “narrow and geographically-
defined artisan cheeses” (Morris 2011: 2) such as Roquefort and compounds such as 
West Country Farmhouse Cheddar and Camembert de Normandie that are protected 
in whole. However, what they view to be illegitimate are names such as Camembert, 
Feta, Parmesan, Emmental, Cheddar, and others that they argue have long been 
recognized as generic around the world. But the elaboration of such a binary 
opposition indicates the presence of myth, which reduces reality to the comparison 
of two easily computable values that promotes the interests of NW dairy groups. 
Ultimately, “The issue is not about coming up with a list of generic products 
but about a methodology for determining what is generic…” (Personal interview, 
April 10, 2013). At the global level there are currently no policy instruments for 
identifying what is and is not generic and genericism remains a constant site of 
discursive formation. From the point of view of NW actors the legitimate system is 
asserted to be one that justly ensures the right to the continued use of common food 
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names that have been used for many years, clearly specifies individual components 
of compound terms as generic and open for use, and allows the protection of terms 
only in their original language. It also takes into account, for example, references 
that include Codex Standards, worldwide production levels, longevity of name use, 
sales and trade volumes, and dictionary definitions (Personal interview, April 10, 
2013; Email interview, May 31, 2013; CCFN n.d.) and promotes the construction of 
compounds (Personal interview, April 10, 2013) that partner generic terms with a 
country or region of production, for example Australian Feta or Wisconsin 
Parmesan. 
NW efforts to construct new rules surrounding generic terms represents an 
attempt to identify European activities as deviant behavior through an active process 
of social delineation and construction. It is important to remember that the threat of a 
folk devil’s behavior is not objectively apparent but takes form through the “quality 
bestowed upon it” (Young 2009: 7, original emphasis). As well, Howard Becker 
(1963: 9, original emphasis ) states that it is claims-makers who “create deviance by 
making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance…” and assigns them to 
specific individuals or groups who are thereafter marked as “outsiders.” The creation 
of rules surrounding generics would have the ultimate effect of sensitizing European 
actions as wrongful behavior. 
6.3.6. Gastro-panic 
When re-considering the various criteria illustrated in Table 6.3 on the 
following page it becomes evident that a countering gastro-panic is manifested in the 
discourse surrounding the global dispute over generic cheese names. By way of this 
discursive strategy of demarcation and legitimation, the cultural, economic, and 
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political boundaries surrounding the use of terms are diminished and new rules and 
models formulated to ensure that they may be used by all producers. Through this 
discourse a new and unquestioned social reality is created in which the EU’s actions 
are constructed by claims-makers from the NW as posing a catastrophic threat to 
dairy industries around the world.  
Table 6.3: Gastro-panic Criteria 
Gastro-panic 
Indicators 
Description 
Concern Heightened in relation to the EU’s international efforts to 
secure exclusive protection for generic cheese names and its 
supposed consequences for businesses, producers, 
manufacturers, and consumers around the world. 
Hostility Toward the European ‘aggressors.’  
Consensus Agreement by numerous NW actors that the threat is real, 
serious, and caused by the behavior of the EU, thus requiring 
a coordinated global response to stop it. 
Disproportionality Highlighted as the unfair conferral of rights to European 
producers at the expense of the rest of the world and attempts 
to reverse it. 
Volatility Contemporary campaign that peaked following the EUKOR 
agreement in response to the insecurity caused by the EU’s 
actions on GIs. Operates to (re)affirm a sense of existential 
security through preserving the right to the use of generic 
terms in an increasingly globalized agri-food system. 
In addition, a role-reversal is apparent as the European folk angel presented 
in the fourth course is demonized through the use of negative imagery that instead 
transforms them into the folk devil by painting their behavior as aggressive, ruthless, 
and strategic. At the same time a defensive strategy purifies the generic-producing 
folk devil of any wrongdoing and presents them as innocent victims or folk angels 
whose rights are in urgent need of protection. Actors appeal to the insecurity caused 
by the EU’s actions in order to provide a foundation for political action to reverse the 
disproportionate conferral of rights to European producers and preserve the open use 
of terms. 
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The pervasiveness of the countering gastro-panic in NW political discourse 
surrounding the generic issue is powerful in that it is not only prevalent as a 
discursive strategy in the language of actors but also structures their practice. The 
issue is not only talked about in terms of the threatening effects of European efforts 
but partially structures much of the actions performed by actors both within the EU 
and in international negotiations where the right to use cheese terms still has the 
potential to be won or lost. Through the countering gastro-panic NW actors construct 
the Europeans as adversaries and folk devils. At the same time, as the innocent folk 
angels they defend their positions against an EU attack, enterprise to mobilize 
supporters against it, and employ legitimating values through organized proposals 
and the creation of new rules to influence policy and government action. Countering 
gastro-panic discourse also serves a clear political-economic purpose and the NW 
deployment of security logic acts as a persuasive device to convince policy-makers 
that action must be taken to deter the European threat of GI protection. By framing 
the dispute as a security issue, NW cheese-makers and manufacturers are able to 
rally supporters and generate a consensus to legitimate actions to preserve the right 
to the use of cheese names.  
Global agricultural and food policy is a highly-differentiated multi-actor and 
multi-levelled terrain. The policy and practice of individual countries is influenced 
by interests at the domestic level, which has a profound impact on policy and 
decision-making (Putnam 1988). Generic terms are economically and culturally-
important resources and dairy firms, trade associations, and lobbyists defend their 
use vigorously and attempt to influence the action taken by government officials to 
ensure that their interests are represented in international negotiations. This is 
particularly the case in countries such as the US who, much like the EU, has a long 
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history of agricultural interventionism (Cathie 1985). The sector has been 
historically characterized by a preponderance of ‘family farms’ (Tilzey 2006) and a 
persistence of ‘agrarian myths’ that resonate with public and government officials 
(Grant 1993: 251). As a result agri-food lobbies continue to possess significant 
political influence (Gawande 2006; Woll 2009). Threats to the use of generic terms, 
whether real or perceived, infuse the debate with a sense of urgency and purpose that 
enhances the political salience of the issue by defining it as a problem that justifies a 
governmental and policy response. 
Thus, the countering gastro-panic represents a boundary-maintaining and 
creating mechanism used by NW claims-makers to legitimize their normative and 
material interests in attaining the open use of generic cheese terms. It is also a form 
of myth that simultaneously allows a focus on certain aspects of the situation, such 
as the conceptualization of GI protection as threatening, while shrouding others, such 
as the historical origins of particular types of cheese. The overall effect of the gastro-
panic is to counter-securitize GI protection as a threat in order to enhance its political 
salience and secure its placement on the policy agenda with the ultimate aim to 
secure the open use of terms within the global market. 
6.4. Demythologizing the Countering Gastro-panic 
Countering gastro-panic language presents European producers as aggressive 
and protectionist folk devils. As well, an elaboration of genericism serves as a 
conceptual map of meaning by which NW claims-makers interpret the debate. But 
these significations have only recently become normalized and Barthes would argue 
that they conceal the operation of further orders and ideologies. In this final section I 
analyze the volatility of the countering gastro-panic and deconstruct it as myth to 
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further understand why the issue has arisen in recent years, what motivations 
underlie it, and what ideological alignments are being served. This is important 
because gastro-panic is a rational process that does not just occur naturally in 
society. Rather, its materialization and influence is dependent upon actors driven by 
specific motives, interests, and agendas. It is also contextual and often arises during 
difficult times of social, economic, and political change.  
I intend to show how the generic issue reflects the concerns and preferences 
of different actors and institutions in NW countries and is linked to larger, 
politically-charged debates surrounding the liberalization of agricultural trade, 
appropriate assistance for farmers and rural communities, the need to preserve the 
use of generic terms around the world, and the roles of governments and the market. 
I argue that NW actors are competing over the status of cheese names not only to 
profit from economically significant terms but in an attempt to restore an existential 
sense of security during a time of perceived insecurity brought about by European 
efforts in the context of the increased industrialization and globalization of cheese 
production. Here, generic terms are seen as tools to accomplish various commercial, 
political, and socio-economic objectives. 
6.4.1. Economic Interests 
To understand contemporary pressures to preserve the right to use generic 
terms around the world also requires consideration of the value and importance of 
cheese industries. For many NW countries, dairy is a major contributor to domestic 
and international economies. Cheese is one of the most important products within the 
sector and constitutes an important source of economic output. And because of this 
its production and marketing assumes the role of an important referent object that is 
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worth protecting. This is the case for New Zealand (Sutton 2004; The New Zealand 
Herald 2005) and Australia where in the latter dairy is the third most valuable rural 
and export industry after beef and wheat. In 2012 Australians exported 
approximately 28% of production worth billions of dollars (Dairy Australia 2013: 1). 
In addition, dairy is an important contributor to the US economy in terms of revenue 
and employment (Suber 2013: 1) and in Canada is second only to meat in terms of 
value with products such as butter, cheese, yogurt and ice cream accounting for 63% 
of production or 15.1% of all processing sales in the food and beverage industry 
(Canadian Dairy Commission 2012). 
Much opposition stems from threats to existing companies who have for 
some time built their businesses using generic names that originally came from 
Europe. This could apply to large-scale industrial factories but also affects small 
companies who have “built their livelihoods around artisan foods…” (Said 2003) 
and whose very survival depends on the use of widely-recognizable names. Some of 
these companies are an important part of the development of national economies and 
provide employment for hundreds of workers (CCFN n.d.). In the US for example, 
Suber (2013: 1) indicates that there are tens of thousands of dairy farms that 
contribute billions to the US economy and that, “The U.S. dairy industry is a key 
engine of growth and jobs, particularly in rural communities, and growing export 
sales have helped to strengthen it.” Therefore, the issue is not just about the names 
themselves but concerns “rural America and jobs” (Jalonick 2014). And it is these 
livelihoods and communities that European proposals and restrictions put at risk.  
Dairy industries in many NW countries are also increasingly active in global 
export markets; a main reason for this being the rise in incomes and cheese 
consumption particularly in Asia (Sutton 2004; Saez 2013; O’Connor 2013) and 
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issues at the domestic level. One EU trade official admitted that “we’re all trying to 
battle for market share” in Asia and “competing for getting our products into the 
emerging markets in China especially” (Personal interview, April 9, 2013a). 
Decreased trade barriers and rising wealth continue to create global market 
opportunities where none existed previously and the proportion of cheeses traded 
internationally is rising, aided in part by the increasing liberalization of dairy 
industries and export-growth strategies.  
These changes are important for countries such as Australia who are a large 
exporter of dairy products sold under European names (Brink 2007: 1). They rely on 
“unsubsidised, highly productive agriculture – to win markets” (Dibden, Potter, and 
Cocklin 2009: 300). But for a country like the US, European activities are occurring 
against a backdrop of changes at the national level and international pressures to 
liberalize domestic markets. Like the Parmigiano-Reggiano industry, US dairy 
industries are struggling in the face of reform (Hagstrom 2012), low prices, and 
increasing costs and have turned to export markets as a “strategic growth 
opportunity” (Congressional Dairy Farmers Caucus 2010). Historically small in 
volume and value, US cheese exports have been growing in recent years and it was 
reported that in 2009 “20 cents out of every one dollar’s return that U.S. dairy 
farmers received from the export market was attributable to overseas cheese sales” 
(USDEC/NMPF 2010).  
Many countries where the EU has been negotiating protection for cheese GIs 
happen to be important export markets for NW countries, which makes their actions 
seem to be even more of a threat. For example, in the past few years Singapore was 
the third most important market for Australia where cheese exports grew by 60% 
since 2005. And this was not confined to large-scale industrial cheeses but also 
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included niche products produced by small and medium-sized companies (Dairy 
Australia 2013:  2). South Korea is the second most important export market for US 
cheese (USDEC/NMPF/IDFA 2011) and US dairy industries had placed a priority on 
access for cheeses in the US-Korea FTA, expecting strong returns from expanded 
exports (Congressional Dairy Farmers Caucus 2010). Claims-makers therefore see 
European efforts as seriously threatening market access, current cheese exports and, 
perhaps even more importantly, future export potential (Embassy Wellington 2005; 
Morris 2011: 2; ADIC et. al. 2010). The emphasis on future rights is interesting 
because it is tied to potential growth and profits as countries continue to build and 
access extra-local markets as dairy industries are further globalized. 
Preserving the right to worldwide use of generics is attractive to producers 
and business and it is no coincidence that they have become part of the international 
debate just as world trade in cheese is reaching record levels and economies become 
more integrated. There are strong commercial interests at play and generic names are 
seen as valuable tools to accomplish commercial objectives, which could be 
hampered by the European confiscation of product terms and directly impact the 
growth and profitability of dairy sectors. According to one interviewee “consumers 
in domestic and foreign markets will place a (potentially high) premium on those 
‘names’…cheeses in particular are a mature market, so the room for innovation is 
rather small” (Email interview, July 20, 2013). President of the American Cheese 
Society Greg O’Neill states that, “Cheese is big business; it is the largest single 
category in specialty food” (USA Today 2014). And in the US, European attempts 
are reported to be “threatening a multi-billion dollar industry” (CBS NEWS 2014). 
The global has now become a battleground upon which to fight in order to secure 
market access and boost domestic profits and actors are able to mask what are 
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essentially vested dairy interests as security concerns, forcing the issue to the top of 
governmental negotiating agendas to legitimate generic exceptions in international 
markets. 
6.4.2. Protecting Whom? Preserving the Neoliberal Status Quo 
Like the Italian and European actors in the fourth course, NW claims-makers 
appear to approach the use of terms – in this case the open use – as a security 
measure for consumers as well as companies and producers both at domestic and 
international levels. As claims-makers they naturalize the generic status of terms 
through genericism. They also call attention to the troublesome actions of the EU 
and profess to promote the needs, preferences, and interests of consumers and 
producers in an attempt to influence policy-makers and negotiators to take action 
against it. For example, the disadvantages to consumers are emphasized as a taken-
for-granted consequence of restricted competition. This reflects the widespread 
belief that open competition and the right to market a wide variety of cheeses under 
familiar names ultimately benefits the consumer through lower prices and greater 
choice and that they are penalized by any form of protectionism and the 
implementation of trade barriers (Gaisford and Kerr 2001). 
Myth seeks to ground political and historical situations, and ideological 
alignments, in the realm of the natural. It is also composed of beliefs and 
representations that sustain and legitimate current power relationships and promote 
the values and interests of dominant groups in society. Through the myth of 
genericism NW actors are able to naturalize their approach to terms as common 
sense and obscure the influence of the policy paradigms that guide them. But when 
this is deconstructed it becomes apparent that discursive legitimation for political 
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action in the generic debate is sought by recourse to ‘neoliberal’ and ‘agricultural 
normalist’ (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2009: 12) arguments.  
Therefore, in this context European exceptionalist efforts threaten the status 
quo constructed through the dominant ideology currently shaping global agri-food 
system governance and restructuring (McMichael 1994), which promotes increased 
liberalization and reduced state intervention, free trade, and open markets and 
contends that agriculture should be treated as no different from other economic 
sectors. This ideology has been embraced and is promoted within governmental 
policy agendas and by dairy industries from a number of NW countries. For 
example, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Canada are all members of the 
Cairns Group of agricultural exporters committed to reforming trade and eliminating 
market distortive policies and practices. Neoliberal political discourse is particularly 
acute in the farm and agricultural policy of Australia and New Zealand who have 
taken a lead in promoting free trade and criticized the EU’s construction of 
multifunctionality as a front for maintaining non-tariff trade barriers and 
disadvantaging other producers on world markets (Alston 2004; Pritchard 2005; 
Dibden and Cocklin 2009). New Zealand declared that it was committed to breaking 
down international barriers (Sutton 2004) and Australia’s dairy industry has already 
operated in a liberalized dairy market for over a decade (Dairy Australia 2013: 1). 
Neoliberalism has emerged as a source of ideas and justifications for the 
maintained genericity of terms and as a means of discrediting European protectionist 
measures in a world that increasingly condemns such practices. The agricultural 
exceptionalism promoted through European efforts to protect “lots of teeny tiny 
people” (Personal interview, April 10, 2013) and “a bunch of small agricultural 
producers” (Personal interview, May 30, 2013) is dismissed for lacking commercial 
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and business credibility and efficiency. At the same time, attempts to regain the 
exclusive use of generic cheese terms under the GI façade have been cited as 
“market restrictive and anathema to the spirit and goal of trade liberalization…” 
(Hough 2013) and the US House Committee on Agriculture (2004: 147-48) referred 
to GIs as an unacceptable “interference with free trade” while Canada’s ambassador 
to the WTO was quoted in an article stating that, “We should be bringing down 
barriers…not creating new ones” (Chase 2003). GIs are seen as being incompatible 
with the ultimate goals of agricultural negotiations – specifically improved market 
access and the elimination of protectionist practices (House Committee on 
Agriculture 2003; Embassy Wellington 2005; Hough 2013). And within this context 
the claw-back of terms is dismissed as nothing more than an insidious ‘trade barrier’ 
(Suber 2012; Hagstrom 2012; IDFA 2013; Carper 2013; Hough 2013; Schumer and 
Toomey 2014; Castaneda 2014) and a new form of protectionism bent on stifling 
competition (Tundel 2003; House Committee on Agriculture 2004: 147-48; The 
Editors 2013). Castaneda states that (2013b: 4): 
“It is one thing to establish a GI for a new name, one that is not already well 
entrenched in global markets. But seeking to monopolize names that have already 
entered into common usage is a defacto barrier to trade in international markets and 
would be a great hindrance to open competition in our own market. We must not 
encourage this type of anti-competitive behavior…”  
Under neoliberalism, open and fair competition is what Busch (2010: 336) declares 
is “its central dogma, its DNA.” Claw-back therefore strikes at the very heart of the 
ideology and it becomes difficult for those who subscribe to the liberal logic of free 
trade, efficiency and open competition to be able to accept the special treatment of 
GIs and the state intervention that comes with it, especially when such protection 
threatens the use of valuable generic terms. The language used by actors is 
persuasive because it presents a vision of European efforts that appear as inconsistent 
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with the ideological underpinnings of food and agriculture in international society. 
The global market is an environment in which threats to dairy interests can assume a 
high profile for many and gastro-panic logic can be persuasively used to demonize 
an opponent whilst legitimating a neoliberal agenda that breaks down barriers 
between national and global agri-food economies.  
But as myth the countering gastro-panic allows a focus on certain aspects of a 
situation – such as the battling aspects of the international dispute, its contrariness to 
the neoliberal agenda, or the threatening nature of European behavior – while 
shrouding others. In doing so it prevents us from paying attention to other aspects of 
the situation that might be inconsistent with it. A certain irony is present in the 
assertions made by NW actors and the contradictions within these stances deserve 
exposure. First, the argument that consumers all over the world would lose if 
producers and manufacturers are unable to market cheeses using generic terms is 
itself a taken-for-granted assumption. Many consumers do indeed purchase products 
based on their awareness of generic terms and this is especially the case in many NW 
markets where there is a high familiarity with types of cheeses. But if the EU were to 
be successful in expanding protection to food products, dairy industries in individual 
NW countries would still possess the right to market their cheeses to domestic 
consumers using familiar terms as mandated through the generic exception in Article 
24 of the TRIPS agreement. The consumer-loses argument is thus questionable when 
considering that a large part of the dispute centers on access to emerging markets 
where there is a greater unfamiliarity with types of cheese. In many of these markets 
the connotations associated with cheese names in the minds of consumers are 
actively being constructed and there is no assurance that they would benefit from a 
wide variety of products being classified under as-of-yet unfamiliar generic terms. 
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Therefore, the consumer might not be penalized by the restriction of a cheese name 
to European producers if they learn to associate it as such. 
Next, on the surface NW claims-makers promote a strong rhetoric extolling 
neoliberal principles and unilaterally demonizing the EU and its privilege-seeking 
producers for stepping outside the boundaries of this agenda. The political 
legitimation for the open use of terms thus revolves around targeting their improper 
and aggressive behavior through the gastro-panic. But behind the scenes these actors 
also seek to promote their own interests and instil their preferences within 
international agreements. While the EU has tended to differentiate its policy in favor 
of maintaining a degree of ‘exceptionalist’ support for agriculture, the market liberal 
model has taken hold in other countries such as the US (Skogstad 1998; Coleman 
2011), Australia and others. But as mentioned previously, the US has a long history 
of agricultural interventionism and has also been pressured to reduce governmental 
support. The US government must therefore balance these conflicting imperatives 
through pursuing “a strategy of qualified neo-liberalism” in order to satisfy powerful 
domestic interest groups and commitments to international reform (Tilzey 2006: 15). 
Moreover, Australian government policy and industries might appear to be the poster 
child of unbending devotion to neoliberal ideology with its non-interventionist 
approach and heavy concentration on principally undifferentiated large-scale 
production and exports. Unlike in the US and the EU there exists little political 
pressure to retain protectionist policies in the country because Australian agricultural 
policies are geared almost entirely towards international competitiveness and offer 
little sympathy or support to the travails of smaller-scale enterprises (Tilzey 2006; 
Dibden, Potter, and Cocklin 2009). But such outward focus makes it vulnerable to 
pressures from agri-business interests and the Australian government “still 
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intervenes opportunistically in order to satisfy particular political agendas” 
(Pritchard 2005: 9). 
Additionally, the EU is not the only one entering into FTAs to secure their 
interests, which have proliferated in recent years (Heydon and Woolcock 2009). It is 
no secret that in absence of a consensus on GIs in the WTO that the US has been 
pursuing a rigorous agenda to enshrine its ontological and legal viewpoints in 
various bilateral and regional FTAs.  While the language of EU provisions 
emphasizes a sui generis GI system that in many cases prioritizes protected GIs over 
generic terms, US agreements focus on the protection of GIs specifically through a 
trademark system and preserves the right to the use of generic terms (Personal 
interview, May 24, 2013). The pursuit of two different modes of protection and focus 
on competing “systemic frameworks” (Smith 2006: 20) has resulted in many 
countries becoming party to agreements with contradictory obligations (O’Connor 
2013; Viju, Yeung, and Kerr 2013). The US enshrined clauses into its agreement 
with South Korea (KORUS) in order to protect trademarks that incorporated generic 
terms and according to one informant their approach has been to block GIs through 
the ‘first in time, first in right’ principle – a standard rule of trademarks whereby the 
first to use and register a mark in commerce has priority over all others – but that 
they were forced to change tactics when the EU completed the EUKOR agreement 
first (Personal interview, May 24, 2013a). 
Since then the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement has been seen as a 
strategic arena through which “more reasonable guidelines for the use of common 
food names” (Suber 2013: 7) could be institutionalized and has been structured so 
that it “allows a GI which is generic in the territory of a third member but not generic 
in the territory of the GI’s origin to be refused as a GI. Article 2.18 also says that a 
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trademark or GI may become generic even after their registration or recognition” 
(O’Connor 2013: 3). Some of the countries involved in TPP negotiations have 
already protected certain contested cheese terms through agreements with the EU – 
such as Canada, Peru, and Singapore, or are in the process of negotiations. This 
provision would therefore prevent a term such as Feta, considered generic in the US 
and Australia, from being protected as a GI in Peru or from being restricted in 
Canada where the recent CETA agreement requires the use of a qualifier such as 
‘like’ in marketing the product. Additionally, it allows protected terms to become 
victims of genericide and erode over time, something that is impossible under the EU 
system. Such attempts call into question the preserved territoriality of genericism. 
Ultimately, it must be remembered that the liberalization of food and 
agricultural sectors remains a highly contested policy agenda and neoliberalism has 
been referred to as “a dominant taken-for-granted set of practices…” (Busch 2010: 
344) and “a negotiable discourse” (Dibden, Potter, and Cocklin 2009: 300). There is 
no one-size-fits-all approach to instituting the neoliberal agenda in food and 
agriculture and it has been adapted and opposed to differing degrees by different 
countries who seek to benefit from its “selective accumulation opportunities” while 
at the same time maintain “some level of agricultural and socio-environmental 
‘exceptionalism’ in policy…” (Tilzey 2006: 1). I already discussed the diverging 
approaches of competitive agriculture and multifunctionality that have emerged in 
the market liberal context, the former being embraced by the US and Cairns Group 
and the latter by the EU. Therefore, the contemporary struggle over the use of 
particular cheese terms is also “essentially about the drive to establish, resist, or in 
some way modify neoliberalism as the dominant policy discourse” (Potter and Tilzey 
2005: 586) to ensure the maximum level of security for domestic interests. 
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6.4.3. (Re)affirming Security 
It can be argued that the countering gastro-panic surrounding European 
efforts is more than an attempt at instrumental profit maximization and has arisen 
within the international debate in recent years as claims-makers seek restore a sense 
of security in an increasingly fractured, competitive, and globalized marketplace. 
This becomes more evident when considering that what NW claims-makers seek is 
not any form of extra or enhanced rights but rather the preservation of pre-existing 
rights to the use of generic terms that are in danger of being restricted and greater 
certainty in their clarification. In Barthesian terms this mythical discourse has 
occurred because the taken-for-granted generic nature of cheese terms has been 
called into question, which threatens the interests of established dairy industries 
within the context of the increased industrialization and globalization of cheese 
production and the continuous construction of global norms and regulations 
surrounding GI protection.  
For non-EU companies and cheese-makers, the restricted use of widely-
recognized cheese terms is a major threat that would put them at a disadvantage in 
the marketplace. This has created a climate of insecurity that is evident when 
considering frequent references by claims-makers in their arguments against claw-
back to ‘uncertainty’ in global dairy industries, the ‘safety’ of terms that are at ‘risk’, 
the idea of keeping producers and manufacturers ‘safe’ from the incursions of GI 
policy, and the ‘vulnerability’ of terms: 
“Generics don’t always remain generic…The argument in the EU is that GIs are 
vulnerable because they can become generic, which in the EU is not possible. But in 
my view this is not true that GIs are imminently in threat of becoming generic…I 
think you could say that generics are more vulnerable to be eroded in third country 
markets than the other way around” (Personal interview, April 9, 2013b). 
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The status of generic names is perceived as being more fluid than their GI 
counterparts, the latter of which may never become generic once they are registered. 
Furthermore, the referent objects illustrated in Table 6.4 are indicative of this 
insecurity because they reflect different types of security concerns reflected in 
actors’ discourse that are perceived to be endangered by the EU’s efforts. This has 
prompted claims-makers to fight the exclusive protection of terms at the global level 
in order to safeguard their open use. The assurance of such rights and the power to 
prevent the exclusive linkage of names to certain products and producers is projected 
to create a climate of ‘fairer’ competition. Generic terms thus serve as powerful 
security tools that are vital to the well-being of companies and firms in order to 
maintain competitiveness in the global marketplace. 
Table 6.4: Referent Objects Perceived to be Endangered by EU Efforts 
Sector Referent Objects 
Economic 
 
Resources (generic cheese names), businesses, profits, 
trade, market share (present and future), jobs and 
livelihoods 
Societal Immigrant heritage, knowledge, and traditions 
Political Use rights (present and future), intellectual property norms, 
rules, and institutions, national sovereignty 
Attempts to define and maintain the delocalized meaning of terms may be 
understood as a reaction against the perceived threats of protectionism and an active 
defense that seeks to de-legitimize the European position. While NW claims-makers 
might legitimately view the EU’s practices as protectionist and harmful, they have at 
the same time strategically sought to construct a version of the concept of 
‘genericism’ that suits their own trade interests. To pursue this agenda, these actors 
have been strong advocates in demarcating what constitutes a ‘generic’ term and 
creating an international methodology for determining it. Fundamental to this agenda 
has been an attempt to gain widespread acceptance of such a methodology that in 
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some cases disregards the territorial rights of other countries to determine the 
genericness of product names, and producers and manufacturers to use them.  
Economic incentives are not the only motive driving defenders of generic 
cheese terms. The effort to secure their open use around the world is also related to 
issues of immigrant heritage, history, and culture. Food cultures and products have 
transcended borders throughout history and serve as collective identity markers for 
immigrants in new lands who both reproduce and fuse cuisines to suit local 
ingredients and tastes (Fischler 1988; Koc and Welsh 2001). Thus, it is possible to 
“view foods not only as placed cultural artefacts but also as dis-placed, inhabiting 
many times and spaces which far from being neatly bounded, bleed into and indeed 
mutually constitute each other” (Cook and Crang 1996: 132-33). To assert the 
necessity of preserving the open use of generics is partly to assert the importance of 
respecting this cultural heritage. It also raises questions about the right of immigrants 
to continue reproducing their culinary traditions in new places and whether in a 
continuously globalized framework authenticity should necessarily be limited to the 
territorial and cultural contexts of the supposed country of origin.  
The generic issue represents an attempt to claim equal opportunities for NW 
producers that places them on an even playing field with competitors, for example by 
emphasizing the long-term use, immigrant heritages, and quantity which 
characterizes production of the cheeses and the benefits afforded to consumers. For 
European opponents, however, this is little more than blatant counterfeiting, an abuse 
of legitimate producer rights, unfair competition, and a justification for free-riding 
on European reputations on the grounds of perceived generic use rights. The generic 
term acts as a security tool to protect both vested interests and the market advantages 
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derived from it. But it also carries with it negative consequences for the ‘original’ 
producers and manufacturers of certain European cheeses and has contributed to the 
issue becoming a majorly contested topic of international discussion. Such measures 
create tensions in a global climate increasingly framed by competing discourses of 
neoliberalism and have in turn become a threat to the European policy discourse of 
multifunctionality. At a time of rapid change and competition where cheeses are 
increasingly traded around the globe, the generic term helps companies and 
producers compete, define, and profit from genericism by characterizing a ‘type’ of 
cheese. Advocacy for the preservation of generic use can thus be understood as a 
desire to secure NW dairy interests and growing presence in the global cheese 
market at a time of increasing threats and insecurity caused by the EU.  
6.5. Conclusion 
In this course I addressed the first and third research questions through using 
cheese as a lens to examine the countering processes at play within the contested 
cultural politics of food name protection and to better understand genericism in the 
context of global GI politics. I revealed how claims-makers from NW countries are 
competing with the EU through a countering discursive process of gastro-panic in 
which a perceived political-economic problem – that of the EU’s aggressive attempts 
to recapture ‘generic’ terms around the world – is securitized as a serious threat to 
global dairy industries and nurtures a view of folk angel (‘innocent’ NW producers 
and companies) versus folk devil (‘aggressive’ EU). This portrayal infuses the debate 
with a sense of urgency that justifies a coordinated global defense and the creation of 
a methodology for determining genericness in an attempt to restore an existential 
sense of security during a time of perceived insecurity within the context of the 
increased industrialization and globalization of cheese production. Here, generics 
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serve as important security tools for their commercial value and role as inherited 
cultural heritage in NW countries and genericism emerges as a constant site of 
discursive construction that is being negotiated within the international arena. 
The countering gastro-panic is not simply a neutral or objective reflection of 
reality but an interpretative framework through which NW actors convey their own 
perspectives and evaluations of the current situation and agricultural policy in 
general, which reflects and at the same time reinforces a particular way of 
understanding the actions to preserve the use of generics in terms of legitimate 
rights. It is also a discursive tool designed to achieve a number of political goals that 
include naturalizing the current oppositional approach and recruiting allies through 
reifying a narrow conception of the debate that presents European attempts as wholly 
negative, threatening, and contrary to the neoliberal agenda. Claims-makers use the 
discourse of gastro-panic to persuade government and trade officials, companies, 
farmers, food producers, and consumers that action taken to mitigate the threat is 
necessary, desirable, and achievable. The countering gastro-panic is itself a form of 
myth in that it presents a simplified vision of a much more complex issue and 
shrouds underlying interests and motivations. It also works to enforce a particular 
interpretation and meaning in the form of the genericism of terms. Within this 
context language is deployed as a means of normalizing a global campaign against 
the EU’s efforts on GIs and legitimizing a global methodology for the determination 
of generic status. 
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Seventh Course 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis used a food studies approach that employed the dispute over 
cheese, and specifically the cases of Parmesan and Cheddar, as a lens to understand 
the contested politics of GGIs. The main objective was to thoroughly explore the 
international conflict over GGIs, which has received little academic attention thus 
far, by investigating three research questions: First, how and why are European and 
NW actors competing over the status – protected or generic – of cheese names? 
Second, why has this struggle manifested in the case of Parmesan but not of 
Cheddar? And third, how can we better understand genericism within the context of 
GI policy?  
The thesis was driven by three main arguments designed to investigate the 
research questions. First, I contended that actors on both sides of the debate compete 
to secure the use of terms through oppositional discursive strategies of ‘gastro-panic’ 
where they appeal to a language of security in order to persuade policy-makers to 
take action, through policy changes or other arrangements, against the perceived 
threatening actions of their opponents in order to secure the exclusive or open use of 
terms. In doing so they also frame their arguments in ways that are consistent with 
either the ‘Multifunctionality’ or ‘Competitive’ agricultural paradigms that shape 
how they identify problems in the agri-food sector and ways to address them. These 
international actors are not only motivated to secure access to the use of cheese 
names purely for profit-maximizing purposes but also in order to maintain a sense of 
security amidst the perceived insecurity brought about by the increasing 
globalization of dairy industries, trade, and international norms and regulations.   
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Next, I argued that the appearance of a gastro-panic is dependent upon the 
active endeavors of actors invested in its success who are guided by these differing 
worldviews that affect whether or not they perceive the outside use of a term to be a 
threat. Thus, no struggle emerged surrounding Cheddar because its widespread use 
has not been interpreted as a threat to the ‘original.’ This is a result of its genericity 
being naturalized by producers and governments as indisputable fact or common 
sense and occurs within a market liberal context that preserves the openly 
competitive use of the term where any protectionist attempts to restrict it might 
otherwise be viewed as a threat. And lastly, I asserted that within the GI context 
genericism may be understood as a highly complex, unstable, and socially-
constructed concept as well as a strategic discursive device aimed at blocking the 
successful registration of proposed product names as GIs. 
This research is important because genericism is an inherently contested 
concept despite the un-protectability of generic terms being enshrined in GI policy. 
As well, within the broader political-economy of GIs the generic use of geographical 
names is one of the most contentious issues. Moreover, the use of these names is of 
significant importance to producers, manufacturers, consumers, and policy-makers 
all over the world yet the rules and regulations governing their use remain vague and 
under-developed. The debate over cheese reveals the inherently political nature of 
the ways in which genuineness and genericness are constructed in an increasingly 
competitive market-place. 
7.1. Summary of the thesis 
The various courses in the thesis, which is how I referred to the different 
chapters, were designed to shed light on the main research questions. The second 
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course provided the historical context and a broad overview of the multidisciplinary 
literature devoted to GIs. Its purpose was to expose the gap in the literature and lack 
of focus on the issue of GGIs. Following from that, the third course elaborated on an 
interdisciplinary explanatory framework derived from a synthesis of moral panic, 
securitization, and Barthesian myth, which I referred to as the gastro-panic. Gastro-
panic is fundamental because it enabled me to call attention to how European and 
NW actors compete over cheese names by invoking a language of food system 
security as a means of providing a foundation for and justifying political action to 
deter perceived threats to the use of certain terms. Gastro-panic manifests itself in 
competing policy discourses, understood as discursive strategies employed to secure 
the exclusive or generic use of terms, and is key to understanding how different 
groups in this debate promote their interests. Gastro-panics represent attempts to 
create new competitors and platforms of action, in other words to demonize an 
‘other’ as the folk devil as a means of legitimating action taken against them. Crucial 
in this respect has been the role of claims-makers including individuals, groups, and 
government actors who initiate the processes by professing to represent the interests 
of producers and consumers everywhere and also by re-defining what constitutes 
inadmissible behavior. Through the gastro-panic myth each side naturalizes what is 
essentially cultural and contextual and makes dominant cultural and historical 
values, attitudes, and beliefs in the approach to food terms seem ‘self-evident’, 
obvious, and common sense. 
Next, in the fourth course I introduced the controversial case of Parmesan. 
This course was intended to support the argument that opposing actors are involved 
in competing processes of gastro-panic intended to secure the right to the use of a 
contested cheese name and also to shed light on the complicated and shifting nature 
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of genericism. It demonstrated how each side has attempted to fix the otherwise 
shifting meaning of Parmesan in order to secure the right to its use at the 
international level. In addition, it highlighted a gastro-panic strategy manifested in 
the language of European claims-makers. Here, Italian and EU claims-makers were 
shown to frame generic producers as counterfeiting folk devils who deserve to have 
their name-use rights revoked due to the deleterious consequences it has for 
producers and consumers of the original cheese. These actors pursue global 
protection for Parmesan using a justification of terroirism that links the name to its 
place of origin and is legitimated through agricultural exceptionalism and discourses 
of ‘multifunctionality.’ They do this in an attempt to restore an existential sense of 
security during a time of perceived insecurity brought about by socio-economic 
difficulties within the region of origin and the increased industrialization and 
globalization of cheese production. Considering that Parmigiano-Reggiano has co-
existed with Parmesan for some time, this behavior has only recently been 
considered objectionable at the global level. Advocacy for the protection of 
Parmesan can thus be understood as a way to capture the exclusive right to market a 
cheese in an increasingly global economy and a desire to protect struggling European 
producer, rather than consumer, interests and dominance in the global cheese market 
at a time of increasing competition from non-EU producers.  
Unfortunately however, these attempts appeared to conflict with those who 
hold a view that Parmesan is a generic term and should be open for use by everyone. 
Both terroirism and genericism emerged not as given characteristics of the name but 
as contested and complex processes of negotiation. The specific or generic nature of 
Parmesan therefore results from dynamic processes of meaning attribution through 
which social actors construct and defend the exclusive connection between its name 
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and a place and its improper use by outsiders on the one hand and the disconnection 
of its name from a place and the threat of its protection on the other, the linkages of 
which must be continuously defended and re-legitimized.  
To continue, the fifth course presented the uncontested case of Cheddar as a 
contrast to the contested case of Parmesan and proved valuable to better understand 
genericism in the context of GI policy and consider why no discursive struggle has 
manifested surrounding its use. One of my main arguments held that the appearance 
of a gastro-panic is dependent upon the active endeavors of actors invested in its 
success who are guided by differing worldviews that affect whether or not they 
perceive the outside use of a term to be a threat. When compared to the case of 
Parmesan, the widespread use of Cheddar has not been similarly interpreted as a 
threat to the ‘original’ because its genericity has been naturalized by producers and 
governments as indisputable fact or common sense. This has occurred within a 
market liberal context that preserves the openly competitive use of the term where 
any protectionist or exceptionalist attempts to restrict it might otherwise be viewed 
as a threat. This was supported by evidence pointing to the widespread agreement 
that Cheddar has succumbed to genericide and various ambiguities and 
inconsistencies within the EU and internationally.  
Finally, in the sixth course I revealed how gastro-panics are not simply one-
sided affairs by analyzing the NW response to the EU’s actions in the area of GIs. I 
argued that the particular structure of language used in the debate and current 
coordinated attempts to preserve the right to use generic cheese terms in commerce 
is an indication that the folk devil is fighting back. This is done through a countering 
discursive strategy of gastro-panic that challenges the EU folk devilling process 
likening their production activities to illegal counterfeiting, thereby recasting the 
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EU’s actions in a negative light. Rather than being legitimate folk angels, the EU’s 
actions are constructed as posing a catastrophic threat to dairy industries around the 
world. A role-reversal is apparent as the European folk angel is demonized through 
the use of negative imagery that paints them as incredibly aggressive, ruthless, and 
strategic while at the same time a defensive strategy purifies the generic-producing 
folk devil of any wrongdoing and presents them as innocent victims whose rights are 
in urgent need of protection. Actors appeal to security through securitizing the EU’s 
actions in order to provide a foundation for political action to reverse the 
disproportionate conferral of rights to European producers and preserve the open use 
of terms. By framing the dispute as a security issue, NW cheese-makers and 
manufacturers are able to rally supporters and generate a consensus to legitimate 
actions to preserve the right to the use of cheese names.  
7.2. Key findings 
This research demonstrates a number of key findings. To begin, an important 
lesson to learn is that the protection or non-protection of food names emerges 
through a dynamic process of discursive construction. Barthes would say that as 
signs the connotations attached to food names are rarely stabilized or unproblematic 
in practice. Because their meaning fluctuates within and between territories they are 
also inherently contested and change as competing actors seek to fix their otherwise 
shifting meaning. This is important because it emphasizes that meaning is the 
outcome of politics and the connotations attached to cheese names emerge as a 
socio-cultural construction that industry participants and other actors have to 
constantly negotiate and re-define. Additionally, rather than being a stable and 
objectively-assessed state of being, genericism itself is a complex notion that has 
different and sometimes contradictory meanings. The production and maintenance of 
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genericism relies upon the consensus of actors working within the negotiated and 
contested terrain of international politics, some of whom are more powerful and 
well-organized than others. 
Next, competing European and NW actors make claims and counter-claims 
in an attempt to establish dominance over the other through discursively demarcating 
what constitutes proper and improper use. As signs, cheese names are given meaning 
by how they are represented as place-specific or generic. These meanings are not 
merely abstract notions but also have real practical effects, being developed and 
deployed in concrete struggles over the power to demarcate and influence the right to 
the use of certain terms. But actors also compete over security where the 
construction of territorial and cultural boundaries surrounding the use of terms as 
well as the preservation of use rights is fundamental to its pursuit. However, both 
strategies of demarcation are a source of conflict as there are incompatible claims 
over the use of terms. This can be problematic because it creates strict divisions that 
may cause actors to lose sight of any cooperative potential within the dispute. 
Furthermore, the pervasiveness of oppositional gastro-panic strategies in 
agri-food political discourse within the generic debate is powerful in that it is not 
only prevalent as a discursive strategy in the language of actors but also structures 
their practice. The issue is not only talked about in terms of the threatening effects of 
the others’ efforts but partially structures much of the actions performed by actors in 
international negotiations where the right to use cheese terms still has the potential to 
be affected. Through the active demonization of a folk devil, claims-makers consider 
the other side to be adversaries and as the folk angels they defend their positions, 
enterprise to mobilize supporters against them, and employ legitimating values 
through organized proposals and the enforcement of new rules to influence policy 
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and government action. Thus, the discourse pervading the gastro-panics serves a 
political-economic purpose where the deployment of a language of security is used 
to securitize the opposing side as a perceived threat and can be a useful means of 
persuading policy-makers that action must be taken against them. By framing the 
dispute within this type of setting, claims-makers on both sides are able to rally 
supporters and generate a consensus to legitimate actions to preserve a particular 
right to the use of cheese names.  
Additionally, the nature of the gastro-panic myth differs given the divergent 
geographical, historical, political, and institutional contexts in which it is being 
framed. Different forms of neoliberalism and ideas about the role that dairy plays in 
the economy and society underlie the competing sides and helps explain divergent 
European and NW approaches to the generic issue. In a discursive sense, the debate 
about the implications of generic use within the agricultural protectionist 
environment of the EU or the restriction of use in more market-oriented countries is 
similarly security-maximizing. Countering gastro-panic politics inform national and 
international debates on the future of food terms and are interwoven with demands 
for agricultural liberalization, market access, and open competition in a proposed 
global free trade regime. The progressive globalization of the world economy has 
contributed to a growing sense of insecurity amongst many and significantly affected 
agricultural policy. At the international level, rules, regulations and norms are 
constantly being shaped and the international agri-food market has become a 
battleground for groups with conflicting interests attempting to influence policy and 
its construction.  
In short, this thesis demonstrates that genericism is not a given condition. 
Genericity, like genuineness, is not a quality of the name and product themselves but 
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is something which is ascribed to them by someone with authority. Food names 
become territorialized or disembedded through the mobilization of values and 
meanings that construct them as either ‘genuine’ and ‘specific’ or ‘ingenuine’ and 
‘non-specific’. In the case of Parmesan, the localization process is about utilizing a 
terroirist discourse that roots the product in time and space and at the same time 
demonizes its outside use as counterfeiting. Exclusive rights to the name are 
legitimated through European claims-makers’ discourses as they emphasize the 
essential link between its authenticity and ‘realness’ and the Reggio-Emilia territory, 
traditional production methods, and history. At the same time, the de-localization 
process that seems to have affected Cheddar is about utilizing a discursive strategy 
that releases the name in time and space and legitimizes its outside use. In the 
narratives of opposing NW actors the product name loses its cultural specificity 
through emphasis on its generality. Within this oppositional process actors are 
unable to find a compromise to reconcile the diverging interests of different 
stakeholders and their desire to secure the rights to use.  
At the same time, there is also something particularly interesting about the 
comparison between Parmesan and Cheddar. While I have done my best to pinpoint 
the ways in which the situations surrounding the two cheeses differ, in many ways 
they are actually quite similar. Take for example their historical prestige and long 
histories, the traditional production processes that are proudly upheld by artisan 
producers, and the desire of producer groups to demarcate and differentiate them 
from their industrial counterparts. They have also both become some of the most 
globalized and widely-produced cheeses around the world. This therefore blurs the 
distinction between the two cheeses by presenting them as similar but different, the 
main difference being that one is a protected foodstuff and the other is not. 
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7.3. Contribution 
This thesis sought to investigate and bring into focus the current 
controversies surrounding the genericity of cheese terms and broaden the literature 
on GIs where the issue has been largely neglected. It can also be used to inform 
current international policy debates surrounding generic terms. The thesis makes an 
original contribution by widening the understanding of and demythologizing the 
issue of genericism within GI politics, expanding the analysis beyond a transatlantic 
focus to encompass broader perspectives from NW actors, and by interrogating the 
issue through the lens of cheese – specifically the innovative comparison of the 
highly contested case of Parmesan and the uncontested case of Cheddar. This is 
important in contemporary global GI politics as the ownership of cheese names is an 
ongoing site of negotiation and contestation. As well, it is the request for an 
extension of stronger protection to foodstuffs and the claw-back of generic food 
terms that constitutes the most current area of contention within the GI debate.  
This research also moved beyond the primarily legalistic focus on GGIs. 
Through deconstructing the complex rhetorical strategies and counter-claims 
processes employed by actors within the debate, it makes an original 
interdisciplinary contribution to the multidisciplinary literature on GIs. As was 
demonstrated throughout the thesis, the status of certain names is sometimes not the 
result of objective processes of definition and demarcation but rather the outcome of 
negotiations in which actors, driven by particular interests, compete over meanings 
and worldviews in order to secure the rights to their use. GIs and generics are social 
constructs and as signs their connotations differ from one region or territory to 
another. It is therefore important to problematize the taken-for-granted nature of 
opposing perspectives and analyze the processes of social and cultural construction 
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within political negotiations because the decisions made have concrete effects on the 
use cheese terms around the world and also affect the development of international 
regulations and markets.  
7.4. Policy recommendations and avenues for future research 
The international treatment of GGIs is likely to be controversial in the 
foreseeable future. Generics fall within conceptual and institutional ambiguities and 
their actual or potential value is what arouses controversies. The picture thus far is 
one of a disjuncture between entrenched political positions. The NW argues that 
generic use should be preserved and that EU actions are a protectionist device used 
to serve its own ends. On the other side, the EU argues that consumers need 
protection from lower quality counterfeit goods and legitimate producers need their 
rights upheld. And there are signs that such debates are heating up as the EU has 
recently entered transatlantic negotiations with the US, one of the main opponents to 
the protection of generic terms. Rising support and inflexibility on both sides is 
likely to lead to more deadlock and disagreement while opposing sides attempt to 
enshrine their own norms in the international arena. In practice it will depend on 
negotiations to arrive at compromise solutions for generics and GIs; however 
balancing competing interests will definitely be a challenge.  
Within this dispute difficult questions exist as to who has the right to use 
certain terms and what the place of culture and protection is in an increasingly 
borderless world. This is an issue about spheres of interest, market share, barriers to 
entry, but also perceived heritage and tradition is very strong. For example, should 
producers be able to recapture names? And are food cultures destined to become 
immovable and fixed entities forever rooted to the place of origin? This is reflective 
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of the paradoxical effect of globalization which has over time expanded the material 
and symbolic reach of food cultures and at the same time triggered attempts to re-
localize them. Paralleling this has been the dramatic rise of global dairy industries 
and the continued formation of intellectual property rights through GIs. 
Globalization and the expansion of world trade have also led to increased demands 
for international rules on generics as a means to protect and enhance market share in 
cheese. 
Numerous actors have called for the creation of a methodology for 
determining genericity, clearer definitions, and lists. This will become increasingly 
important as global competitiveness and growing world market share are the primary 
goals of both sides. But such requests raise other tough questions. For example, in 
order to prove genericity at the global level would it be sufficient to show that the 
production and consumption of a product is larger than in the country of origin? Or 
would it be necessary to carry out consumer tests in each individual country? And if 
so, in how many member countries would it be necessary to come up with this 
evidence? Judging by the EU’s failed attempts to generate a list and the stagnated 
situation of Parmesan, widespread agreement at the global level could prove much 
more difficult.  
Nevertheless, it is high time to move beyond this inflexibility. In view of the 
highly controversial nature of a small number of terms and potential to anger trading 
partners the EU might do well to forgo their global pursuance through bilateral and 
other agreements. In doing so they might be able to secure better protection for other 
key agricultural GIs. At the same time, NW countries will need to recognize the 
specificity of many European names and not necessarily assume that their outside 
use constitutes genericity. Giving up the use of minor or minimally-used GIs might 
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make the EU more amenable to agreement on more important and widely-used 
generic terms. It may also become necessary to formulate a generic register, similar 
to the EU’s request for a GI register, whereby countries agree that certain widely-
used terms will remain unprotected.  
Using case study, the goal of this research was to present a comprehensive 
portrayal of the relationships and processes constituting GGI politics rather than 
focusing on generalizability and causation in order to inform practice, establish the 
value, and generate better understanding of the issue. But while the use of cheese as 
a lens, and specifically the cases of Parmesan and Cheddar, are important for their 
own sake, they are at the same time not prevented from informing related concerns 
surrounding the genericity of other products. Thus, the topics covered in this thesis 
raise further interesting questions and offer opportunities for avenues of future 
research. Specific interrogations that could be explored might include how 
genericism goes beyond cheese and impacts other product categories. It is evident, 
for example, that conflicting terms and interests exist within the meat industry. Other 
questions to ask might be how does genericism in the wine sector differ from that of 
cheese? Also, is there such a thing as, if not a somewhat contradictory notion, 
varieties of ‘genericisms’ that impact differently across these product categories? 
Furthermore, the gastro-panic framework discussed in the third course could 
potentially be applied to other empirical cases within the food system. Gastro-panic 
involves the perceived and expressed anxiety over a wide range of elements in the 
food system, how this concern is manifested in political and public discourse, and 
the concrete effects it has. As such, it might usefully be applied as a lens to better 
understand the issue of GMOs where public fear over potential risks has led to 
changes in policy, the rhetoric of the Slow Food movement that seeks to protect food 
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cultures from the existential threat of globalization, or the political debate over food 
security and safety in general.  
Ultimately, it is important not to ignore the generic issue if further progress is 
to be made on the international regulation of GIs. Charles de Gaulle once pondered, 
“How do you govern a country that has 246 varieties of cheese?” (Ratcliffe 2011: 
118). Although this quote is cliché in the world of cheese writing it makes an 
important point when considered on a larger scale. How do you govern a global 
world that has thousands of varieties of cheese and those who produce it? This is a 
tricky and sensitive issue to be sure. As far as generics are concerned, the answer 
remains to be seen. The difficulty lies in reconciling territorial concepts, in the form 
of cheese names, in an increasingly interdependent world.  
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8. Appendices 
Appendix A. 
 
Cheeses registered in DOOR database 
Country Registered Published Applied 
France 50 4 9 
Italy 47 0 7 
Spain 28 1 4 
Greece 21 0 0 
UK 15 0 1 
Portugal 12 0 0 
Germany 7 0 4 
Austria 6 0 0 
Netherlands 6 0 1 
Slovakia 6 1 3 
Poland 5 0 0 
Slovenia 4 0 0 
Czech Republic 3 0 0 
Denmark 2 2 0 
Belgium 1 0 0 
Ireland 1 0 0 
Lithuania 1 1 0 
Sweden 1 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 1 
SUB-TOTAL 216 9 30 
    
TOTAL 255   
    
 
PDO, PGI, and TSG product breakdown 
Product Type Number Registered 
Fruit, vegetables and 
cereals fresh or 
pressed 
382 (PDO 155/PGI 
227) 
Cheese 255 (PDO 209/PGI 
46) 
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Meat products 
(cooked, salted, 
smoked, etc.) 
179 (PDO 44/PGI 
135) 
Fresh meat (and 
offal) 
157 (PDO 38/PGI 
119) 
Oils and fats (butter, 
margarine, oil, etc.) 
134 (PDO 118/PGI 
16) 
Bread, pastry, cakes, 
confectionary, 
biscuits and other 
baker’s wares 
75 (PDO 5/PGI 70) 
Fresh fish, molluscs, 
and crustaceans and 
products derived 
therefrom 
46 (PDO 14/PGI 32)  
Other products of 
animal origin (eggs, 
honey, various dairy 
products except 
butter, etc.) 
43 (PDO 32/11) 
Beers 24 (PDO 0/PGI 24) 
Pasta 7 (PDO 0/PGI 7) 
Essential oils 4 (PDO 3/PGI 1) 
Natural gums and 
resins 
2 (PDO 2/PGI 0) 
Mustard paste 2 (PDO 0/PGI 2) 
Hay 1 (PDO 1/PGI 0) 
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Appendix B. 
 
Food Studies 
1) University programs 
 School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Food Studies Centre 
 Erasmus Mundus Programs such as the European Master in Food Studies, 
Food Identity Master and EM Food of Life 
 European Institute for the History and Culture of Food (IEHCA) at 
Université François Rabelais, Tours 
 Food Systems, Culture and Society at the University of Catalonia 
 Anthropology of Food at Indiana University 
 Food Studies degrees or focuses at NYU Steinhardt, Chatham University, 
City University of New York, the New School, the University of Oregon, 
Marylhurst University, New Mexico State University, the University of 
Adelaide, Concordia University, The Umbra Institute 
 Gastronomy at Boston University 
 The University of Gastronomic Sciences 
2) Associations, societies and networks 
 British Sociological Association (BSA) Food Study Group 
 The Oxford Martin Programme on the Future of Food 
 Oxford Symposium on Food and Cookery 
 Association for the Study of Food and Society (ASFS) 
 Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society (AFHVS) 
 Canadian Association for Food Studies (CAFN) 
 Australian Food, Society and Culture Network 
 The Food Studies Knowledge Community 
 The Agrifood Research Network 
 Gustolab 
3) Academic journals and texts 
 Gastronomica: The Journal of Food and Culture 
 Food, Culture and Society 
 Food Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 
 British Library Food Studies collections 
 Encyclopedia of Food and Culture (2003) by Solomon H. Katz and William 
Woys Weaver 
 The Cambridge World History of Food (2000) by Kenneth F. Kiple and 
Kriemhild Coneè Ornelas 
 Routledge International Handbook of Food Studies (2013) edited by Ken 
Albala 
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 Food Studies: An Introduction to Research Methods (2010) by Jeff Miller 
and Jonathon Deutsch 
 Critical Perspectives in Food Studies (2012) by Mustafa Koç, Jennifer 
Sumner, Anthony Winson, and Tony Winson 
 Food: The Key Concepts (2008) by Warren Belasco 
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Appendix C. 
Total foodstuffs by country 
Country Registered, Published, 
or Applied 
Italy 298 
France 239 
Spain 201 
Portugal 137 
Greece 106 
Germany 97 
UK 61 
Czech Republic 29 
Poland 28 
Slovenia 23 
Austria 16 
Belgium 15 
Croatia 14 
Hungary 13 
Slovakia 13 
Netherlands 11 
Denmark 9 
Finland 7 
Ireland 5 
Lithuania 5 
Sweden 5 
Luxembourg 4 
Bulgaria 3 
Romania 3 
Cyprus 2 
Latvia 2 
Estonia 0 
Malta 0 
TOTAL 1375 (PDO 576/PGI 605) 
Source: European Commission (2014) DOOR database 
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Appendix D. 
Cheeses protected in international trade agreements* 
EU Claw-
back 
Proposal 
(2003) 
 
EU-Korea 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(2011) 
 
EU-China 
Geographical 
Indications 
(2012) 
 
Trade Agreement 
Between the EU 
and Colombia 
and Peru (2012) 
 
EU-Moldova 
Association 
Agreement 
(2013)  
EU-Singapore 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(2013) 
 
Asiago Asiago Comté Brie de Meaux 
 
Allgäuer 
Emmentaler 
Asiago 
 
Comté Brie de 
Meaux 
Grana Padano Camembert de 
Normandie 
Asiago  Brie de Meaux 
Feta Camembert 
de 
Normandie 
Roquefort Comté 
 
Brie de 
Meaux 
Camembert de 
Normandie 
Fontina Comté West Country 
Farmhouse 
Cheddar 
Danablu 
 
Brie de 
Melun 
Comté 
 
Gorgonzola Emmental 
de Savoie 
White Stilton 
Cheese/Blue 
Stilton 
Cheese 
Emmental de 
Savoie 
Caciocavallo 
Silano 
Danablu 
 
Grana 
Padano 
Feta  Feta 
 
Camembert 
de 
Normandie 
Emmental de 
Savoie 
Manchego Fontina  Gorgonzola Comté Feta 
Mozarella 
di Bufala 
Campana 
Grana 
Padano 
 Grana Padano Danablu Fontina 
Parmigiano 
Reggiano 
Gorgonzola  Idiazábal 
 
Emmental de 
Savoie 
Gorgonzola 
 
Pecorino 
Romano 
Mahón-
Menorca 
 Parmigiano 
Reggiano 
 
Emmental 
français est – 
central 
Époisses 
Grana Padano 
 
Queijo São 
Jorge 
Mozzarella 
di Bufala 
Campana 
 Provolone 
Valpadana 
 
Feta 
 
Mahón-
Menorca 
Reblochon Parmigiano 
Reggiano 
 Queijo Serra da 
Estrela 
Fontina Mozzarella di 
Bufala 
Campana 
Roquefort Pecorino 
Romano 
 Reblochon 
 
Gorgonzola Parmigiano 
Reggiano 
 Provolone 
Valpadana 
 Roquefort 
 
Mahón – 
Menorca 
Pecorino 
Romano 
 Queijo de 
São Jorge 
 Taleggio 
 
Mozzarella di 
Bufala 
Campana 
Pecorino Sardo 
 
 Queso 
Manchego 
  Munster; 
Munster - 
Géromé  
Pecorino 
Toscano 
 
 Reblochon   Neufchâtel Provolone 
Valpadana 
 Roquefort   Noord - 
Hollandse 
Edammer 
Queijo S. Jorge 
 
 Taleggio   Noord - 
Hollandse 
Gouda  
Queso 
Manchego 
    Parmigiano 
Reggiano 
Reblochon / 
Reblochon de 
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Savoie 
    Pecorino di 
Filiano 
Roquefort 
 
    Pecorino 
Romano 
Taleggio 
    Pecorino 
Sardo 
 
    Pecorino 
Siciliano 
 
    Pecorino 
Toscano 
 
    Provolone 
Valpadana 
 
    Provolone 
del Monaco 
 
    Queijo S. 
Jorge 
 
    Queijo Serpa  
    Queso 
Manchego 
 
    Reblochon; 
Reblochon de 
Savoie 
 
    Roquefort  
    Ricotta 
Romana 
 
    Taleggio  
    West 
Country 
Farmhouse 
Cheddar  
 
    White Stilton 
Cheese; Blue 
Stilton 
Cheese 
 
Sources: Council Decision 2011/265/EU, Council Decision of 3 December 2012, 
European Commission 2013, European Commission 2012c, European Commission 
2012d 
* All cheese names protected are listed except for in the EU-Moldova Association 
Agreement due to the large number of terms. 
 
Number of cheeses protected by country 
Member 
State 
EU-Korea EU-
Colombia 
and Peru 
EU-
Singapore 
Total 
Italy 9 5 11 25 
France 6 6 6 18 
Spain 2 1 2 5 
Portugal 1 1 1 3 
Greece 1 1 1 3 
Denmark 0 1 1 2 
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